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Abstract 
This study explores the question whether share repurchases are an integral part of US and UK 
firms’ financial decision-making, or whether they are merely an afterthought and therefore 
not systematically related to managers’ principal financial decisions, namely dividends, 
investment and leverage. It aims to address concerns that share repurchases might be 
detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment (FINNOV, 2012) and can lead 
to the excessive leverage of companies (Foroohar, 2013). As the US and the UK display 
differences in terms of the legal and institutional environment, the first two chapters focus in 
the US and the UK respectively. The US findings indicate that share repurchases are driven 
not merely by free cash flows, but also by decisions about investment and dividends, and 
both dividends and investments are in turn affected by share repurchases. The fact that these 
results hold both for the period before and subsequent to the credit crunch suggests that 
share repurchases have become an essential consideration when managers take financial 
decisions in large US firms. By contrast, the UK research fails to show a consistent interaction 
between share repurchases and investment. Moreover, the findings suggest that share 
repurchases are being used as a complementary form of payout and not as a substitute. 
Considering the differences in the results from the first and second empirical chapter, the 
question arises, whether these are due to differences in the sample characteristics, as the 
size of S&P 500 companies tends to much larger than that of FTSE All Share Index 
companies, or whether they reflect country-specific institutional differences. This question is 
explored in the third empirical chapter. This research supports the contention that national 
differences in terms of regulatory frameworks and the development of financial markets can 
affect corporate decision-making (e.g. Bennedsen and Nielsen 2010, La Porta et al. 2000). 
More specifically, country specific factors appear to lead to a lower use of share repurchases 
in the UK possibly due to the stricter regulatory framework. In addition, UK firms seem to try 
to maintain higher dividend payout ratios than their US counterparts, which can be attributed 
to a culture of high dividend payouts. These differences seem to explain the non-integration 
of share repurchases into UK firms’ financial decision-making. Therefore, without considering 
country specific factors, it is not feasible to generalise economist concerns that share 
repurchases can be detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment (FINNOV, 
2012) and for leading to the excessive leverage of companies (Foroohar, 2011). 
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1. Introduction 
Share repurchases have become increasingly commonplace during the last two 
decades both in the US and in the UK. More specifically, in the US the majority 
of publicly listed firms distribute funds both through dividends and share 
repurchases (Floyd et al. 2013), and in 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2006 the 
annual level of share repurchases actually surpassed that of cash dividends 
(Dittmar 2008). Throughout the 1990s UK firms exhibited Europe’s largest 
share repurchase activity, accounting for between 60% and 80% of EU share 
repurchases (Rau and Vermaelen 2002; Stonham 2002). Dhanani and Roberts 
(2009) report that in the UK share repurchases rose from £10 billion in the 
late 1990s to £46 billion in 2006, while the number of listed companies buying 
back shares rose from 14% in 1997 to 58% in 2006.  
So far, there has been a wide range of research, which focused on the motives 
behind share repurchases and their effect on the repurchasing firms’ value 
(Allen and Michaely, 2002). Findings from this research tend to agree on three 
main motives. Firms buy back their shares as an investment decision to take 
advantage of potential undervaluation, to distribute excess capital and to 
mitigate the dilution effect of stock options (Dittmar 2000; Brav et al. 2005; 
Chan et al. 2007; Dixon et al. 2008; Dhanani and Roberts 2009; Young and 
Yang 2011). Moreover, research in various markets consistenlty suggests that 
share repurchase announcements and actual repurchases are followed by 
abnormal positive returns (Kahle 2002; Oswald and Young 2004; Wang et al. 
2009).  
However, the related research has failed to address the impact of share 
repurchases on other financial decisions. Previous literature has highlighted 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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the importance of the interactions between key financial decisions, such as 
investment, leverage and corporate pay-out policies (see McCabe 1979; 
Jensen et al. 1992; Barclay et al. 1995; Noronha et al. 1996; Crutchley et al. 
1999; Faulkender et al. 2006; Ding and Murinde, 2010; Aggarwan and Kyaw 
2010). Faulkender et al. (2006, p.1) argues that ’’the literature has treated 
dividend policy and capital structure as two distinct choices, even though there 
is reason to believe that there are common factors affecting both’’. Similarly, 
Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010, pp.142) argue that ’’because of the 
interdependence between dividend policy and capital structure, empirical 
studies of capital structure … are most likely mis-specified unless they include 
an assessment of dividend policy’’. This issue was highlighted already in 1979 
by McCabe (1979) who argued that firms have access to limited funds, which 
managers allot to either dividend payments and/or investments. This suggests 
that capital structure, payout and investment policy are interdependent. 
However, present research in the area has so far largely failed to take account 
of this interdependence (e.g Huang and Song 2006; Li and Zhao 2008; Brown 
and Sum 2010). While there has been research into the relationship e.g. 
between share repurchases and dividend pay-outs (see Jagannathan et al. 
2000; Grullon and Michaely 2002) so far it appears that there has been no 
research which investigates the possible interaction between share 
repurchases and other key financial decisions such as investment and 
leverage. Therefore, given the increased economic importance of share 
repurchases this study aims to fill this relevant gap in the literature. Such a 
study is of particular importance given publicly voiced concerns regarding the 
use of share repurchases. EU, similar to US firms, have been criticized to use 
share buybacks as a mean to recycle capital and to prop up share prices 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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instead of investing in capital expenditures and promoting growth (Laurent, 
2015). Moreover, this form of payout has been associated with distorted 
incentives such as to mitigate the EPS dilution effect of stock options and has 
been argued to undermine productive investment (see FINNOV, 2012 a,b) and 
lead to the excessive leverage of companies (Foroohar, 2013). As this 
research, aims to provide empirical evidence regarding these concerns, its 
findings are expected to be of importance to regulators and investors alike. 
The relationship between share repurchases and investment is of particular 
importance to regulators as well as long-term investors as a negative effect 
might limit funds available for investment thus harming economic recovery. If 
indeed, such concerns are substantiated regulatory authorities might consider 
a stricter regulatory framework regarding share repurchases. As firms’ 
behaviour might differ during booms and recessions, this research considers 
both the period before and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
In order to estimate our system of equations we employ a number of 
parametric and non-parametric estimations methods. In addition, to the 
traditional OLS,  we use two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) and three-stage 
Least Squares (3SLS). Gujarati (2004) suggests 2SLS and 3SLS, in the 
presence of endogeneity issues, however the author underlines the difficulty of 
finding valid instruments. Nevertheless, the use of 2SLS and 3SLS is common 
in studies which employ systems of equations (see McCabe. 1979; Jensen et 
al. 1992; Noronha et al. 1996; Crutchley et al. 1999; Ding and Murinde 2010; 
Aggarwan and Kyaw). However, 2SLS and 3SLS estimations often suffer from 
weak instrument issues while most studies which employ instrumental 
variables do not report tests regarding their validity (see Jensen et al. 1992; 
Noronha et al. 1996; Adedeji 1998; Crutchley et al. 1999; Ding and Murinde 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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2010, Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). Furthermore, regression results from some 
of the aforementioned studies (see McCabe 1979; Crutchley et al. 1999) 
suggest weak instrument issues. For example, McCabe uses stock’s beta as an 
instrument for dividends. His findings suggest that this is a weak instrument 
as it appears statistically insignificant in his estimations. Another example can 
be found in the study by Crutchley et al. (1999). The authors use sales growth 
and investment as instruments for dividends. Investment appears to be 
statistically insignificant and sales growth is not consistenlty1 statistically 
significant. However, instrument validity is not usually discussed or tested. 
This might be due to the difficulty of finding valid instruments underlined by 
Gujarati (2004).  Woolridge (2006) underlines invalid instruments can produce 
poorer results than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), since the relevant 2SLS and 
3SLS estimators can have large standard errors and large asymptotic bias. 
Therefore, in order to consider the robustness of the results, this study also 
employs OLS and two non-parametric estimation techniques, specifically 
median regressions and regressions with bootstrapped standard errors. The 
use of non-parametric estimation techniques is also expected to address 
normality issues in financial data. 
As financial decisions are considered long-term decisions, we follow the 
previous literature and consider financial decision-making over time. 
Therefore, average values are used as these more closely reflect  the long-
term nature of these key financial decisions (see Adedeji, 1998). 
                                       
1 The authors investigate simultaneity between leverage, dividends, insider and 
institutional ownership in two periods 1987 and 1993. Sales growth is statistically 
insignificant in the 1987 estimations. 
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In addition, the credit crunch offers this study a unique period to test the 
integration of share repurchases into financial decision-making. The period 
before the credit crunch was characterized by a relative high amount of 
liquidity in the market whereas the period after low growth opportunities and 
illiquidity. It might be that share repurchases are a complementary non-core 
financial decision associated with high liquidity and likely to be marginalized in 
periods of financial uncertainty and illiquidity. Therefore, this research 
considers the period both before and after the credit crunch and more 
specifically 2005-11. Taking into account that the recession originated in Q.2 
2008 (see Figure 3), this period is divided into two subsamples 2005-2008 and 
2008-2011. Keeping this in mind and assuming the long-term nature of 
financial decisions, we expect that during 2008 many firms readjusted their 
financial policies in light of the liquidity crisis triggered by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the 2008-2009 recession. Thus, 
2008 is included in both periods. 
Therefore, in order to address both the lack of research into the relationship 
between share repurchases, dividends as well as investment and leverage and 
concerns about misspecification in previous research into financial decision-
making, this study initially investigates jointly capital structure, payout and 
investment policies within a system of equations using a sample of large US 
companies. As share repurchases are especially prevalent in the USA, both in 
terms of magnitude and frequency (Dittmar 2008, Floyd et al. 2013), US firms 
are particularly likely to integrate share repurchase programs systematically 
into their financial decision-making. Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis 
investigates the interactions between share repurchases and dividends, 
investment and leverage in the US market. The findings indicate that both in 
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the period before and after the credit crunch key financial decisions about 
share repurchases, dividends and investment were interrelated. Specifically, 
we document a robust negative relationship between share repurchases and 
investment. This suggests that US managers consider share repurchases as an 
important alternative to investment when they set their corporate policies. 
This finding appears to provide empirical support for concerns that share 
repurchases might undermine productive investment (Lazonick 2008; FINNOV 
2012).  
However, it is not feasible to generalise the US findings because they could be 
related e.g. to culture, managerial experience or differences in financial, labour 
and capital markets (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et al. 1996; Short and 
Keasey 1999; La Porta et al. 2000 Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 2005; 
Bennedsen and Nielsen 2010). As different institutional settings might produce 
different results, the next chapter investigates the integration of share 
repurchases into another market where share repurchases are well 
established, namely the UK.  
The UK is the ideal market to further this study because of two reasons. First, 
share repurchases are comparatively well established in the UK. Secondly, the 
UK displays a number of differences compared to the US regarding its 
institutional and regulatory environment. In addition, due to the magnitude 
and frequency of share repurchases in the UK economists have expressed 
similar concerns, as in the US, regarding the impact of share repurchases on 
investment (FINNOV, 2012 a, b). In the EU, similar to the USA, firms have 
been criticized to use share buybacks as a mean to recycle capital and to prop 
up share prices instead of investing in capital expenditures and promoting 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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growth (Laurent, 2015). Critics (see FINNOV, 2012 a, b) argue that, as share 
repurchases reduce the number of shares outstanding, managers might use 
share repurchases primarily to manipulate firm’s earnings per share (EPS) 
ratios, as earnings are distributed across a lower number of shares. Therefore, 
an investigation regarding the relationship between share repurchases and 
investment is equally important in the UK. Moreover, research in the UK has 
not provided clear empirical evidence whether or not UK firms substitute 
dividends for share repurchases. Therefore, considering the frequency and 
magnitude of share repurchases in the UK, the aforementioned interrelations 
in financial decision-making are of concern to UK policy makers and long-term 
investors.  
Like in the US case, these interrelations are examined in the UK for both the 
pre and crisis period, specifically (2005-08 and 2008-11). The relationship 
between both forms of payout, dividends and share repurchases, and 
investment is of particular importance in the post crisis period as there have 
been concerns that the diversion of funds from investment to payouts can be 
harmful in periods of economic recovery (Griffiths and Wall 2007; FINNOV 
2012).  
The findings from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that there are similarities but also 
significant differences in the factors that drive key financial decisions, in 
particular share repurchases, between the USA and the UK. As far as 
similarities are concerned, in both the US and the UK we document a negative 
interdependence between dividends and investment. Moreover, in both 
countries share repurchases do not seem to influence firms’ capital structure. 
However, while for the USA the findings provide evidence that share 
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repurchases have become an integral part of large firms’ financial decision-
making, this does not appear to be the case for the UK.  
In the US, share repurchases seem to be driven not merely by free cash flows 
but also by decisions about investment and dividends, and both dividends and 
investments are in turn affected by share repurchases. This indicates that 
share repurchases have become an essential consideration when managers 
take financial decisions in large US firms. Moreover, the fact that these results 
hold both for the period before and subsequent to the credit crunch suggests 
that, while firms’ overall pay-out ratios fell, in general the credit crunch did not 
lead managers to marginalize share repurchases over dividend payments or 
vice versa. The robust negative interaction between share repurchases and 
investment suggests that concerns that share repurchases can undermine 
productive investment (see FINNOV, 2012) are substantiated for the US 
market. 
In general, the UK findings suggest that share repurchases are not 
systematically related to managers’ other principal financial decisions. In 
contrast to the USA, in the UK, the negative interaction between share 
repurchases and investment is not consistent as it holds only for the pre-crisis 
period. Therefore, concerns that share repurchases might withdraw funds from 
productive investment, especially significant in times of economic recession 
and recovery seem not to be substantiated in the case of the UK.  
In addition, the UK research does not support interdependence between 
dividends and share repurchases. Instead, UK managers appear to use share 
repurchases as a flexible mean to reduce free cash flows and/or to fund stock 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
15 
 
options. The findings therefore indicate that in the UK share repurchases are 
not used a dividend substitute.  
The aforementioned differences might suggest that national differences in the 
development of capital, financial and goods markets as well as regulatory 
frameworks and corporate governance systems can influence corporate 
behaviour (see Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et al. 1996; Short and Keasey 
1999; La Porta et al. 2000 Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 2005; Bennedsen and 
Nielsen 2010). However, documented differences could also be attributed to 
firm characteristics. For example, in this research we draw on a US sample of 
non-financial companies included in the S&P 500 index, whereas the UK 
sample draws on non-financial companies included in the FTSE All Share 
Index. Consequently, firms in the US sample are on average significantly 
larger than the firms in the UK sample. Even if we would curtail the UK sample 
to the FTSE 100 index, a noticeable size difference between the firms in the 
two different samples would be maintained. So, the resulting question is if the 
US-UK differences can be attributed to country specific factors or different firm 
characteristics due to sample choice. 
Therefore, in the fifth chapter, this study investigates whether differences 
between the US and UK results are driven by firm characteristics or by country 
specific differences. This research seems worthwhile, as it will contribute to 
knowledge by indicating the degree to which different cultural, structural or 
regulatory reasons influence corporate behaviour or whether US-UK 
differences can be explained by firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size. 
This is expected to be of importance to regulators and investors especially in 
the case of the integration of share repurchases into financial decision-making. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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If such factors do indeed influence corporate behaviour then economists’ 
concerns that share repurchases can be detrimental to firms’ ability to create 
value through investment (FINNOV, 2012) should not be generalized.  
The findings from Chapter 5 suggest that country specific factors lead to a 
lower use of share repurchases in the UK possibly, due to the stricter 
regulatory framework as supported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002). Moreover, 
UK firms, all else equal, seem to try to maintain higher dividend payout ratios 
than their US counterparts. This might be attributed to a culture of high 
dividend payouts in the UK as well as the reluctance of managers to reduce 
these (see Bond et al. 1996; Allen and Michaely 2003; Griffiths and Wall 2007; 
Cook 2014). Finally, the UK environment seems to have lead to comparatively 
more levered firms despite the stricter bankruptcy code in the UK. This might 
be associated with the historically higher UK dividend payout ratios. As firms’ 
cash flows fluctuate, UK firms may have used relatively higher debt financing 
in order to sustain the higher dividend payout ratios. It seems that differences 
in country specific factors can affect the integration of share repurchases in 
financial decision-making and explain discrepancies between the US and UK 
findings.  
Summarizing, this thesis provides empirical evidence that share repurchases 
are an integral part of US managers’ financial decision-making. Specifically, it 
provides evidence of a negative interdependence between share repurchases, 
dividends and investment in US firms. Thus, it appears that share repurchases 
are taken into consideration by US managers when financial policies are set. In 
particular the finding that share repurchases and investment in US firms are 
negatively related underlines existing concerns that in the US share 
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repurchases can have a negative impact on firm investment, which might be 
detrimental not only to the long-term growth of individual companies but the 
economy as a whole.  
In addition, the findings suggest that this is not the case with UK firms. Share 
repurchases seem not to be integrated into UK firms’ financial decision-
making. The UK findings suggest only interdependence between dividends and 
investment. Therefore, economist concerns that share repurchases might 
undermine productive investment are not substantiated for the UK market.  
The findings from the fifth chapter suggest that the reason for differences 
regarding the integration of share repurchases into US and UK financial 
decision-making is differences in country specific factors such as the 
regulatory and institutional environment. These findings are expected to be of 
importance to regulators and investors alike considering the increasing 
economic importance of share repurchases and the related concerns regarding 
their impact on firms’ financial decision-making. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses extant 
capital structure and payout policy theories and identifies links between capital 
structure, dividends, share repurchases and investment. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the integration of share repurchases in large non-financial US firms’ financial 
decision-making. It begins by providing a review of relevant payout and capital 
structure theories and identifies possible relations regarding capital structure, 
dividend payout, share repurchases and investment in the US market. 
Consequently, a description of the data and an explanation of the chosen 
research methodology are provided. This is followed by a description and 
interpretation of the empirical results and the conclusion.  
Chapter 2. Literature review 
18 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the integration of share repurchases in UK firms’ 
financial decision-making. Chapter 4 begins by discussing financial decision-
making in the UK. This is followed by a description of the data and the chosen 
research methodology. Consequently, the UK empirical results are described 
and interpreted, before the chapter concludes. 
Chapter 5 investigates whether differences between the US and UK results are 
driven by country specific differences or by differences in firm characteristics. 
It begins by discussing country-specific differences between the US and the UK 
in terms of bankruptcy, tax codes and corporate governance. Because of 
differences in the development and the impact of the financial crisis, it will 
consider the impact of the financial crisis on both countries. In addition, 
Chapter 5 will consider how the aforementioned differences influenced the 
financial decisions under investigation. This is followed by a description of the 
data and the chosen research methodology. Consequently, the empirical 
results are described and interpreted followed by the conclusion. 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate decision-making regarding capital structure and dividend policy has 
puzzled finance scholars for a number of decades. Up to now, research into 
these two key areas of Corporate Finance has led to the development of a 
number of significant theories and empirical studies. However, both the 
’’Capital Structure Puzzle’’ (Myers, 1984) and ’’Dividend Puzzle’’ (Black, 1976) 
remain unsolved. The determination of these two policies is amongst the most 
basic managerial duties. Therefore, further research in this area is worthwhile. 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
19 
 
The importance of payout policy to managers and investors alike is underlined 
by Allen and Michaely (2003) who highlight the need to repeat and reevaluate 
this decision over time, the substantial amounts of money involved and the 
interaction of payout policy with other firm’s financial decisions (e.g. 
investment). Capital structure decisions can be considered equally important 
due to their interaction with investment and payout decisions. 
Research in both areas has followed an almost identical path as the ’’Capital 
Structure Irrelevance’’ and the ’’Dividend Irrelevance’’ theorems of Modigliani 
and Miller (hereafter M&M) in 1958 and 1961 respectively, heavily influenced 
it. The main idea of Modigliani and Miller was that real value could not be 
created just by a financing or payout policy decision but only through a firm’s 
operations and choice of investment projects. However, the two theorems are 
based on a rather unrealistic set of conditions where among others there are 
no transaction costs, no taxes, no agency and bankruptcy costs and all 
investors share the same information. From that point onwards, researchers 
have focused on lifting these assumptions and investigating the resulting 
effects. This has led to a number of significant theories for capital structure 
and dividend policy, each derived from the relaxing of one or more of 
Modigliani and Miller restrictions. Even though these theories and their related 
empirical studies provide us with valuable insights and describe at least some 
aspect of the firms’ financial decision-making, they often have empirical 
shortcomings (Barclay et al. 1995; De Angelo and De Angelo 2007). An 
example regarding one of the most dominant capital structure theories, the 
Pecking Order theory, is provided by Myers (1984). The Pecking Order theory 
suggests that firms prefer debt financing to equity financing due to its lower 
asymmetric information costs. However, Myers (1984) points out that the 
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Pecking Order theory cannot fully explain reality, as there are cases when 
equity was issued when debt financing was available.  
Furthermore, the well-documented rise of share repurchases as an important 
payout mechanism in the US and the UK has made the task of explaining 
financial decision-making in firms’ behaviour even more complex. A body of 
literature (see Allen and Michaely 2002; Oswald and Young 2004; Dhanani and 
Roberts 2009) which often borrowed theories from dividend policy tries to 
explain the phenomenon of share repurchases. Research in this area seems to 
have identified some possible share repurchase determinants (Ditmmar 2000; 
Bancel et al. 2005; Dhanani and Roberts 2009). Firms use share repurchases 
as an investment decision to take advantage of potential undervaluation, to 
distribute free cash flows and to mitigate the dilution effect of stock options 
(Dittmar 2000; Brav et al. 2005; Chan et al. 2007; Dixon et al. 2008; Dhanani 
and Roberts 2009; Young and Yang 2011). Since free cash flows can be 
distributed via dividend payouts, a number of authors suggest that share 
repurchases are used as dividend substitutes. However, existing research has 
not provided us with a clear answer on whether this is the case.  
An important observation regarding the abovementioned research and its 
efficiency is that the majority of theoretical and empirical literature has tried to 
explain corporate financial policies independently from each other. Faulkender 
et al. (2006, p.1) argues that ’’the literature has treated dividend policy and 
capital structure as two distinct choices, even though there is reason to believe 
that there are common factors affecting both’’. Similarly, Aggarwal and Kyaw 
(2010, pp.142) argue that ’’because of the interdependence between dividend 
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policy and capital structure, empirical studies of capital structure … are most 
likely mis-specified unless they include an assessment of dividend policy’’.  
McCabe (1979) who argued that firms have access to limited funds, which 
managers allot to either dividend payments and/or investments, highlighted 
this issue already in 1979. This suggests that capital structure, payout and 
investment policy are interdependent. However, present research in the area 
has so far largely failed to take account of this interdependence (e.g Huang 
and Song 2006; Li and Zhao, 2008; Brown and Sum 2010). 
As previously highlighted, from a theoretical perspective, the most famous 
theories which explored the determinants of capital structure and dividend 
policies largely focused on lifting the very restrictive assumptions Modigliani 
and Miller (1958; 1961) proposed to justify their “Capital Structure 
Irrelevance’’ and ’’Dividend Irrelevance’’ theorems (see table 1). 
Table 1 Capital Structure and Payout Policy theories 
 Asymmetric 
information 
Agency costs Taxes 
(corporate and 
personal, dividend 
and capital gains) 
Capital 
Structure 
The Pecking Order 
Theory 
Agency theory 
and the theory of 
free cash flows 
Trade Off theory 
Dividends Signaling theory Agency theory 
and the theory of 
free cash flows 
Tax Clientele theory 
Share 
Repurchases 
Signaling theory Agency theory 
and the theory of 
free cash flows 
Tax Clientele theory 
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As Faulkender et al. (2006) and Aggarwan and Kyaw (2010) underline some of 
these theories are applicable to two or more of the financial policies under 
consideration. 
Pecking Order theory (Myers, 1984), for instance, links capital structure and 
dividend policy as it hypothesizes that firms adjust their dividend payments 
while considering retained earnings and investment opportunities. 
Agency theory can also be used to establish a link between capital structure 
and dividend policy. Easterbrook (1984) for example suggests that firms pay 
out dividends although this means that they consequently have to issue equity 
or debt in order to fund new investment opportunities. Issuing dividends 
reduces the free cash flow in a company, which decreases the possibility for 
opportunistic behaviour by managers or inside blockholders. If firms never-
the-less require additional capital to pursue profitable investment 
opportunities, they need to convince investors of the profitability of these 
projects. Both factors serve to reduce the agency costs in firms. 
Only a comparatively few papers (McCabe 1979; Jensen et al. 1992; Barclay 
et al. 1995; Noronha et al. 1996; Crutchley et al. 1999; Faulkender et al. 
2006; Ding and Murinde 2010; Aggarwan and Kyaw, 2010) draw on these 
considerations to investigate jointly, capital structure and dividend policy. 
Studies which examine the possibility that capital structure and dividend policy 
are simultaneously determined are even rarer (e.g. Noronha et al. 1996; 
Crutchley et al. 1999; Ding and Murinde 2010), though their findings generally 
support the contention that capital structure and dividend policy are 
interdependent. 
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However, none of these studies includes share repurchases in their modeling. 
While historically dividends represent the most common and widely used 
method of payout, as discussed earlier, more recently importance of share 
repurchases for corporate payout policies has noticeably increased2, both in 
the USA and in the UK (DeAngelo et al. 2008; Dhanani and Roberts 2009). It 
is therefore highly probable that previous models used to investigate these 
financial decisions are misspecified and suffer from endogeneity problems 
(Aggarwan and Kyaw, 2010). Moreover, since there are common factors 
affecting two or more of the financial decisions, the resulting spurious 
correlations can lead to inappropriate causality inferences (Jensen et al. 1992; 
Faulkender et al. 2006). This study accounts for share repurchases and the 
interdependence in financial decision-making thus dealing with the 
aforementioned methodological concerns. 
The magnitude and frequency of share repurchases has lead to economists’ 
concerns that share repurchases might undermine productive investment (see 
Laurent 2015; FINNOV 2012). Specifically, US and EU firms have been 
criticized to use share buybacks as a mean to recycle capital and propping up 
share prices instead of investing in CAPEX and promoting growth (Laurent, 
2015). However, the impact of share repurchases on investment so far 
remains unaddressed. The impact of share repurchases on investment is of 
particular importance in the light of the financial crisis originating in 2007/08 
                                       
2 More specifically, as (De Angelo et al. 2008) point out, the value of both gross and net 
share repurchases surpassed that of cash dividends after 2000 in the US. For the UK 
Dhanani and Roberts (2009, pp. 1) report that : 
  
’’In the UK, repurchase activity… rose to an annual spend of 10 
billion in the late 1990s, approximately eight times higher than that 
a decade earlier (Lasfer, 1998). Repurchase activity continued to 
soar during the first few years of the21st century, and it is estimated 
that in 2006 British companies spent a record 46 billion on buying 
back their shares(Durrant, 2007), a remarkable growth rate of 64% 
on the previous year.. ).’’ 
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as any diversion of funds from investment to share repurchases can negatively 
influence economic recovery. Furthermore, falling demand, limited access to 
external finance and falling income as well as the lack of investment 
opportunities are all expected to have a direct effect on firms’ investment, 
capital structure, share repurchases and dividends decisions. Therefore, this 
study investigates the interrelations between share repurchases and key 
financial decisions, in the US and the UK, for both the pre and crisis period, 
specifically (2005-08 and 2008-11). This methodology is used in order to 
check if the impact of share repurchases on other financial decisions holds 
irrespective of different macroeconomic conditions. By observing possible 
differences in the reactions of US firms and UK firms to the 2007/08 financial 
crisis, we hope to gain more insight into their financial decision-making. We 
expect the impact of the financial crisis on companies in the US and the UK to 
differ because of their different institutional and economic environments and 
the different scales of government interventions. The understanding of 
corporate behaviour in terms of its financial decisions especially during a crisis 
might be worthwhile to regulatory authorities. 
Therefore, it seems that research into the relationship between dividend 
payouts and share repurchases, capital structure decisions and investment is a 
timely endeavor. 
More specifically this research project aims to contribute to filling the gaps in 
the literature mentioned so far by investigating the following questions: 
 To which degree are capital structure, payout and investment decisions of 
firms interdependent? Are share repurchases and dividend substitutes? Are 
payouts and investment competing uses of funds? 
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In this context, the research will explore alternative methods to model this 
interdependence, in order to investigate how far these decisions are 
simultaneously determined and whether the use of simultaneous equation 
modeling can help develop our understanding of these issues. 
 When the interdependence of decisions about capital structure, payout and 
investment is taken into account, is there a dominant theory that can help to 
explain firms’ decisions in this area? 
In order to facilitate this research we will in particular investigate, what are 
the most influential factors that affect capital structure and payout policy 
decisions. To identify relevant factors we will draw on a review of historical 
and recent relevant theories and empirical research. 
 Initially, this research focuses on US listed non-financial companies. However, 
as a second stage we use a sample of UK listed non-financial firms to explore 
whether there are significant differences in capital markets that use share 
repurchases. Since this is the case, we investigate whether these can be 
explained by cultural, structural, regulatory and/or other reasons. 
 Has corporate behaviour in terms of capital structure and payout policy been 
affected by the global recession originating in 2008? If yes, how did firms 
readjust their capital structure, investment and payout policies? 
Since repurchases can be used as a mechanism to support falling prices and 
enhance market liquidity, it will be interesting to observe how firms with 
different characteristics such as growth opportunities and cash reserves 
responded to the credit crunch.  
Summarizing, this study aims to contribute to our knowledge about 
companies’ financial decision-making in the following ways: 
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 This study will belong to only a limited number of empirical studies that 
investigate jointly capital structure and payout policy. Based on an extensive 
literature review it appears that this will be the first study, which will take 
account not only of dividend payments but also of share repurchases.  
 This study aims to improve our understanding of the validity of different 
historical and current theories in explaining capital structure and pay-out 
decision using recent data.  
 By investigating capital structure, dividends and share repurchases in two 
countries (USA, UK) we hope to contribute to our understanding how different 
cultural, structural or regulatory reasons influence these financial decisions. 
 The global recession originating in 2008 provides this study with a unique time 
framework. An observation of possible changes in the relative importance of 
the determinants of corporate financial decision-making, before and after 2008 
might provide us with more insight into corporate strategic behaviour 
The following section will begin by presenting the most influential theories and 
related empirical research regarding capital structure, dividends and share 
repurchases. By doing so it will help explain how these theories provide 
linkages between certain financial policies. The last part of this chapter will 
present a number of empirical studies that have evaluated jointly certain 
financial policies and investigated the possibility that they are simultaneously 
determined.  
2.2 Capital structure theories  
2.2.1 Introduction 
The term Capital Structure refers to the financing mix that firms utilize to fund 
their investments. This financing mix consists of equity, debt and hybrid 
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securities. A firm’s choice of a capital structure and especially its relationship 
to the firm’s value has been extensively discussed within the Corporate 
Finance literature. Two basic questions lie at the heart of this research. Does 
the capital structure choice affect firm value? If yes, is there an optimal capital 
structure?  
One of the most frequently cited and influential papers that attempted to 
answer the first question is Modigliani and Miller’s (M&M) (1958) ’’ The cost of 
capital. Corporation finance, and the theory of investment’’. Their famous 
’’irrelevance’’ proposition included in their 1958 paper, argues that the value of 
a firm is independent of its capital structure. The authors argue that value 
depends only on the success of the firm’s investments and its ’’real’’ 
operations. However, M&M (1958) come to this conclusion while assuming that 
certain unrealistic conditions are met. More specifically, they assume perfect 
and frictionless capital markets where taxes, transactions costs, agency and 
bankruptcy costs do not exist. Even though these conditions are not met in the 
’’real world’’, Barclay et al. (1995) point out that the practical value of the 
M&M proposition was to direct future research towards the factors that do 
matter and therefore must be taken into consideration when the method of 
financing is decided. 
To date, finance scholars, have lifted the assumptions of the M&M proposition 
and incorporated market frictions into their analysis (see Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Miller 1977, Myers 1984). This led to the development of various 
theories. The most significant amongst them are Trade Off, Asymmetric 
Information theory and Agency theories. As Myers (2001) explains, the Trade 
Off theory emphasizes taxes, Agency theory emphasizes in agency costs and 
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the Asymmetric information theory (Pecking Order theory) emphasizes in 
differences in information regarding the firm’s real value and prospects 
between insiders and investors. 
2.2.2 The Capital Structure Irrelevance theory. 
This chapter is going to start by providing a summary of the MM (1958) paper 
since it is a seminal paper in the Capital Structure literature that is considered 
to have fueled and on the same time directed research in this area. Afterwards 
the most well known theories regarding capital structure are going to be 
presented. 
The M&M (1958) paper includes three Propositions. Proposition I, also known 
as the ’’Capital Structure Irrelevance’’ theory states that the value of a firm is 
independent of its financing method. In order to reach this conclusion MM 
make a series of restrictive assumptions. Their theory is developed within a 
framework of perfect capital markets where: i) there are no transaction costs , 
no taxes, no agency and bankruptcy costs ii) investors can borrow at the same 
terms as firms do iii) all investors share the same information, have the same 
expectations of the firms’ expected returns and behave accordingly iv) all firms 
can be categorized in certain classes where the expected returns of each firm 
have the same risk characteristics and v) firms can either issue equity or risk 
free debt. Under this theoretical framework M&M (1958) argue that the only 
thing that determines a firm’s value is the cash flow from the firms’ operating 
activities. The example the authors provide in order to prove their point 
considers two firms, a levered and an unlevered one, with the same expected 
operating cash flows where one of them is overpriced; arbitrage opportunities 
exist and will be exploited thus bringing into line the value of the two firms. 
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These arbitrage opportunities exist because investors have the ability to 
duplicate the firm’s corporate actions by borrowing and lending in their own 
personal accounts, thus rendering corporate financing decisions irrelevant.  
Proposition II refers to the cost of equity and stems from proposition I. 
Proposition I indirectly states that the firm’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) is independent of its capital structure. Since both firms have the same 
expected returns, these returns have to be discounted by the same WACC to 
give equal firm values. Taking under consideration that the WACC is the 
weighted sum of a firm’s cost of debt and cost of equity, M&M reason that, as 
a firm increases its leverage, and therefore replaces equity with cheaper debt, 
its cost of equity should increase as well in order to remunerate shareholders 
for their increased exposure in financial risk and therefore keep the WACC 
constant. 
Proposition III states that the only way to increase a firm’s value is to 
undertake investments whose returns are greater than the firm’s WACC.  
However, M&M (1958) recognize that their set of restrictions is unrealistic. The 
authors close their paper stating that their extreme simplifications should be 
relaxed in order to make more realistic and relevant conclusions. Real world 
observations indicate capital structure relevance and not irrelevance (Barclay 
et al., 1995; Myers, 2001). Myers (2001) highlights the constant innovation 
that is observed in the real world in terms of evolving security designs and 
new financing schemes. If financing did not matter, there would not be any 
requirement for innovation. 
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2.2.3 Capital Structure and taxes 
The ’’no taxes’’ assumption was the first assumption to be lifted as M&M 
(1963) factored corporate income tax into their analysis. This time the authors 
argued that debt financing has an advantage because interest expenses are 
tax deductible. When corporate taxes are taken into consideration, the total 
cash flows of the firm are received not only by shareholders and debtholders 
but by the state as well. Increasing leverage and therefore interest expenses 
reduces the firm’s tax base and therefore the cash flow towards the state, 
while on the same time increasing the total cash flow/return towards creditors 
and shareholders. In conclusion, these generated tax savings (often referred 
to as tax shields) lead to an increase in a firm’s value.  
It is important to mention that under this line of reasoning, the optimal capital 
structure for every firm should utilize as much debt as possible. This way firms 
would reap the full advantage of the created tax shields. In the real world 
however, facts show that this is hardly the case. M&M (1963, pp.442) 
recognizing this empirical shortcoming underlines that: 
’’It may be useful to remind readers once again that the existence of a 
tax advantage for debt financing, even the larger advantage of the 
corrected version does not necessarily mean that corporations should 
at all times seek to use the maximum possible amount of debt in their 
capital structures.’’ 
Consequently, the authors provide a few reasons why complete debt finance is 
unlikely to be utilized and observed. One is that firms often need to preserve 
financial flexibility for strategic reasons. More specifically, firms maintain an 
unutilized borrowing capacity, which is ready to be employed when other 
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sources of financing are unavailable or costly. Another reason mentioned is 
that lenders often impose limitations on debt financing in order to limit the 
firms’ risk of failure and therefore their risk of losing their capital. Finally, M&M 
(1963) refer to the effect of the existence of personal income tax. In the 
presence of investors’ personal income tax, retained earnings are sometimes a 
cheaper financing method.  
Another tax related theory that has been hypothesized to affect capital 
structure choice is the existence of non-debt tax shields. As explained earlier 
firms can take advantage of the tax deductibility of interest payments and 
generate tax shields while levering up. However, De Angelo and Masulis 
(1980) point out that, firms have other ways than debt to reduce their 
corporate taxes burden. These non-debt tax shields include depreciation, 
investment tax credits, or loss carry forwards. Therefore, debt and non-debt 
tax shields can be considered substitutes. As this theory predicts a substitution 
between tax shields and non-tax shields, a negative relationship between 
leverage and the existence of non debt tax shields is expected.  
Empirical research and survey findings indicate that tax and non-tax shields 
are determinants of capital structure. Givoly et al. (1992) investigate the 
effect of the 1986 US Tax Reform Act3 on US firms capital structure. Their 
findings indicate that capital structure is determined at least partially by tax 
and non-tax shields. Specifically, the authors report that firms which lost more 
non-tax shields increased their leverage more that the others. In addition, 
their findings show that firms with higher effective tax rates decreased their 
leverage more than others indicating the importance of corporate tax rates. 
                                       
3 The 1986 US Tax reform Act revoked investment tax credits and decreased corporate 
income tax. 
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Wald (1999) tests the significance of eight possible determinants of capital 
structure across five countries (US, UK, Germany, France and Japan) using a 
Tobit regression. The coefficient of his non-debt tax shield related proxy is 
negative in all five countries although it is statistically significant only in the 
US. Results of Shallheim et al. (2006) also support the relevance of non-debt 
tax shields. Shallheim et al. (2006) utilize a new proxy for non-debt tax 
shields (tax expense minus interest paid) in their models and find a statistical 
significant and positive relationship between this proxy and an under-leverage4 
proxy. Therefore, the authors claim that firms often resort to other methods 
than debt to reduce taxable income.  
Responses from financial executives in surveys in Europe and the US indicate 
that although the tax effects of debt financing are often taken into 
consideration in the capital structure choice, they are not of prime concern. 
Nevertheless, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) report that, 58% of firm managers 
across 16 European countries; describe the ’’tax advantage of interest 
deductibility’’ as an ’’important or very important’’ factor affecting capital 
structure. The corresponding percentage for the US is 45% according to the 
survey of Graham and Harvey (2001). Brounen et al. (2005) provide similar 
results for European firms. 
2.2.4 The Trade Off theory of Capital Structure 
Since 1963, finance scholars argued that personal taxation and other factors 
can often offset the tax advantages of debt thus leading to the Trade Off 
theory. One example is Miller (1977) who argues that personal income tax can 
                                       
4 One of Shallheim et al.s’ (2006) argument is that the observation that US firms do not 
hold as much debt as it would be expected taking under consideration a ‘’rational use of 
the interest tax deduction’’ can be explained by the existence of non tax debt shields. 
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often evaporate the tax shield gains or even turn them into a loss. Specifically, 
if creditors are taxed on a personal level then more generated income is 
required to meet the creditors’ expected return.  
In addition, it has been argued that gearing increases the probability that a 
firm goes into bankruptcy. More specifically, during fluctuations of its 
operating cash flows it might not have the ability to make high interest 
payments and therefore go bankrupt. Vernimmen et al. (2008) explain that 
bankruptcy carries direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include lawyers’ fees, 
administration costs and redundancy payments. Indirect costs include less 
trade credit and financing difficulties as well as reduced productivity and order 
cancellations. Vernimmen et al. (2008) also suggest that a highly geared 
company in financial distress can lose value because it will not be able to fund 
profitable investments and R&D. As leverage increases, the marginal costs of 
debt increase and the marginal benefits of debt decrease. 
In summary, Trade Off theory suggests that firms try balance the tax benefits 
of debt against the various costs of debt and reach an optimal debt ratio when 
the firm’s value is maximized5. As long as one additional dollar of debt 
financing brings more benefits than costs, the firm will continue to lever up. 
Therefore, at the point where the marginal benefits of debt will equal the 
marginal costs of debt, the firm will stop levering up and its optimal capital 
structure will be reached (Myers, 1984). Fig. 1 presents the static Trade Off 
theory as portrayed by Myers (1984). 
                                       
5 Investment is held constant. 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
34 
 
Figure 1 Trade Off theory 
 
PV = present value 
Source: Myers, S. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, 
Issue 3, p. 577 
Trade Off theory implies that there is an optimal capital structure and that any 
observed deviation from the optimal ratio is only temporary and due to 
random circumstances. 
Miller (1997, pp. 262) does not find the Trade Off model convincing. 
Specifically he disagrees with the idea that bankruptcy costs can offset debt 
benefits since they’’ seem disproportionately small relative to the tax savings 
they are supposedly balancing’’. The author adds as well that the difference 
between benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs would be especially great in 
large and low-levered companies. Another argument presented by Miller 
(1977) is that capital structure in the US has remained relatively stable from 
the 1920’s to the 1950’s even though during this period tax rates had 
quintupled. 
The Trade Off theory provides many testable hypotheses about its validity. 
Profitable firms should carry more debt as they have more income to shield. In 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
35 
 
addition, firms with more tangible assets will have increased leverage as they 
can be used as collateral. Likewise bigger firms are expected to carry more 
debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) explain that, bigger firms are usually more 
diversified, have more stable cash flows and therefore have a lower risk of 
bankruptcy. Finally, firms with volatile earnings who therefore are more prone 
to financial distress should carry less debt. Therefore, Trade Off theory 
predicts that leverage has a positive relation with profitability, size and asset 
tangibility and a negative relationship with the probability of financial distress. 
In general, empirical research has tested all theories of capital structure jointly 
by including all possible determinants through various proxies in regression 
models. Results are inconclusive towards the validity of the Trade Off theory. 
Profitability does not have the predicted sign as the regression results of 
various studies report (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995; Huang and Song 2006; 
Booth et al. 2001; Bevan and Danbolt 2002; Chen 2004; Huang and Song 
2006). However, size, tangibility, and probability of financial distress have the 
sign predicted by the theory in the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Booth et al. (2001), Wald (1999), Chen (2004), and Huang and Song (2006). 
Surveys conducted in European countries and the US have tried to establish, 
whether firms have a target debt ratio. The responses indicate differences 
between countries and only limited support for the Trade Off theory. US CFOs’ 
responses to a survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) indicate that while the 
majority of large firms in the US have a target debt ratio, only less than one 
third of small US firms have one. Brounen et al. (2005), report that less than 
10% of firms in their sample of UK, French, and German and Dutch firms have 
a strict debt ratio target. In addition, over half of French firms and a third of 
UK and Germany firms state that they have no target debt ratio. However 
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more than two thirds of US and Dutch firms state that they aim for some 
target ratio (’’flexible target debt ratio’’, ’’ somewhat strict target debt ratio’’, 
’’strict target debt ratio’’ (Brounen et al. (2005), p. 23) 
2.2.5 Agency theory, agency costs and free cash flow  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) the observed behaviour of any 
organization is the outcome of a complex process. Specifically, it is the 
outcome of a process, which brings the conflicting interests of all its 
stakeholders into an equilibrium defined within a framework of contractual 
relationships. An example of these contractual relationships, are agency 
relationships where principals hire agents to act on their behalf. In the case of 
a corporation, shareholders (principals) hire managers (agents) for their 
services and by doing so they inevitably pass on a part of their decision-
making authority to managers, thus causing a separation of ownership and 
control. If both shareholders and managers are concerned with maximizing 
their own benefits, we can assume that the decisions and actions of the latter 
will not always be on the best interest of the shareholders. 
Agency theory analyses the conflicts of interest that arise from agency 
relationships and their impact on firm value (Jensen, 1986). Finally, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) distinguish between two types of agency costs. Agency 
costs of debt (conflicts of interest of shareholders versus debtholders) and 
agency costs of equity (conflicts of interest of shareholders versus managers). 
Agency costs of debt relate to the wealth expropriation and asset substitution 
hypothesis. This means that when firms take on debt managers may have an 
incentive to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders by substituting 
existing assets with riskier ones. To explain this Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
utilize options theory. The value of shareholders’ equity can be viewed as a 
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European call option with a strike price equal to the value of debt. Since the 
value of this option increases with the variance of the firm’s future cash flows, 
managers might be tempted to invest in risky projects to increase 
shareholders wealth. This will have a negative impact on debtholders since it 
increases their risk and therefore decreases the value of debt as the same 
fixed cash flow return from their bonds comes under a greater risk. In order to 
avoid such behaviour creditors often impose restrictive covenants to ensure 
that the firm will not substitute the existing assets with riskier ones. This limits 
investment decisions and can therefore lead to opportunity wealth losses.  
 The agency costs of debt are more severe when the probability of bankruptcy 
is high. In such circumstances, creditors’ interests can be harmed in various 
ways by shareholder behaviour. Since shareholders have only their invested 
capital to loose and are not concerned with operating risk they can choose to 
invest in high-risk projects in the hope of the high return outcome to occur. 
 Underinvesting. If shareholders are expected to contribute to financing a 
positive NPV project, they might wish not do so if the cash inflows will be 
utilized to repay creditors. 
 Milking the property. Shareholders might sell part of the assets of the 
company and distribute the proceeds to themselves in the form of dividends. 
Therefore, the firm’s creditors acknowledging that such actions might 
materialize might demand a higher requested return in the form of higher 
interest.  
Agency costs of equity refer to problems that arise from the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders. The main idea is that as the percentage 
of outside equity increases the managers’ ownership claims decrease and 
therefore his incentives to increase firm value diminish. In addition, managers 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
38 
 
might consume corporate resources to maximize their own pecuniary and non-
pecuniary returns, because the cost is shared with shareholders. Prospective 
minority shareholders will perceive this and will incorporate monitoring costs 
and the manager’s behaviour into the share price that they are willing to pay. 
Shareholders incur three types of agency costs according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Monitoring costs, which stem from the observation of the 
managerial actions and the attempt to control them (e.g. budget restrictions, 
compensation methods). Incentive costs when shareholders provide incentives 
to induce the desired managerial behaviour (e.g. reward or penalize 
managerial actions). Finally, residual losses represent losses occurring from 
the deviation between the actions taken by managers and the actions that 
would maximize shareholders wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen (1986) underlines that even though the agency costs of debt have 
been extensively debated, little or no importance has been given to the 
benefits of debt. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory explains the benefit of 
taking on debt in the case of firms with substantial free cash flows. Free cash 
flows are defined as the cash flows in excess of the capital that is required to 
finance all investment projects, which discounted at WACC have a positive net 
present value. Jensen’s theory claims that the existence of significant free 
cash flows would cause severe agency costs between shareholders and 
managers. Managers focus on maximizing their utility by e.g. increasing the 
resources under their control to increase their growth related compensation. 
Therefore, they might spend the excess cash flow on low return projects or 
waste them on managerial perquisites. Shareholders would prefer to see free 
cash flows returned to them in the form of dividend payments or share 
repurchases. Jensen’s main argument is that in the presence of significant free 
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cash flows debt can be beneficial because it restricts the resources under the 
manager’s control. Debt poses a very serious and bonding choice because the 
firm’s creditors can make the firm bankrupt if they do not receive their 
payments. Consequently, when leverage increases, managerial control over 
the firm’s cash flow is reduced, as more of the firm’s cash flow is committed to 
debt repayments. Therefore, debt leads to the decrease of agency costs 
between managers and shareholders.  
Jensen (1986) points out that this disciplinary function of debt would be more 
applicable to low growth firms with substantial cash flows. In this case, the 
existence of free cash flows would play an important part as a capital structure 
determinant. The hypothesis that, firms that generate excess cash tend to 
overinvest has been empirically researched by Richardson (2006) who claims 
supportive evidence. However, Graham and Harvey’s (2001,2002) extensive 
surveys of 392 CFOs’ financing decisions find no support that free cash flow 
plays an important role in capital structure decision-making. Perhaps firms 
choose other ways to reduce resources under managerial control than by 
distributing cash to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. 
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2.2.6 Asymmetric information and the Pecking Order theory  
In 1984, Myers presented his Pecking Order theory based on Donaldson’s 
(1961) study. Myers (1984) claims that the Pecking Order theory performs as 
well as the static Trade Off theory in explaining corporate behaviour. Contrary 
to the static Trade Off theory, the Pecking Order theory does not imply that 
firms have an optimal leverage ratio which they seek to maintain. Instead, it is 
based on the idea that firms prioritize their sources of financing according to 
their related asymmetric information costs.  
The term asymmetric information is used to explain the adverse selection that 
occurs when the distribution of information about the real quality of a product 
between a seller and buyer is unbalanced or asymmetric. One of the most 
cited papers in economic history; Akerloff’s (1970) paper ’’The Market for 
Lemons’’ discusses information asymmetry. The author explains that because 
buyers perceive the existence of good quality and bad quality products, and 
they are not sure which product quality they are buying, they are willing to 
pay only an average price. This reasoning can be applied in the world of 
finance where a manager is the seller, the investors the buyers and the 
product is the firm’s financial securities (bonds, hybrid securities, equity). In 
this framework the sellers named ’’insiders’’ (e.g. management, major 
shareholders) know more about the company’s risk, value and investment 
opportunities and therefore have more accurate and therefore superior 
information than ’’outsiders’’ (other shareholders) about their product. 
Therefore, it can be in the interest of insiders not to share their set of 
information with outsiders. The realization of this informational ‘disadvantage’ 
makes investors suspicious about the firm’s corporate financing decisions. As a 
result, investors demand a form of remuneration for this information gap and 
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therefore demand a higher return for their investment, which leads to a higher 
cost of capital. In general, investors interpret each financing decision as a 
signal, which, if not interpreted correctly, can lead to mispricing of the firm’s 
securities. For example, they can interpret a security issue as an offering of 
overvalued shares. 
The Pecking Order theory is a theory based on the assumption of asymmetric 
information. It initially categorizes sources of financing into internal and 
external capital. Internal capital refers to cash flows that are being produced 
by the firm and are not being distributed to shareholders and external capital 
refers to either issuing debt or equity capital. These two sources of financing 
bear different costs when viewed under the prism of asymmetric information. 
The Pecking Order theory as presented in Myers (1984), and Myers and Malijuf 
(1984), makes several assumptions: A firm is facing a Net Present Value 
(NPV) opportunity and the source of financing is equity. There are no 
transaction costs or other market frictions. In addition, managers know more 
than investors about the value of their chosen investment project and about 
the possible under or over valuation of their share price. Management’s main 
concern is the existing shareholders who are passive (they do not rebalance 
their portfolios in relation to the firms actions). Under this theoretical 
framework, the existence of asymmetric information can have the following 
negative impact. Investors might interpret the firm’s stock issue as an offer of 
overvalued stock therefore adjusting the price downwards. Management might 
choose not to issue equity at a lower undervalued price because doing so they 
might harm their existing shareholders wealth (if the NPV of the project does 
not offset the value lost from the price drop). The impact of asymmetric 
information on this instance is that the firm forewent a positive NPV project. 
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In general, the Pecking Order theory predicts that the existence of asymmetric 
information can prevent the allocation of funds to NPV projects and lead to 
higher costs of capital. Therefore, firms prefer internal over external financing, 
as internal capital carries no asymmetric information costs. Thus, the observed 
changes to capital structure are caused by imbalances of internal cash flows 
relative to investment opportunities and the need for external capital that this 
imbalance brings. 
In addition, Myers (1984) claims that, if internal financing is unavailable and 
firms need to resort to external financing, then debt is preferred over equity. 
The reason for this is that debt is less risky than equity and it carries a better 
signaling content than equity. As Barclay et al. (1995) explain, debt comes 
with covenants and guarantees, which oblige a firm to make a series of fixed 
payments. If these payments are not met, serious consequences will occur. 
Debt is far less forgiving than equity. 
Summarizing, the Pecking Order financing hierarchy as described by Myers 
(1984): 
 Firms prefer internal over external financing. If internal financing is available, 
firms draw down their cash balances to fund their investment opportunities. 
Firms may even adjust their dividend payout in order to utilize internal 
financing. 
 Considering cash flow fluctuations and the ’’stickiness’’ of dividends, firms 
might have to resort to external financing. First, they issue the less risky 
security. Therefore, debt comes first followed by hybrid securities, the last 
resort being equity. 
Myers (1984, pp.582) supports his theory by reporting that ’’For all non-
financial corporations over the decade 1973-1982, internally generated cash 
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covered, on average, 62 percent of capital expenditures, including investment 
in inventory and other current assets. The bulk of required external financing 
came from borrowing. Net new stock issues were never more than 6 percent 
of external financing’’. In addition, a look at more recent descriptive statistics 
provided by Vernimmen (2008) indicates the validity of the Pecking Order 
theory. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3. Internal capital is the dominant 
source of financing for the 2002 – 2010 for a sample of the top 1,200 market 
capitalizations worldwide. In addition, during the period 1998 – 2006 firms 
were mainly financed with internal capital (an average of 80%). Because 
internal capital was not sufficient to fund investment opportunities external 
capital was utilized. The external capital used was mostly debt rather than 
equity. In addition, Baskin (1989) observes that many studies have identified 
a sharp decrease in share price after an equity issue announcement, which he 
believes can be explained by information asymmetries.  
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Figure 2 Sources of funds for the 1,200 top market capitalizations worldwide 
for 2002- 2010 
 
Source: Vernimmen (2012), Newsletter No.61 {available online}, (accessed 7th 
January 2012), available at: < http://vernimmen.com/html/letter/articles-
statistics.php> 
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Figure 3 Source of Finance of 247 Multinational Enterprises 
 
Source: Vernimmen 2008, p. 703 
However, the Pecking Order theory cannot fully explain corporate behaviour. 
Myers (1984) provides some empirical shortcomings against his own theory. 
His first example is that the Pecking Order theory cannot fully explain reality, 
as there are cases when equity was issued when debt financing was available. 
In addition, there are studies, which indicate market timing of security issues. 
Alti (2006) reports that numerous studies provide convincing evidence that 
firms issue stock when the cost of equity capital appears low and security 
prices are ’’high’’. 
The Pecking Order theory translates into the empirical hypothesis that firms, 
which exhibit high debt ratios, must have internal capital deficits. Likewise, 
highly profitable firms would exhibit low leverage. Empirical research results 
regarding Pecking Order theory are contradicting and do not provide a clear 
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
new equity
Increase of
debt
Self-
Financing
Chapter 2. Literature review 
46 
 
answer. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), suggest that if firms respond to 
internal capital shortages with debt then the regression of the firm’s debt on 
the internal financing deficit will be close to one. The authors argue that their 
results are supportive of the Pecking Order theory especially in the case of 
mature firms. In the case of small or growth firms however, the results are not 
supportive of Pecking Order theory (Frank and Goyal, 2003). This makes sense 
as small start up or growth firms do not generate enough internal cash flows 
to fund their investment therefore this deficit would be even greater.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) claim that in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
model the financing deficit is considered exogenous. Because the financing 
deficit’s components are most likely to be endogenous, the model is likely 
misspecified.  
Fama and French (2005) observe large equity issues from firms that are not in 
financial distress, which contradicts the Pecking Order theory. Supportive are 
the Lemon and Zender’s (2004) findings. However, their model is based on a 
modified Pecking Order theory model that includes debt capacity. Finally, 
Leary and Roberts (2010) research suggests that the Pecking Order theory 
alone is not sufficient to explain corporate behaviour and that when factors 
from alternative theories are incorporated to their models their explanatory 
power increases drastically. 
Qualitative studies as in Graham and Harvey (2001), Bancel and Mittoo (2004) 
and Brounen et al. (2005), have found weak or no support for the Pecking 
Order theory. The above studies survey a large number of CFO’s from US and 
European countries. The need to preserve financial flexibility has been 
identified by the majority of CFO’s in all countries as one of the most 
significant issues related to the capital structure choice. Even though the 
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notion of financial flexibility is related to the Pecking Order theory, Brounen et 
al. (2005) report that their findings indicate that the need to preserve financial 
flexibility is not related to the Pecking Order theory. Similarly, Graham and 
Harvey (2001) state that their results do not provide evidence in support of 
the Pecking Order financing hierarchy. 
The results of quantitative studies into the validity of the Pecking Order theory 
do not provide conclusive results. Pecking Order theory mainly has been tested 
through the incorporation of profitability and growth opportunity proxies in 
various regression models where leverage was the dependent variable. 
Pecking Order theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage ratios 
and profitability and a positive one between leverage and growth 
opportunities. Supportive to the Pecking Order theory, negative relationships 
between leverage and profitability have been found by the majority of studies 
as in Titman and Wessels (1998) Friend and Lang (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Huang and Song, Booth et al. (2001), Bevan and Danbolt (2002), 
Chen (2004), Huang et Song (2006). However growth opportunities are found 
to be positively related to debt in Wald (1999) and negatively in Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2006). 
2.2.7 Summary and Discussion 
This section has portrayed the most influential capital structure theories, 
namely Trade Off theory, the Pecking Order theory and agency costs theory. 
In addition, it has presented the most related and significant survey based 
research and quantitative studies. It seems that both qualitative and 
quantitative research so far, have produced contradicting results. For example, 
managerial responses from several countries provide moderate support for two 
opposing theories, the Pecking Order and the Trade Off theories. Quantitative 
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studies also give inconclusive results (see Table 2). Furthermore, some 
theories succeed in explaining some aspect of corporate financing behaviour 
but fail to do so in others. As an example, the Pecking Order theory succeeds 
in explaining why large profitable firms operate under low debt ratios while it 
fails to explain why firms, which are able to issue debt sometimes, issue 
equity. 
The failure of capital structure related research to provide clear and convincing 
evidence may lay in the fact that capital structure policy has been investigated 
mostly in isolation from other significant corporate financial decisions such as 
dividend policy (Faulkender et al. 2006; Aggarwan and Kyaw 2010). The 
authors support that payout policy and capital structure policy are interrelated. 
More specifically, the Pecking Order theory of Myers (1984) links capital 
structure and dividend policy as it hypothesizes that firms adjust their dividend 
payments while taking under consideration retained earnings and investment 
opportunities. The capital structure and dividend policy are also related under 
an agency framework. Debt and dividends can both be used as substitutes in 
order to reduce agency costs by reducing resources under managerial control. 
In addition, as we shall see in the next sections, most of the factors that have 
been found to influence capital structure have been found to influence payout 
policy as well (dividends and share repurchases). The majority of research 
regarding capital structure does not account for this interdependence and 
therefore it is highly probable that the developed models are misspecified and 
suffer from endogeneity problems (Aggarwan and Kyaw, 2010). 
This study attempts to remedy this by choosing a more appropriate system of 
equations. More specifically, the inclusion of share repurchases as an 
endogenous variable into the investigation of the relationship between firms’ 
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dividend payout policies and capital structure will reduce at the very least 
problems of omitted variable bias, which is expected to be present in previous 
research on this topic. 
 
Table 2 Capital Structure Determinants 
 
2.3 Payout policy  
2.3.1 Introduction 
Payout policy refers to two important decisions that a firm’s management has 
to make. First it must decide how much cash it will distribute to its’ 
shareholders. Secondly, it has to decide the form of this payout. As Allen and 
Michaely (2003) point out, the most common form of payout is cash dividends. 
In general, cash dividends tend to have a recurrent and regular nature. 
Determinants Predicted 
sign  
Empirical findings by previous studies 
Profitability +: trade-
off 
-: Pecking 
Order 
-:Titman and Wessels (1998) Friend and Lang 
(1998),Rajan and Zingales (1995) ,Huang and 
Song, Voulgaris et al. (2002),Booth et al. 
(2001),Chen (2004), Huang et Song (2006) 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
Size +:trade-off +: Rajan and Zingales (1995),Booth et al. 
(2001),Wald (1999), Daskalakis et Psilaki 
(2008), Voulgaris et al. (2002)  
Tangibility +:trade-
off, Pecking 
Order 
+: Rajan and Zingales, (1995),Voulgaris et al. 
(2002), Chen (2004), Huang and Song (2006) 
Growth 
opportunities 
+:Pecking 
Order 
-: trade-
off, agency 
costs 
+: Michaelas (1991),Wald (1999) 
-: Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. 
(2001),Huang and Song (2006) 
Propability of 
financial 
distress 
-:trade-off -: Booth et al. (2001),Chen (2004), and 
Bradley et al. (1983)  
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However, firms sometimes make one-off payments in the form of special 
designed dividends. Moreover, there are cases where firms decide to pay 
dividends in the form of stocks (stock dividends). 
As with the case of capital structure, payout policy has been extensively 
researched in relation to the firm’s value. Is there a form of payout that 
maximizes firm value? Are firms that pay dividends worth more than firms 
who do not? Recent researchers focus mainly on dividends and share 
repurchases since these are the most predominant forms of payout. As various 
studies report, dividends have been historically the most common form of 
payout (Allen and Michaely 2002; De Angelo et al. 2008; Dhanani and Roberts 
2009) and repurchases gained increasing popularity after the 1980’s (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Grullon, G. and Ikenberry, D.L. (2000). What do we know about stock repurchases? Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, Issue 1, p. 33 
 
 
 
Table 3 The use of Dutch Auctions, Tender Offers and Open Marker Share 
Repurchases through time 
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2.4 Dividend Policy 
2.4.1 The Dividend Irrelevance theory 
As with capital structure, one of the most well known papers regarding 
dividend policy belongs to Modigliani and Miller. Similarly, to the ’’capital 
structure irrelevance theorem’’ M&M developed the ’’Dividend Irrelevance 
theorem’’. Their reasoning remains the same in both cases. Value cannot be 
created just by a financial decision. A firm can only increase its value by 
choosing the right investment projects and by its operations. In the authors’ 
own words. 
’’Values are determined solely by ’real’ considerations- in this case the 
earning power of the firm's assets and its investment policy-and not 
by how the fruits of the earning power are ’packaged’ for distribution’’ 
(M&M, 1961, pp. 414). 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) suggest that dividend policy does not affect firm 
value. They assume that shareholders are indifferent between dividends and 
reinvestment of earnings. In the first case, shareholders receive cash but the 
share price will drop. In the second case, shareholders will realize capital gains 
from the reinvestment of earnings, if the firm is earning its expected return. 
As Black (1976) explains, if investors receive a dividend per share the share 
price will drop on the ex dividend date by about the amount of the dividend. 
This is because the amount of dividend paid per share causes the entire range 
of possible stock prices to drop by that amount.  
Gordon (1962) counter argued M&Ms’ Dividend Irrelevance proposition. 
Gordon (1962) suggested that investors are not indifferent between dividends 
and capital gains because of the greater risk that the latter encompasses. 
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Investors, according to Gordon, prefer receiving dividends now than being 
exposed to the risk that the capital gains that would occur in the future from 
the undistributed dividends reinvestment will not materialize. Therefore, 
investors will be willing to pay a higher price for companies with high dividend 
ratios. This rationale is usually referred to as the Bird in the Hand theory. 
Another counter argument to M&Ms’ contention is that it is based on the unreal 
’’perfect capital markets’’ assumption. In perfect capital markets, there are no 
transaction costs, brokerage fees and dividends and capital gains have the 
same tax treatment. As in the case of the ’’capital structure irrelevance 
theorem’’ the importance of the dividend irrelevance theorem is that it 
indicates why under real world conditions payout policy matters. For example, 
Allen and Michaely (2003) argue that the existence of tax differentials between 
dividends and share repurchases makes payout policy relevant. If capital gains 
are less heavily taxed then they dominate dividends. 
Another argument against M&M’s ’’Dividend irrelevance theorem’’ is that the 
variability in the use of certain forms of payouts as well as the evolution in 
their design indicates that payout policy is relevant. For example, in 1996 in 
the UK, investment banks frequently utilized the agency buyback, a form of 
open market repurchase because of its tax ’’appeal’’ to pension funds (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 2002). However, as reported by the authors this tax loophole was 
detected later by the tax authorities and was abolished. Vernimmen et al. 
(2008) provide another paradigm that indicates the continuous adaptation of 
payout policy to economic factors. They report that the practice to pay 
dividends in shares appears to be making a comeback in 2008, as firms might 
want to preserve their cash reserves during the financial crisis.  
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Black and Scholes (1974) tested the irrelevance theory empirically. The 
authors created 25 portfolios varying from low dividend yield portfolios to high 
dividend yield portfolios and low to high betas. However, the authors did not 
find any significant results that expected returns on low yield portfolios 
differed from high yield portfolios.  
So far, the dividend literature has mainly focused on the no taxes, the no 
asymmetric information and the no agency cost assumptions of M&M dividend 
irrelevance theorem thus giving rise to tax, tax clientele and signaling 
theories. 
2.4.2 Dividends and taxes 
The ’’Dividend Irrelevance Theorem’’ assumption that dividends and capital 
gains have the same tax treatment is rather unrealistic. Vernimmen et al. 
(2008) report that, in most countries dividends are taxed more heavily than 
capital gains. For example in the US, dividends are taxed once on corporate 
level by the corporate income tax and twice on investor level by the personal 
tax of each shareholder. This suggested tax advantage of capital gains implies 
that the optimal policy is not to pay dividends at all. However, historically, a 
significant percentage of firms has been paying dividends and continues to do 
so. In the US, Fama and French (2001) report that during the 1978 to 1999 
period the percentage of dividend paying firms ranged from 67% to 21%6. The 
explanation to this paradox according to Allen and Michaely (2003) is that not 
all investors are taxed as individuals and that some institutions find it hard to 
invest in low dividend paying stock due to legal restrictions.  
                                       
6 Fama and French (2001) argue that the decline in the percentage of dividend paying firms in recent years can 
be attributed to the increase in appearance of growth firms. Such newly established firms are characterized 
during their early phases by large investment opportunities and low profitability do not pay dividends. 
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More specifically, the authors explain that a firm’s shares can be held by 
various entities like individuals, pension funds and other corporations. All 
these types of investors are taxed differently regarding their dividend income. 
In the US, pension funds do not pay taxes on dividends and therefore are 
indifferent between capital gains and dividends. In addition, corporations, 
which own dividend-paying stocks, are required to pay tax only at a certain 
percentage of the dividends they receive7. The fact that a company’s shares 
are held by different investor groups, which incur different tax treatment, gave 
rise to the Clientele theory. Clientele theory argues that investors will invest in 
companies that have a dividend policy that matches their preferences. 
Therefore, the theory predicts that individuals will hold low dividend paying 
stocks while medium dividend paying stocks will be held by tax-free 
institutions. Finally, corporations will hold high dividend paying stocks. It is 
important to add that as Allen and Michaely (2003) mention institutional 
investors (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies, commercial banks) are 
restricted by the prudent man’s rule8 to invest in no or low dividend paying 
stocks. The legal regime and its influence on institutional investors can affect 
dividend policy considering the size of institutional investor holdings. For 
example, according to Brav and Heaton (1998) during 1964 -1988 institutional 
investors held an average of 36.5 % of US equities. A 34.4 % average of these 
shareholdings was held by private pension funds subject to the prudent man’s 
                                       
7 ’’Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA), a corporation that held the stock of another corporation paid taxes 
on only 15% of the dividend. Therefore, the effective tax rate for dividend income was 0.15 x 0.46 = 0.069. 
After the TRA, the corporation income tax rate was reduced to 34%. The fraction of the dividend exempted 
from taxes was also reduced to 70%. The effective tax rate for dividend income was therefore increased to 0.3 
x 0.34 = 0.102. In both time periods, the dividend exemption could be as high as 100% if the dividend-paying 
corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary of the dividend-receiving corporation.’’ (Allen and Michaely 2002, p. 
24)  
8 Brav and Heaton (1998) report that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) subjected 
private pension funds to a more strict "prudent man" rule. In addition, the US case law approved prudent 
investments as investments that paid steady dividends. Therefore the investment of pension funds seems to be 
guided to the direction of medium or high dividend paying firms.  
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rule. Moreover, Davis (2002) states that, the average percentage of the equity 
held by domestic institutional investors is 30-40% for the US and the UK. 
Empirical research findings as well anecdotal observations and surveys provide 
moderate support about the impact of taxes and the existence of clienteles on 
dividend policy. Allen and Michaely (2003), underline that their findings show 
that for the last 30 years, the percentage of dividend payments that 
individuals in high tax brackets receive, keeps increasing. This observation is 
the exact opposite of to what the clientele theory and tax disadvantage of 
dividends predict. However, an explanation may be provided by the existence 
of risk aversion. Risk aversion may stop individuals in high tax brackets to 
position themselves completely in low dividend paying firms. Such firms will be 
favored but not at the exclusion of all other potential investments. Barclay et 
al. (2009) find evidence contrary to the tax clientele hypothesis. According to 
their observation dividends do not increase after a large percentage block of 
stock trade from individuals to corporations takes place. On the contrary 
supportive are the evidence of Elton and Gruber (1970), Brav and Heaton 
(1988). Elton and Gruber’s (1970) findings indicate that drop off ratios are 
positively correlated with dividend yield. The authors interpret this as high tax 
investors selling their high dividend paying stocks and purchasing low dividend 
yield stocks. Their finding seems consistent to the tax clientele theory. Also, 
supportive to the tax clientele theory seems the finding of Brav and Heaton 
(1988) who report that firms who omit dividends lose their institutional 
investors; this loss is permanent if the firm does not reinitiate dividends. 
Finally, a recent study regarding the May 2003 dividend tax cut by Blouin et al. 
(2011) indicates that taxes do affect payout policy and that tax clienteles 
exist. 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
56 
 
The May 2003 dividend tax cut in the US can be considered as a ’’natural 
experiment’’ (as described by Chetty and Saez, 2006), that provided valuable 
insight on the impact of taxes on dividend policy and the existence of tax 
clienteles. At that time, the tax rate for retail investors in the US decreased 
significantly9. Chetty and Saez (2006) state that the tax cut resulted in a 20% 
increase in dividend payments and in a large number of dividend initiations. In 
addition, their results show that firms with nontaxable institutional ownership 
did not alter their policy after the tax cut. Blouin et al. (2004) also document a 
large increase in dividends initiations. Furthermore, Blouin et al. (2011) study 
presents evidence that after the 2003 tax cut individuals rebalanced their 
portfolios to maximize their after tax returns as well as evidence that firms 
with a large percentage of individual shareholders increased their dividend 
payments. The above findings seem consistent with the tax clientele theory 
and indicate a change in corporate behaviour caused by the tax cut. However, 
Julio and Ikenberry (2004) argue that an increase in aggregate dividend 
payments was documented in late 2000; therefore, the post 2003 tax cut 
dividend payment increase may not be fully attributable to tax effects. Chetty 
and Saez (2006) disagree with this view and claim that the 2000 increase in 
dividends is due to the dot.com bubble bust resulting in non-dividend paying 
high tech stocks disappearing from the utilized top 1000 sample.  
Surveys on managerial views regarding dividend policy give moderate support 
to tax considerations. More specifically Brav et al. (2007) surveyed managerial 
responses to the 2003 US tax cut. Responses indicate that the indeed the tax 
played a role in the following dividend increases and consideration but its 
                                       
9 ’’The top statutory tax rate on dividend income dropped from more than 38% to 15% 
and the top rate on capital gains declined from 20% to 15%’’ (Brav et al., 2007) 
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effect was of a second hand order. Brav et al. (2007) explain that managers 
identified other factors to be more significant payout determinants and 
suggest that firms who initiated or increased dividends were ’’on the fence’’ to 
do so before the tax cut. The second order importance of tax considerations 
and of the clientele theory are also supported by US and European financial 
executives responses in the surveys of Bancel et al. (2005) and Brav et al. 
(2007). The percentage of financial executives that rate ’’the personal taxes of 
my shareholders when receiving dividends’’ as ’’important or very important’’ 
factor affecting dividend policy is around 21% in both the US and Europe. 
More value seems placed upon the ’’attracting institutional shareholders’’ 
factors. This factor is highlighted as ’’important or very important’’ from 50% 
of European managers and by 32% - 50% of US ones, (Bancel et al. 2005; 
Brav et al. 2007) 
In general, research so far seems to indicate that tax and clientele 
considerations affect dividend policy but are of second order importance when 
compared to other payout policy determinants. 
2.4.3 Information asymmetries and signaling theories 
Information asymmetries between managers and the capital markets are 
another possible cause of market imperfection. Managers know more about 
their company’s value and earnings prospects than investors do. Therefore, 
they can perceive if their company’s share is fairly valued by the market. If the 
managers’ belief is that their stock is undervalued, they can signal this to the 
market through a dividend increase. Dividend policy can be utilized to send a 
more effective and credible signal of good future prospects when compared to 
other forms of financial information. For example, Vernimmen et al. (2008) 
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mention that financial information that investors receive from companies are 
usually biased. Companies tend to ’’window dress’’ their results through 
manipulative accounting and selective disclosures in order to present their 
company in the best possible way. Such practices are available to all firms 
therefore undervalued firms must find a credible and effective way to signal 
their mispricing. Signaling theory supports that dividend policy can be utilized 
as an effective form of communication that can signal the firms mispricing to 
the market and the reason for this is the associated cost (Allen and Michaely, 
2003). For example, a dividend increase can be interpreted as a good sign by 
investors. It is known, that capital markets punish dividend reductions with 
share price reductions. Thus managers would not risk increase the dividend 
payments if it they did not have solid information about future earnings 
realization and therefore their ability to maintain the increased level of 
dividend payments. If their expectations do not come true, dividend payments 
would have to be decreased and the company would suffer the market 
punishment10. Hence, a dividend increase can prove costly.  
Empirical research has tested the signaling theory of dividends mostly in two 
ways. The first way was to investigate if unanticipated changes in dividend 
payments cause stock price changes in the same direction. The second was to 
test if dividend changes are followed by changes of earnings in the same 
direction. Allen and Michaely (2003) state that empirical research agrees in the 
following three findings: i) Dividend changes cause share prices to move in the 
same direction, ii) there is a relationship between the immediate price reaction 
and the magnitude of the dividend change. iii) Decreases in share price after a 
                                       
10 Empirical evidence show that capital markets punish dividend reductions with share 
price reductions (Benartzi et al. 1997; Allen and Michaely 2003) 
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dividend decrease announcement are larger than increases in share price after 
a dividend increase announcement. The above empirical findings seem 
consistent with signaling theory. However, Allen and Michaely (2003) note that 
the above findings are necessary for the signaling theory to be valid but not 
sufficient. The authors mention that the most basic condition for signaling 
theory to be valid is that changes in earnings follow the changes in dividends. 
Grullon et al. (2002b) support the same. Grullon et al. (2002b) claim that 
empirical research into the relationship between dividend changes and future 
earnings reports is not supportive of the signaling theory. One of the examples 
mentioned is the study of Benartzi et al. (1997). Benartzi et al. (1997) findings 
show that the earnings’ growth rates of firms do not increase after an increase 
in dividends. In addition, earnings growth rates significantly increase in firms 
that decrease their dividends. Grullon et al. (2002), reason that stock price 
increases after dividend increases show that investors perceive such changes 
as positive. But empirical findings support that this perception is not owed to 
earnings expectations. Therefore, Grullon et al. (2002b) test the hypothesis 
that firms who increase their dividend experience a significant decline in 
systematic risk. Their findings are supportive of this and hence they argue that 
the decline in systematic risk leads to a decrease in the firms’ cost of capital, 
which explains the positive stock price reactions. 
The ”costly signal’’ aspect of the signaling theory has been also empirically 
researched. Signaling theory implies that as the signal gets more costly, the 
information signaled becomes more reliable (Bernheim and Wantz 1995). 
Under this reasoning, increasing dividends is more costly when taxes on 
dividends are higher than capital gains. Therefore share price reactions to 
given dividend changes should be more positive in periods when dividends are 
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more tax disadvantaged. Findings do not point to a clear direction. In 
Germany where dividends are taxed less than capital gains Amihud and Murgia 
(1997) find that dividend changes lead to changes in the stock price in the 
same direction. This contradicts the notion that a signal has to be costly to 
convey information but shows that dividend changes in the German law frame 
remain informative possible for other factors. Amihud and Murgia (1997) 
support Black’s (1976) argument that dividends might still convey information 
because of the managers are not keen in reducing dividends and only raise 
them when they believe they can be sustained. Alternatively, as Bhattacharya 
(1979) notes if an increase in dividends will not be supported by future 
earnings a firm will have to resort to costly external financing to fund its 
investment. On the other hand, Bernheim and Wantz (1995) results for a 
sample of US firms are supportive of the signaling theory. Bernheim and 
Wantz (1995) use regression analysis to investigate the hypothesis that an 
increase in dividend taxation should increase the per share market response 
per dollar of dividend change. Their results support this hypothesis and 
therefore signaling theory.  
Finally, surveys on European and US CFO’s by Bancel et al. (2005) and Brav et 
al. (2003) respectively, show moderate support for signaling reasons as a 
basic payout policy determinant. More specifically Brav et al. (2003), underline 
that managers clearly rejected the idea that they pay dividends as a costly 
signal to indicate their firm’s true value or to separate their firm from rest. 
However, they believe that dividends do have an informational content. 
It seems that dividends do carry an informational content to investors because 
empirical research agrees that dividend changes are followed by share price 
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reactions in the same direction. However, managerial views reject signaling 
motives affecting dividend policy. The abovementioned informational content 
of dividend changes and its impact on share prices might be explained by the 
agency theory of dividends, which is described in the following section. 
2.4.4 Agency theory, free cash flow and dividends 
The agency theory as described in the capital structure section can be linked 
to dividend policy. Easterbrook (1984) supports that, ’’logically any dividend 
policy (or any other corporate policy) should be designed to minimize the sum 
of capital, agency, and taxation costs’’. The author provides two explanation of 
why dividends are paid. As he explains, agency costs arise from two issues. 
First, as the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) supports, the 
interests of managers and shareholders often diverge. Therefore, shareholders 
incur monitoring costs to observe if the behaviour of managers is in 
accordance with their interests. In addition, managers’ behaviour can be 
characterized by risk aversion. They will tend to choose low risk low return 
projects in order to feel safe and keep their position11. This is contrary to the 
shareholders’ interest. Shareholders would prefer investment in riskier more 
profitable projects as these increase their wealth. Dividends according to 
Easterbrook (1984) can reduce monitoring costs as their payment causes 
managerial behaviour more similar to the preferences of shareholders. 
If a firm pays dividends to its shareholders, then the likelihood that it will need 
external financing to fund investments increases. The resources under 
managerial control decrease and therefore the firm will be more likely to sell 
shares to the capital markets. This will have the following effect. First, the firm 
                                       
11 Shareholders hold more diversified portfolios in comparison to managers whose wealth is related more to 
their firms’ success. Therefore shareholders have limited risk exposure to a single firm’s actions than 
managers. 
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will incur the strict monitoring of capital markets (e.g. investment bankers). 
Since dividends reductions are punished by the capital markets, managers will 
perceive that they will have to resort to external financing more frequently. 
Under the more intense monitoring of the market, managerial behaviour will 
be more closely aligned to the shareholders interest. They will have to become 
more efficient and focus on maximizing firm and shareholders’ wealth. 
According to Jensen (1986), the agency costs above are more severe in 
companies with significant free cash flows. The need to minimize cash under 
managerial control in this case is greater. This could be done in the form of 
higher payouts to shareholders. However, Jensen (1986) supports that debt 
(without retention of the issue) would be more efficient in such cases. Debt 
forces managers to make interest payments or face bankruptcy. On the other 
hand dividends payments can be reduced. 
The main testable hypothesis of the agency and free cash flow theory is that 
firms with excess cash flows should pay more dividends. In general, empirical 
research findings support this hypothesis. La Porta et al. (2000) study the 
relationship between investor protection in various countries and the level of 
dividend payout. They find that in countries with better minority shareholder 
protection (e.g. countries where investors have the right to vote on the 
election of managers or vote on other significant firm issues, the right to take 
legal action against the company) firms generally pay more dividends. In line 
with agency theory, this indicates that minority shareholders are able to force 
managers to disgorge cash and thereby protecting their investment by insiders 
(managers and large shareholders) expropriation. Also in line with agency 
theory are the findings of DeAngelo et al. (2004). The authors utilize 
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qualitative response models and find a statistically significant relationship 
between high-earned equity ratios and the decision to pay dividends for a 
sample of US firms. Denis and Osobov (2008) report similar findings for their 
sample of six G-20 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan). 
However, both Denis and Osobov (2008) and DeAngelo et al. (2004) observe 
that larger firms are more likely to pay dividends. In accordance with this De 
Angelo et al. (2004, pp. 1) argue that:  
’’Had they not paid dividends, the 25 largest long-standing 2002 dividend 
payers would have cash holdings of $1.8 trillion (51% of total assets), up from 
$160 billion (6% of assets), and $1.2 trillion in excess of their collective $600 
billion in long-term debt. Their dividend payments prevented significant 
agency problems since the retention of earnings would have given managers 
command over an additional $1.6 trillion without access to better investment 
opportunities and with no additional monitoring’’ 
Similar are also the results of Brav et al. (2003). Their survey of managers 
underlines the importance of agency theoretical considerations for dividend 
decisions in firms with very high free cash flows (’’cash cows’’12). 
However, by contrast, Baker et al.’s (2002) survey of NASDAQ firm managers 
finds weak to little support for agency theoretical considerations as a 
determinant of dividend policy. However, their questionnaire does not include 
a question on excess cash flow and merely asks managers if dividend 
payments align their interests with those of shareholders and if they force a 
firm to seek external financing subjecting it to market scrutiny. 
                                       
12 Brav et al. (2003), name ”cash cows’’ profitable firms with high credit ratings and low investment 
opportunities. Such firms are expected to generate significant excess cash flows. 
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On balance, agency theory seems to be supported by research based on both 
firm behaviour and managerial opinion surveys. As Allen and Michaely (2003) 
note, agency theory could provide an explanation of why the markets react 
positively to a dividend increase. The market might perceive that dividend 
payments will lead to a decrease of agency costs.  
2.4.5 Dividend Smoothing 
Dividend smoothing is not a theory but an important empirical observation 
regarding dividend policy of Lintner’s (1956) study. Lintner found that the 
most important determinant of a firm dividends policy is its earnings. Lintner 
argues that management’s decision-making is based on earnings because they 
consist are a simple indicator which is widely communicated in the press and 
thoroughly observed by shareholders. In addition, firms have a target payout 
ratio to which they progressively gradually adapt. Lintner (1956) also argues 
that his field observations show that managers believe that shareholders place 
a premium at the stability and consistency that this kind of dividend policy 
conveys. In addition, the author underlines the reluctance of managers to 
reduce dividends. 
Lintner reports that, his model13 was able to explain 85% of the dividend 
changes in his sample. Fama and Babiak (1968) test Lintner’s model and find 
that it also performed well from 1946 to 1964. Allen and Michaely (2003) 
underline that empirical studies in general have found Lintner’s model to 
perform well over the years, while Leary and Michaely (2008) note that 
dividend smoothing is one of most pronounced and well-documented corporate 
                                       
13Lintner’s model as presented by Allen and Michaely (2002): For firm i, D*
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finance phenomena. However, managerial views as documented by the 
surveys of Brav et al. (2005) and Bancel et al. (2005) in US and 16 European 
countries are not completely in accordance with Lintner’s findings. Both 
surveys report that managers agree that they are reluctant to cut dividends 
and they smooth dividends. Then again, they disagree that they have a target 
payout ratio as a key and unique driver of their decisions.  
The corporate behaviour that dividend smoothing describes strengthens the 
hypothesis that dividends carry an information content. The reluctance of 
managers to cut dividends indicates that they are aware of the negative 
market interpretation of such an action and the impact on the share price. In 
addition, the relative stability that this corporate behaviour causes can also be 
considered supportive to the clientele hypothesis. By keeping a relatively 
stable policy, firms might want to attract a certain type of investor group. 
2.5 Share Repurchase Policy 
2.5.1 Signaling hypothesis 
Many researchers have placed repurchases into an asymmetric information 
framework in order to explain the increasing popularity of this form of payout. 
Asymmetric information about the company’s prospects between insiders and 
investors can lead to adverse selection problems in the capital markets. 
Therefore, in order to mitigate this problem, repurchases can be used as 
signaling method, which conveys positive information to the market. It is 
important to underline that there are two versions of the signaling hypothesis 
something, which is often overlooked in relevant debates, (Grullon and 
Ikkenberry, 2000). As Baker et al. (2003) explain the first is that firms know 
more about the firm’s prospects and they want to convince the market about 
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this by sending a costly signal. The second one is that management believes 
that the share price is mispriced when existing public information are taken 
under consideration. Therefore, firms might use repurchases as a mean to 
signal future prospects and/or this mispricing to the market. Since repurchases 
carry a certain cost the signal should be interpreted as valid. However, it is 
important to note that open market repurchase announcements (the most 
dominant form of payout) as a signal are less costly than dividends or fixed 
price tender offers. Open market repurchase announcements are not a 
commitment to the firm and they are not accompanied by large premiums as 
fixed price tender offers. This is a first counterargument to the explanatory 
power of signaling theory when utilized to explain repurchases. 
Many researchers have tested the signaling hypothesis by examining the share 
price reaction to share repurchase announcements and to actual repurchases. 
The largest part of empirical studies has focused on the US market. However, 
studies regarding other countries such as the UK, Germany and China report 
similar results to the US. In general studies of this nature seem to agree that 
repurchase announcements have positive impact on the share price. Comment 
and Jarrell (1991) document positive excess stock returns on the 
announcement day for all three types of repurchase (open market, tender 
offers and Dutch Auctions). In the case of Germany, Seifert and Stehle (2003) 
observe significant positive returns on the announcement day for German 
firms. In the UK market Lasfer (2000), Oswald and Young (2004) and 
Hjelmstad et al. (2006) confirm positive market reaction on the announcement 
day. Specifically, Oswald and Young (2004) find an almost 2% abnormal 
return over the 11 day window centered on the announcement day which as 
they explain is similar to US findings from other studies. Similar results of a 
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1.64 % increase over the 5 day period {-2, +2} are reported by Lasfer 
(2000). Actual share repurchases seem to be also followed by positive share 
price reactions. Zhang (2002) reports positive but low abnormal returns after 
the actual repurchase and Wang et al. (2009) observe a similar reaction for a 
sample of UK firms. If repurchases are used to convey information to the 
market or signal undervaluation then the above findings are consistent with 
this as they report positive share price reactions. In addition, it is important to 
mention that most of the abovementioned studies find statistically significant 
negative abnormal returns up to the announcement day, which is an indication 
of an undervaluation motive. However, as in the case with dividends, the 
positive reaction of the stock market to a repurchase announcement gives 
validity to the first version of the signaling theory only if the repurchase is 
followed by an increase of the firms operating performance. If indeed 
repurchases are used to signal future prospects then operating performance 
should be observed to increase. Grullon and Ikkenberry (2000), report that 
earnings improvement was found only by studies investigating fixed price 
tender offers. The authors also report that empirical research has provided 
mixed results in the case of open market share repurchases. Here, the results 
indicate modest growth or a decline in operating income. In addition, the 
undervaluation motive is not sufficient to explain the rise in open market share 
repurchases. As Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) argue if undervaluation was the 
case then companies would signal this with fixed price share repurchases 
which cause an average 15% share price increase contrary to the 4% of open 
market share repurchases. Therefore, either companies who repurchase would 
be either slightly undervalued or there is a problem of market under reaction.  
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However, survey results are generally in support of the signaling hypothesis. 
Almost 90% of financial executives in European and US firms responded that 
the market price of their stock is important or very important on their decision 
to repurchase indicating a signaling motive (Bancel et al., 2005). Almost 
identical is the response in the survey of Brav et al. (2005) for US companies. 
Similarly Baker et al. (2003), claim that their results are mostly in favor of the 
undervaluation version of the signaling hypothesis. However, in the survey of 
Brav et al. (2005) US executives reject the notion that repurchases are utilized 
as a costly signal while they accept that they carry an informational content. 
Finally, surveys of UK executives by Dixon et al. (2008) and Dhanani and 
Roberts (2009) identify undervaluation signaling as a motive to repurchase 
though less important than the motive of returning excess cash flows to 
shareholders. 
Finally, the existence of asymmetric information between insiders and 
investors is supported by the results of Brockman and Chung (2001). Their 
study showed that bid ask spreads widen and depths narrow during the actual 
repurchase period indicating that investors perceive the superiority of 
information that managers possess. In addition, by comparing the actual 
repurchase costs to a bootstrapping method - generated ’’naïve’’ accumulation 
plan, their study showed that the managers’ strategy outperformed the 
uninformed one in every single year of their 1991-1999 period.  
Summarizing, we can say that research supports the asymmetric information 
assumption of the signaling theory. In addition, as in the case with dividends 
we can assume that repurchases carry an informational content which the 
market perceives as positive; but this content seems not to be better 
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prospects as signaling theory states. In some cases, the positive market 
reaction could be attributed to the perception that the repurchase led to a 
decrease in agency costs.  
2.5.2 Repurchases and the agency theory of free cash flows 
Another theory that has been borrowed from the dividend literature to explain 
the increasing use of repurchases is the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Managers often spend the resources under their control in non-
shareholder wealth maximizing activities. Shareholders therefore incur 
monitoring and bonding costs in order to ensure that managerial actions 
maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, repurchases as in the case of 
dividends can be used to distribute cash to the firm’s shareholders and 
therefore reduce the amount of resources under managerial control. This 
decrease in resources will increase the probability that managers will have to 
resort to external financing and therefore be subject to strict capital market 
monitoring. As a result, managers will be forced to use the remaining 
resources in a more prudent way, which will be more aligned to the 
shareholders’ interests; thus keeping their position and ensuring the 
availability of external financing. Agency costs are expected to be more severe 
in firms that generate significant free cash flows (Jensen, 1986).  
If this theory holds, the market reaction to the decision to repurchase will be 
more positive for firms that have substantial free cash flows. A study by Wang 
et al. (2009) examines this hypothesis. Wang et al. (2009) observe that the 
market reaction is more favorable to actual repurchases decisions by firms 
with low Tobin’s Q (an indicator of growth opportunities). This seems 
consistent with the agency-free cash flows theory since firms with low 
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growth/investment opportunities are more likely to have more excess cash. 
Hjelmstad et al. (2006) have tested the same hypothesis for a sample of UK 
firms. Using various proxies for growth the authors found a significant 
negative relationship between firm growth and the abnormal return on the 
repurchase announcement; a finding again consistent with the agency- free 
cash flows theory.  
Managerial views indicate that the existence of excess cash flows is an 
important motive for firms to buy back shares. In the surveys of Bancel et al. 
(2005) and Brav et al. (2005), 60 - 65% of US and European firms’ managers 
view the ’’having extra cash/liquid assets relative to my desired shareholdings’’ 
as an ’’important or very important’’ share repurchase motive. In addition, 
Dhanani and Roberts (2009) report that even though UK executives listed 
various reasons as repurchase motives the recurrent motivation was the 
opportunity to return excess cash flows to shareholders. Similarly, the 
statement ’’to return excess cash to shareholders’’ is ranked second in the 
responses of UK manager motives for share buybacks in the survey of Dixon et 
al. (2008). It seems that empirical research supports the validity of the agency 
theory and the theory of free cash flows. In addition, managerial views rank 
the existence of free cash flows as one of the most important motives to 
repurchase. In addition as Grullon and Michaely (2004) state, these theories 
are also able to explain part of the empirical fact of positive price reactions to 
actual repurchases and repurchase announcement. 
2.5.3 Repurchases as dividend substitutes 
The remarkable rise in the use of repurchases, especially in the US, that has 
been noted by many studies (e.g. Dittmar 2008; DeAngelo et al. 2008; 
Skinner 2008), has led researchers to hypothesize that repurchases are 
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starting to substitute dividends as a mean to return cash to the company’s 
shareholders. Grullon and Michaely (2002a) report a series of findings 
regarding the US market that are supportive of the dividend substitution 
hypothesis. Their first indication is that even though figures show a decline in 
the dividend payout ratio of US firms the total payout ratio seems constant 
(after the 1980’s). In addition, Grullon and Michaely (2002a) report that 
established corporations prefer to return cash to shareholders in the form of 
repurchases rather than with a dividend increase. Finally, the authors claim 
that the market shows signs that it perceives repurchases as dividend 
substitutes. The reason is that their test of market reaction of dividend cuts 
from firms that repurchase is not significantly different from zero. 
Due to indications that in fact repurchases are substituting dividends, some 
researchers started to investigate the possible motives behind this 
phenomenon. Most of the literature has identified and focused its attention on 
two possible motives; tax related and employee and managerial compensation 
related motives. 
As described in the clientele theory for dividends each group of investors in a 
firm is taxed differently on dividends and on capital gains. Considering that 
repurchases as capital gains carry less tax burden for individual investors, 
firms might prefer to distribute their earnings in the form of repurchases. 
However, this theory is in contrast with the existence of different investor 
groups in firms some of whom might prefer dividends. As Barclay et al. (2009) 
note, corporations prefer dividends to repurchases because in their case 
dividends are taxed less than capital gains. If, therefore, repurchases are tax 
motivated we would expect to see individual investors attracted to firms that 
repurchase and corporations to move towards dividend paying firms. 
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However, empirical findings and observations regarding the tax motive for 
repurchases are inconclusive. Grullon and Michaely (2002a) run a cross 
sectional regression to test the relationship between the cumulative abnormal 
return around the open market repurchase announcement day and ’’the tax 
differential between the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income and the top 
marginal tax rate on capital gains’’(p.21). The relationship is found to be 
positive and statistically significant. This might be an indication that the 
market values the expected tax benefits of dividend substitution. In contrast, a 
study on the Australian market where due to the imputation system the 
difference between dividends and capital gains is much smaller, Brown and 
Day (2007) find no signs of tax related dividend substitution. Their study 
reports that the repurchase yield is positively related to dividend increases. 
Finally, in the surveys of Bancel et al. (2005) and Brav et al. (2005) only a 
small percentage of financial executives from the US and Europe mentioned 
the tax benefits of repurchases as an important motive.  
Another focus of the research surrounding repurchases has been the existence 
of employee and managerial options and EPS related managerial 
compensation. Kahle (2002) argues that the rise in repurchases can be 
attributed to the rise in the use of stock options as a form of employee and 
executive compensation. Under this consideration Kahle, supports that stock 
repurchases have two advantages. First, they provide the firm with stocks to 
fund its employee stock option plans. Second, repurchases do not affect 
managerial wealth because they do not reduce the value of managerial stock 
options (as dividends do). In her study of open market share repurchases, 
Kahle (2002) finds that the probability that a firm will repurchase is positively 
related to the amount of executive options and that the size of actual 
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repurchases is positively related to the total options exercisable but 
independent of the number of stock options held by managers. In addition, the 
author argues that this motive is perceived by the market, which has a less 
positive reaction to firms that repurchase stock and have a large number of 
non-managerial exercisable stock options. Another aspect of the relation 
between stock option compensation is given by Weisbenner (2000), who 
emphasizes the dilutive effect of stock options on EPS. Weisbenner (2000) 
argues that managers are trying to mitigate the EPS dilution effect with share 
repurchases for two reasons: The first is that EPS is used in equity valuations 
by investors and analysts. The second is that executive compensation is often 
EPS performance related. His study provides supportive evidence that the 
number of outstanding stock options and repurchases are positively related. 
Similar are the results of Fenn and Liang (1999), who find a positive 
relationship between managerial stock options and share repurchases. Finally, 
Young and Yang (2011) in their UK market based study focus on the 
relationship between repurchases and the existence of EPS performance 
related conditions in executive compensation contracts. Their study finds that 
firms which have EPS related conditions in the executive compensation 
contracts are more likely to use repurchases as a payout method. 
In general the positive impact of repurchases on EPS (either through the 
mitigation of the dilution from exercised options or equity valuation or 
executive compensation) has been supported by executive responses in 
various surveys. For example in the Bancel and Mittoo (2005) survey 75% of 
US and 52% of European managers find rate the ’’increasing EPS’’ as an 
important or very important reason to repurchase. In the same survey the 
respective percentages for ’’offsetting the dillutionary effects of stock option 
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plans’’ (p38), are 67% and 29% respectively. Exactly the same high 
percentages are reported from US managers in the survey of Brav et al. 
(2003). Finally, Dhanani and Roberts (2009) report that increasing EPS is the 
second most frequently reported motive to repurchase stock as it has been 
identifies as a motive from 49% UK managers surveyed. 
Quantitative and survey based research seem to agree that the existence of 
employee and managerial options and EPS related managerial compensation 
on payout policy do affect payout policy. Both research methods indicate that 
the existence of such conditions favor repurchases as a method of returning 
cash to shareholders, everything else held constant. 
2.5.4 The Gearing motive 
Since a repurchase of stock, especially if it is followed by a cancellation of 
shares, has a direct effect on the company’s debt to equity ratio, many 
researchers theorized that repurchases might be used to move the company’s 
capital structure towards a more preferred level. Managerial reviews give 
moderate support to the capital structure hypothesis in both the US and the 
UK. In the US only 10% of managers consider ’’changing the capital structure 
of the firms’’ as a highly important reason for repurchase, while 54% state 
that it does not have any effect on the decision to repurchase (Baker et al., 
2003). In the UK, Dhanani and Roberts (2009) report that 36% of the 
repurchasing firms’ sample agreed that ’’increasing the firm’s gearing’’ is a 
repurchase motive. The exception is Dixon et al.’s (2008) survey of UK firms 
where the statement that firms utilize repurchases a method of increasing the 
firms’ leverage is ranked as the most important by managers’ responses. This 
extreme difference in ranking between the two UK surveys can be explained 
by the different period, which the survey was conducted. The survey of Dixon 
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et al. (2008) was conducted before the change in the UK regulatory framework 
that allowed the repurchase shares to be kept as treasury stock. Before the 
change repurchase share had to be cancelled. Therefore, as the authors 
indicate, it is not surprising that their study finds the most significant motive 
to be ’’to achieve an optimal capital structure’’.  
Finally, Ditmmar (2000) uses a series of Tobit regressions to test hypotheses 
derived from all repurchase related theories. According to the results the 
author argues that the significance of each motive varies over time and that 
firms during certain periods use repurchases to change their capital structure. 
From the above research findings it seems that sometimes firms do consider 
repurchases as a mean alter their capital structure. However, the frequency of 
this motive might be conditional upon other factors (e.g. the existence of a 
legal framework as the UK where repurchased stock had to be cancelled). 
2.5.5 Summary and Discussion 
This sub-chapter has presented the most significant theories and empirical 
research regarding payout policy. The focus was on dividends and share 
repurchases, as these two methods have been the predominant forms of 
payout in the last two decades. The emerging share repurchase literature has 
borrowed many of its theories from dividends. As a result, the theoretical 
framework that was used to investigate these two forms of payouts came from 
the three theories: signaling theory, agency theory and tax based theory. In 
the case of share repurchases two additional theories have been developed 
which attribute the increasing use of this method to certain motives such as: 
altering the company’s capital structure and influencing EPS (either to mitigate 
the dilution effect of employee stock options or increase EPS when executive 
compensation is EPS related). 
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It appears that each theory independently cannot fully explain payout policy 
decision-making. However, quantitative studies and managerial views identify 
most of the payout policy determinants derived from these theories as valid. 
However, the relative importance of each factor is not clear and requires 
further research. Furthermore, as Weigand and Baker (2009) highlight, studies 
so far have not been able to explain clearly how firms choose between 
dividends and share repurchases. This research aims to contribute to our 
understanding of this issue. By investigating, the interaction of share 
repurchases with other financial decisions we expect to provide a greater 
understanding of how firms choose between dividends and share repurchases 
as a payout method.  
As in the case with capital structure, the lack of clear results may be attributed 
to the fact that dividend and share repurchases have been investigated in 
isolation from other financial decisions. It may be the case that payout policy 
investigations will produce clearer results when analyzed jointly with other key 
financial policies such as capital structure. A joint evaluation of payout policy 
and capital structure can be justified within both an Agency theory as well as a 
Pecking Order framework. As we shall see in the next part of this section, a 
number of studies have addressed this issue and investigated capital structure 
and dividends jointly using simultaneous equations while providing 
encouraging results. This area of research may be worthwhile of further 
investigation, in terms of possible modifications, which might enhance the 
system of equations. For example, a significant observation is that these 
studies do not recognize share repurchases as a significant component of the 
system even though the use of share repurchases would suggest otherwise.  
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2.6 Interaction and simultaneous determination of Payout 
and Capital Structure Policy 
A point that has been largely ignored by the Corporate Finance literature is the 
possible interdependence between corporate financial policies. Such 
interdependence can be justified both by rational and by existing theories. For 
example, according to McCabe (1979) firm behaviour can be described as the 
process of obtaining limited funds and allocating them to dividends and 
investment. From this viewpoint capital structure, payout and investment 
policy are interdependent. The author therefore argues that the appropriate 
method to investigate corporate financial decision-making is by using 
simultaneous equation systems. However, the majority of research so far has 
investigated each financial decision in isolation while the percentage of studies 
using a system of simultaneous equations seems surprisingly small.  
In addition to the rationale of McCabe (1979), existing theories also provide 
links between distinct financial policies (Faulkender et al. 2006; Aggarwan and 
Kyaw 2010). A first example is the Pecking Order theory of Myers (1984). This 
theory links capital structure and dividend policy as it hypothesizes that firms 
adjust their dividend payments while taking into consideration retained 
earnings and investment opportunities. Another, example is agency theory. As 
explained previously, Easterbrook (1984) suggests an agency cost explanation 
of dividends that associates dividend policy with capital structure. According to 
the author, firms pay out dividends and consequently issue equity14. 
Therefore, in the context of agency theory, payout policy is linked to capital 
structure decisions. Only comparatively a few papers (McCabe. 1979; Jensen 
et al., 1992; Noronha et al., 1996; Crutchley et al., 1999; Faulkender et al., 
                                       
14 Issuing equity will reduce agency costs in two ways: it will reduce monitoring costs since the firm’s 
management will be under the strict monitoring of the market. In addition, it will force firm’s management to 
be more efficient with the now reduced resourcess under its control. 
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2006; Ding and Murinde, 2010; Aggarwan and Kyaw, 2010) draw on these 
considerations to investigate jointly, capital structure and dividend policy. 
Studies which examine the possibility that capital structure and dividend policy 
are simultaneously determined are even rarer (e.g. Ding and Murinde, 2010; 
Faulkender et al., 2006; Noronha et al., 1996), though their findings generally 
support this contention.  
However, none of these studies includes share repurchases in their modeling. 
While historically dividends represent the most common and widely used 
method of payout, as discussed earlier, more recently the importance of share 
repurchases for corporate payout policies has noticeably increased, both in the 
USA and in the UK. This suggests that research into the relationship between 
dividend payouts and share repurchases and capital structure decisions is a 
timely endeavor. 
However, since research findings regarding share repurchases indicate a 
significant component of payout policy it seems appropriate to include a 
related endogenous variable into this investigation.  
McCabe’s (1979) study is one of the earliest attempts to investigate jointly, 
distinct corporate policies in a sample of US firms. He utilized a three 
simultaneous equation model with new debt, investment and dividend as 
endogenous variables. The results indicate interdependence between these 3 
policies. Investment has a statistically significant negative effect on dividends 
and dividends a statistically significant negative effect on investment. This 
supports the author’s theory that investment and dividends are a competing 
use of funds. In addition, investment and dividends have a positive effect on 
new debt for most of the years of the sample as well as for the pooled sample. 
New debt also seems to have a statistically significant positive effect on 
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dividends and investment for most of the years of the sample. McCabe (1979) 
interprets his findings as strong evidence of interdependence between capital 
structure, dividend policy and investments. He also argues that taking under 
consideration his findings, future attention should focus on results derived 
from simultaneous equation techniques. However, McCabe’s (1979) study does 
not include an ownership control variable, which according to research that is 
more recent affects a firm’s financial policies. Research that is more recent 
indicates that ownership seems to play an important role in determining 
corporate behaviour. In particular, most of the limited number of studies that 
use simultaneous equations include an ownership variable in their modeling.  
This short-coming is remedied by research by Jensen et al. (1992) and 
Crutchley et al. (1999), who investigate corporate decision-making in an 
agency cost and asymmetric information framework. The authors include 
ownership concentration as an endogenous variable in their system of 
equations, in line with theoretical considerations that ownership structures can 
affect agency costs. Jensen et al. (1992) find that insider ownership 
concentration has a statistically significant negative impact on dividends and 
debt but dividend and debt policies do not determine insider ownership. 
Crutchley et al. (1999) expand the system of Jensen et al. (1992) and add 
institutional ownership as an exogenous variable. Their system therefore 
comprises of four equations with debt, dividends, insider ownership and 
institutional ownership as endogenous variables. The authors argue that this 
modification enhances the system. Their findings indicate that debt, dividends, 
insider ownership and institutional ownership are interdependent and 
simultaneously determined. In addition, Crutchley et al.’s (1999) findings 
change different results between 1987 and 1993. More specifically institutional 
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ownership is positively related to debt as well as to dividends for the 1987 
period. However, this relationship turns negative for the 1993 period. The 
authors argue that their system captured the anecdotal fact that institutional 
investors are more actively monitoring firms’ related decisions. Therefore 
institutional ownership has become a substitute for internal monitoring 
mechanisms like dividends and debt. 
While the studies of Noronha et al. (1996) and Ding and Murinde (2010) follow 
a similar theoretical reasoning, their analytical approach differs. Their models 
only acknowledge two endogenous variables, dividends and debt, while 
ownership variables (insider holdings and number of shareholders) are treated 
as exogenous variables. In addition, Noronha et al. (1996) separate their 
sample according to the existence of non-dividend means for mitigating 
agency costs15 and growth16. The authors hypothesize that simultaneity 
between dividends and debt is not expected for the sub group of firms with 
high growth and/or non-dividend mechanisms to reduce agency costs. The 
findings of Noronha et al. (1996) confirm the authors’ hypothesis. Strong 
simultaneity and interaction between capital structure and dividend policy 
were found for the subgroup of firms, which are being characterized by both 
low presence of non-dividend means of reducing agency problems and low 
growth.  
Ding and Murinde (2010) apply the agency framework and simultaneous 
equation system of Noronha et al. (1996) to a sample of UK firms (date 
line1986-1988, 1997-2003). Their research also finds supportive evidence that 
capital structure and dividend policy are simultaneously determined in UK 
                                       
15 Such alternative mechanisms to mitigate agency costs are the presence of a large (shareholding in excess of 
5%) outside blockholders who serve as an external monitors, the possibility/likelihood of takeovers and the use 
of performance related managerial pay aimed at aligning managers’ interests top those of shareholders. 
16 High growth is expected to induce capital market monitoring. 
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firms. However both studies do not include a share repurchase variable, 
despite the fact that in the period under review in Ding and Murinde’s (2010) 
research, share repurchases were soaring in the UK.  
Finally, a recent study by Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) finds a positive 
simultaneous interaction between capital structure and dividends in a sample 
of multinational firms. However, their research also ignores share repurchases. 
In general research findings from studies that utilize simultaneous equations 
systems indicate the capital structure and dividends are simultaneously 
determined. However, the direction of these relationships is not clear. 
Furthermore, these studies do not account for share repurchases as an 
important component of payout policy. The modification of such systems in 
order to include a share repurchases endogenous variable is worthwhile as it 
might provide more insight into corporate financial decision-making. 
Furthermore, it will likely improve the system of equations as it will reduce 
omitted variable bias and provide more clear indications as far the direction 
between the interdependent relationships of financial policies is concerned. 
2.7 Summary 
The rise of share repurchases as a popular payout method has raised concerns 
about their impact on key financial decisions such as investment, dividends 
and capital structure (FINNOV, 2012; Foroohar 2013). So far there has been 
research into the relationship e.g. between share repurchases and dividend 
pay-outs (see Jagannathan et al. 2000; Grullon and Michaely 2002) indicating 
dividend substitution however results are not conclusive. Furthermore, it 
appears that there has been no research, which investigates the possible 
interaction between share repurchases and other key financial decisions such 
as investment and leverage. In addition, the aforementioned decisions have 
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been mostly investigated in isolation from one another and thus are likely to 
suffer from misspecification, endogeneity and spurious correlation concerns 
leading to wrong causality inferences (Jensen et al. 1992; Faulkender et al. 
2006; Aggarwan and Kyaw 2010).  
In order to address these methodological concerns this study, considering the 
period before and after the credit crunch, employs a simultaneous equation 
framework to investigate the interdependence in financial decision-making 
suggested by extant theories. By investigating jointly share repurchases, 
dividends, investment and capital structure endogeneity and misspecification 
concerns are accounted for. Furthermore, the findings provide empirical 
support to concerns regarding the impact of share repurchases on key 
financial decisions. Thus, they are expected to be of importance to regulators 
and investors alike. Furthermore, the sample country choice (US, UK) and the 
time frame of this study (the pre and post crisis period) provide the 
opportunity for more insight on how different macroeconomic conditions and 
national differences can impact on capital structure, dividend, share 
repurchase and investment decisions and more specifically on the integration 
of share repurchases into firm financial decision-making. 
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3. Are share repurchases an integral part of US 
financial decision-making? 
3.1 Introduction 
As identified in the previous chapter, the frequency and magnitude of share 
repurchases as a form of payout has raised economists’ concerns regarding 
their effect on key financial decisions such as investment and capital structure 
(FINNOV, 2012; Foroohar 2013). However, there has been no research, which 
investigates the interactions between share repurchases, capital structure and 
investment even though extant theories and empirical research suggest such 
interactions. There has been research into the relationship e.g. between share 
repurchases and dividend pay-outs (see Jagannathan et al. 2000; Grullon and 
Michaely 2002) indicating dividend substitution, however results are not 
conclusive. Moreover, the aforementioned decisions have been mostly 
investigated in isolation from one another and it is therefore highly probable 
that previous models used to investigate these financial decisions are 
misspecified and suffer from endogeneity problems (Aggarwan and Kyaw, 
2010).  
In order to address both the lack of research into the relationship between 
share repurchases, dividends as well as investment and leverage and concerns 
about misspecification in previous research into financial decision-making, we 
investigate jointly capital structure, payout and investment policies within a 
system of equations using sample of large US companies. The majority of 
publicly listed US firms distribute funds both through dividends and share 
repurchases (Floyd et al. 2013), and in 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2006 the 
annual level of share repurchases actually surpassed that of cash dividends 
(Dittmar 2008). As share repurchases are especially prevalent in the USA, in 
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terms of both magnitude and frequency we expect that US firms are 
particularly likely to integrate share repurchase programs systematically into 
their financial decision-making. 
In order to address these methodological concerns this study, considering the 
period before and after the credit crunch, employs a simultaneous equation 
framework to investigate the interdependence in financial decision-making 
suggested by extant theories. By investigating jointly share repurchases, 
dividends, investment and capital structure endogeneity and misspecification 
concerns are accounted for.  
In order to estimate the system of equations we utilize ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions as well as two simultaneous estimation techniques, two-
stage least squares (2SLS) and three stage least squares (3SLS) regressions. 
This allows for a more appropriate testing of existing dividend and capital 
structure theories and determinants, as endogeneity and spurious correlation 
issues expected to be present in previous research are accounted for. In this 
context, we are able to draw on the rich US-based theoretical and empirical 
literature regarding capital structure, payout and investment policies to 
identify suitable control variables to design an appropriate system of 
equations. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
relevant payout and capital structure theories and identifies possible relations 
regarding capital structure, dividend payout, share repurchases and 
investment. Section 3 provides a description of the data and an explanation of 
the chosen research methodology. Section 4 describes and interprets the 
empirical results. Section 5 presents the conclusion. 
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3.2 Literature review 
Research into determinants of firms’ capital structures and payout policies has 
been heavily influenced by Modigliani and Miller’s “Capital Structure 
Irrelevance” (1958) and "Dividend Irrelevance” theorems (1961). Under a set 
of restrictive assumptions, such as no taxation, no asymmetric information 
and no transaction, agency or bankruptcy costs, Modigliani and Miller show 
that real value cannot be created just by financing or payout decisions but 
only through a firm’s operations and choice of investment projects. However, 
once these assumptions are relaxed, theories such as Pecking Order Theory, 
Free Cash Flow and Agency Theory, Signaling Theory, Trade-Off Theory and 
Tax Clientele Theory can be used to explain why capital structure and dividend 
policies are indeed value relevant. Many of the theories developed to explain 
specifically the rationale for and implications of dividend policies have 
subsequently been adapted to explain the phenomenon of share repurchases 
(see Grullon and Ikenberry 2000; Oswald and Young 2008).  
However, the different theories often lead to different predictions about the 
drivers of and relationships between capital structure, investment and payout 
policies. Moreover, empirical research fails to provide clear evidence to support 
one theory over another. For example, research by De Angelo and De Angelo 
(2007) suggests that, contrary to Pecking Order Theory, some firms issue 
equity in situations when debt financing is available and that, contrary to 
Trade-Off Theory, very profitable firms often maintain low debt levels and thus 
do not exploit tax shields.  
In addition, empirical studies often produce inconsistent results (Faulkender et 
al. 2006; Frank and Goyal 2009). Faulkender et al. (2006, p.1) suggest that 
these inconsistencies could be due to the fact that so far the empirical 
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literature has largely “treated dividend policy and capital structure as two 
distinct choices, even though there is reason to believe that there are common 
factors affecting both”. Similarly, Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010, pp.142) argue 
that due to “the interdependence between dividend policy and capital 
structure, empirical studies of capital structure … are most likely mis-specified 
unless they include an assessment of dividend policy”. 
One of the most prominent theories to suggest that decisions about firms' 
capital structure, payout and investment policies are related is Pecking Order 
Theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Malijuf 1984). Pecking Order Theory is based 
on the premise that investors’ are aware that managers might engage in 
opportunistic behaviour and obscure or distort information about the 
company’s risk, value and investment opportunities. This is expected to make 
investors suspicious about the firms’ financing decisions and lead to the 
mispricing of firms’ securities, high costs of external, in particular equity, 
capital and might limit firms’ ability to fund profitable investment projects. It is 
therefore assumed that, to protect their own interests and the interests of 
existing shareholders, managers prefer internal over external financing. With 
regard to mobilizing internal finance, firms are expected to utilize their free 
cash flow, draw down their cash balances or even adjust their payout policies 
to fund investment opportunities. However, given cash flow limitations, 
fluctuations, and the ‘stickiness’ of dividends, many firms ’internal financing 
abilities are curtailed and managers might have to resort to external financing. 
In this case, managers are expected to favor issuing less risky securities 
where asymmetric information costs are more limited, so that debt is preferred 
over hybrid securities, the last resort being equity finance.  
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Consequently, Pecking Order Theory implies a negative relationship between 
firms’ investment opportunities and their dividend payout ratios or share 
repurchases. Moreover, Pecking Order Theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, 
firms with higher dividend payout ratios will have lower retained earnings and 
thus need to rely more on debt to fund investment opportunities. Based on 
this logic firms that engage in share repurchases either need to reduce 
dividends or they need to raise outside capital, preferably debt, to fund 
investment opportunities. Pecking Order Theory therefore predicts that in the 
long run the use of share repurchases leads to a decrease in the dividend 
payout ratio and/or an increase in the firm’s leverage.  
Another prominent theory, which suggests that decisions about firms' capital 
structure, payout and investment policies are related, is Free Cash Flow 
Theory (Jensen 1986). Free Cash Flow Theory suggests that debt, dividends 
and share repurchases can be utilized to reduce the agency costs of free cash 
flow. This is based on the assumption that, due to the separation of ownership 
from control, managers of firms, which generate high levels of free cash flow, 
might engage in opportunistic behaviour and waste funds on inefficient 
investments or managerial perquisites. In competitive markets, investors’ 
awareness of the risk of managerial exploitation of free cash flows can lead to 
pressure to reduce free cash flows by returning funds to shareholders. In this 
context, Jensen (1986) argues that debt can be seen as an alternative, more 
binding mechanism, to reduce free cash flows than dividend payments. Jensen 
reasons that in markets with limited control via competitive markets, 
managers are likely to prefer reducing free cash flow via share repurchases, 
over dividends and over leverage. This implies a negative relationship between 
these three variables. 
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However, if firms are operating in competitive markets, Jensen (1986) 
suggests that the increase of leverage ratios to reduce agency costs is likely to 
be correlated with share repurchases, which not only aids the reduction of free 
cash flow and but also ensures that the increase in debt does not lead to an 
increase in the firms’ total capital. Thus, for firms, which generate a large 
amount of free cash flow and operate in competitive markets, Jensen’s 
arguments point towards a positive relationship between leverage and share 
repurchases.  
Moreover, given Jensen’s (1986, p. 323) premise that “free cash flow is cash 
flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”, Free Cash 
Flow Theory suggests ceteris paribus a negative relationship between firms’ 
profitable investment opportunities and dividends and/or share repurchases. 
With regard to the relationship between firms’ profitable investment 
opportunities and leverage, Jensen’s (1986) reasoning suggests a positive 
relationship for resources constrained firms and a negative relationship for 
firms with high amounts of free cash flows. 
Prior research into the joint determination of capital structure, dividend and 
investment policy generally supports the contention that these three issues are 
interrelated (see McCabe 1979; Jensen et al. 1992; Barclay et al. 1995; 
Noronha et al. 1996; Crutchley et al. 1999; Faulkender et al. 2006; Ding and 
Murinde 2010; Aggarwan and Kyaw 2010). However, as none of these studies 
includes share repurchases in their considerations, those that consider more 
recent samples in which share repurchases were prevalent are likely to be 
misspecified. 
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McCabe’s (1979) study is one of the earliest attempts to investigate jointly 
distinct corporate policies in a sample of US firms. He utilized a three 
simultaneous equation model with new debt, investment and dividends as 
endogenous variables. The results indicate interdependence between these 
three policies. Investment was found to have a statistically significant negative 
effect on dividends and dividends a statistically significant negative effect on 
investment, supporting the author’s contention that investment and dividends 
are competing uses of funds. In addition, investment and dividends had a 
positive effect on new debt and vice versa for most of the years of the sample. 
McCabe (1979) interprets his findings as strong evidence of interdependence 
between capital structure, dividend policy and investments. He also argues 
that taking under consideration his findings, future attention should focus on 
results derived from simultaneous equation techniques. However, McCabe’s 
(1979) model fails to control for important variables, such as growth 
opportunities and firm size, making it prone to misspecification problems. 
Adedeji (1998) who tests the Pecking Order Theory in the UK, using a similar 
three-equation system with a wider set of control variables, remedies this. 
Adedeji’s (1998) findings are similar to McCabe's (1979) with regard to finding 
a negative relationship between investment and dividends. However, contrary 
to McCabe's study, Adedeji (1998) fails to identify a significant impact of debt 
on investment. However, this deviation might relate to the fact that Adedeji 
(1998) uses capital structure levels instead of new debt as his endogenous 
variable. 
Several studies investigate corporate decision-making in an agency cost and 
asymmetric information framework (see Ding and Murinde 2010 for the UK 
market and Jensen et al. 1992, Noronha et al. 1996, and Crutchley et al. 1999 
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for the US market). These studies report strong simultaneity and a negative 
interaction between capital structure and dividend policy. Noronha et al. 
(1996) and Ding and Murinde (2010) apply the same theoretical reasoning and 
modeling to samples of US and UK firms respectively. Their models only 
acknowledge two endogenous variables, dividends and leverage, and ignore 
both share repurchases and investment.  
While Jensen et al. (1992) and Crutchley et al. (1999) include investment in 
their modeling; they only integrate it as an exogenous variable. These studies 
also confirm the negative simultaneous relationship between capital structure 
and dividend policy reported by Noronha et al. (1996) and Ding and Murinde 
(2010).  
Finally, a recent study by Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) finds a positive 
simultaneous interaction between capital structure and dividends in a sample 
of multinational firms. However, their modeling also ignores investment and 
share repurchases. 
In summary, research findings from studies that utilize simultaneous 
equations systems indicate the capital structure, dividends and investment are 
likely to be simultaneously determined in US firms. However, findings 
regarding the direction of these relationships are inconclusive. Moreover, prior 
studies fail to account for share repurchases as an important component of 
payout policy.  
The extension of simultaneous equations systems in order to include share 
repurchases as an endogenous variable is worthwhile as it might provide more 
insight into corporate financial decision-making. Furthermore, it is likely 
improve the system of equations as it will reduce omitted variable bias and 
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provide clearer indications regarding the directions of the interdependent 
relationships of financial policies. 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Sample 
As we want to explore whether share repurchases are an integral part of large 
US firms’ financial decision-making the initial sample comprises of firms listed 
in the S&P 500 index. The sample period is 2005-2011. Corporate financial 
data for this study is collected from the Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database.  
As decisions about investments, capital structure and pay-out policies are 
deemed long-term decisions (Adedeji 1998; McCabe 1979) we follow previous 
literature (Adedeji, 1998) and use 4 year-averages for our variables. The 
sample period therefore allows us to consider whether the relationship 
between key financial decisions changed due to the 2008/09 credit crunch. 
Given earlier suggestions that share repurchases provide more flexibility to 
managers and might therefore be taken subsequent to, rather than 
simultaneously with, dividend and investment decisions (Brav et al. 2005), we 
are particularly interested whether the interaction between share repurchases 
on other financial decisions recedes after the credit crunch.  
We therefore split the period under observation into two subsamples 2005-
2008 and 2008-2011. We observe that between 2005 and 2007 share 
repurchases experienced a consistent growth with a small decrease in 2008 
before a much more noticeable contraction in 2009 (see table 4). Considering 
this contraction and keeping in mind the long-term nature of financial 
decisions, we expect that during 2008 many firms readjusted their financial 
Chapter 3. Are share repurchases an integral part of US financial decision-
making? 
92 
 
policies in light of the liquidity crisis, triggered by the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 and the 2008-2009 recession. We therefore 
included 2008 in both periods. 
 
Table 4 Share Repurchases to Net Income (annually 2005-2011) 
Year Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs. 
2005 0.49 0.50 0 1.45 272 
2006 0.67 0.58 0 1.75 272 
2007 0.88 0.77 0 2.35 272 
2008 0.67 0.57 0 1.74 272 
2009 0.27 0.32 0 0.89 272 
2010 0.42 0.41 0 1.18 272 
2011 0.62 0.50 0 1.49 272 
 
Financial and utilities firms as well as firms with missing observations are 
excluded. The final sample consists of 272 firms.  
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3.3.2 The empirical model 
With regard to this study's objectives, we formulate the following system of 
equations, consisting of one equation for each financial decision under 
investigation. For every company i, each financial decision is a function of the 
remaining ones, plus a vector of exogenous control variables related to the 
specific financial decision. Thus, we arrive at the following system of 
equations, 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓1(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1𝑖) + 𝜀1𝑖 (1) 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓2(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2𝑖) + 𝜀2𝑖 (2) 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖 = 𝑓3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3𝑖) + 𝜀3𝑖 (3) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓4(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4𝑖) + 𝜀4𝑖  (4) 
where ε1i, ε2i, ε3i, ε4i are stochastic zero mean error terms. 
The dependent variables LEV, DIV, REP and INV represent Leverage, 
Dividends, Share Repurchases and Investment respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠i1, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠i4 are the respective vectors of exogenous 
control variables for each dependent variable. The control variables included in 
each vector have been identified based on relevant theories and prior 
empirical research. 
We hypothesize that firms make long-run decisions regarding their capital 
structure, payout and investment policies, which are consistent with each 
other. The theoretical considerations about the interdependence between the 
above-mentioned financial decisions imply that the corresponding variables 
(LEV, DIV, REP, INV) are endogenous. As a result, these endogenous variables 
will correlate with the error term in each equation, thus violating the relevant 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumption. Consequently, the estimation of 
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each equation in the system using (OLS) will produce biased and inconsistent 
coefficients.  
Estimation methods that are appropriate in the presence of endogeneity issues 
are two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) and three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
(Gujarati, 2004).  
The first stage of the 2SLS procedure regresses each endogenous variable 
(LEVi, DIVi, REPi, INVi) on every exogenous variable in the system (i.e. the 
control variables included in 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4i) to 
obtain the fitted values. The obtained fitted values are “purged” of the 
influence of the respective disturbance terms. For the second stage of the 
2SLS process, the obtained fitted values are used as instruments, replacing 
the right hand side endogenous variables in equations (1)-(4). The 2SLS 
process produces consistent estimates. However, 2SLS is a limited information 
method as it estimates each equation in the system individually without 
worrying about the restrictions on the other equations in the system and 
hence may be inefficient.  
By contrast, the 3SLS process is a full information method, which estimates all 
the equations in the model simultaneously, thus taking into account any 
restrictions resulting from the omission or inclusion of a variable in each 
equation. However, as Gujarati (2004) notes, 3SLS is sensitive to specification 
errors. Since 3SLS is a full information method, if one equation is misspecified, 
the error is transferred to the rest of the system's equations.  
Instruments are chosen in accordance to previous literature. We follow 
McCabe (1979) and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) and choose firm systematic 
risk (BETA) as an instrumental variable for dividends (DIV). We choose 
bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE) and collateral (COLTRL) as instruments for leverage 
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(LEV) (see Noronha et al 1996; Aivazian et al 2005; Aggarwal and Kyaw 
2010). As share repurchases have not been used as an endogenous variable in 
research so far we base the choice for the relevant instrumental variables on 
two conditions. First, according to theoretical and empirical research these 
variables are correlated to share repurchases. Secondly, these variables have 
not been identified by earlier research as significant determinants of dividends, 
investment and leverage. Therefore, as instruments for share repurchases 
(REP) we use stock options (OPTIONS), share price returns (RETURN), stock 
liquidity (SLIQ) and cash holdings (CASH). Following a similar rationale, 
depreciation (DEPRC) is the instrumental variable for investment (INV).  
In order to produce results comparable to previous studies; and to consider 
the impact of the different strengths and weaknesses of the different 
estimation techniques, this study employs OLS, 2SLS as well as 3SLS 
techniques for the estimation of the system of equations. As it will be shown 
later, the results produced by 2SLS and 3SLS are largely consistent with each 
other.  
3.3.3 Vectors of control variables  
The vectors of control variables are identified based on relevant theories and 
prior empirical research. 
(1) Leverage – 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i 
According to Trade Off Theory (Myers 1984), profitability (ROA) is expected to 
be positively related to leverage. Profitable firms are expected to use more 
debt financing in order to exploit tax shields. The opposite is predicted by 
Pecking Order Theory, which suggests that firms that are more profitable 
prefer internal financing to reduce costs associated with information 
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asymmetry. Prior empirical results using these variables are inconclusive 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995; Wald 1999; Booth et al. 2001; Huang et Song 
2006; Frank and Goyal 2009).  
Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flows Theory predicts that firms, which generate 
high free cash flows, use debt as a mechanism to mitigate agency costs. Thus, 
we expect a positive relationship between Leverage and the Free Cash Flow 
(FCF). 
The predicted impact of firm size (SIZE) on leverage varies according to the 
theory employed. Trade-Off theory predicts a positive correlation between 
leverage and size as larger firms are expected to have a lower default 
probability. Free Cash Flow Theory predicts the same based on the assumption 
that larger firms generate more free cash flows. By contrast, Pecking Order 
Theory predicts a negative relationship between size and leverage, due to the 
assumption that asymmetric information decreases as size increases and large 
firms therefore face less costs of raising equity finance. Studies by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), Frank and Goyal (2009), which utilize 
OLS estimation techniques find that leverage increases with firm size. 
However, using 2SLS and 3SLS estimation methods, Aggarwal and Kyaw 
(2010) report a negative relationship between leverage and firm size. 
Firms with tangible assets can use them as collateral when a firm is taking on 
debt, thus reducing debt’s agency costs (Jensen, 1976). We therefore control 
for collateral (COLTRL). Empirical research generally supports the contention 
that leverage is positively related with collateral (see Rajan and Zingales 1995, 
Chen 2004, Huang and Song 2006, and Frank and Goyal 2009).  
Trade-Off Theory implies that firms determine their debt levels by balancing 
the benefits of debt (tax shields) against the costs of bankruptcy. We therefore 
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control for firms’ bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE). Empirical research by Booth et al. 
(2001), and Frank and Goyal (2009) support this assertion.  
Finally, in line with Wald (1999), Chen (2004) and Delcoure (2007) we control 
for firms’ growth opportunities (GROWTH). Agency Theory suggests that firms 
with good growth opportunities tend to rely more on equity financing due to 
the potential agency costs of debt. The value of shareholders’ equity can be 
viewed as a call option with a strike price equal to the value of debt. Since the 
value of this option increases with the variance of the firm’s future cash flows, 
managers might be tempted to invest in risky projects to increase 
shareholders’ wealth. This will have a negative impact on debtholders, since it 
increases their risk and therefore decreases the value of debt as the same 
fixed cash flow return from their bonds becomes more risky. In order to avoid 
such behaviour creditors often impose restrictive covenants to ensure that 
firms will not substitute existing assets with riskier ones or increase their 
leverage above certain thresholds. This indicates a negative relationship 
between debt and growth opportunities. However, Pecking Order Theory 
suggests the opposite because firms with growth opportunities have greater 
financing needs and therefore higher leverage as managers are reluctant to 
issue stock. Research by Wald (1999) and Chen (2004) on samples of US firms 
support Pecking Order Theory’s contentions that growth opportunities are 
positively related to leverage. 
(2) Dividends - 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2𝑖 
Free Cash Flow Theory suggests that dividends can be used as a mechanism to 
reduce free cash flow (FCF) under managerial control and thereby agency 
costs. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of the FCF on dividends in line 
with previous research by Aggarwal and Kyaw (2011). 
Chapter 3. Are share repurchases an integral part of US financial decision-
making? 
98 
 
Pecking Order Theory suggests that more profitable firms will have the ability 
to maintain a higher level of dividend payout without the risk of resorting to 
external financing, as they generate more internal funds. Studies by Jensen 
(1992), and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) indeed report a positive relationship 
between dividends and profitability. We therefore control for profitability 
(ROA). 
Free Cash Flow Theory predicts a positive relationship between dividends and 
firm size, based on the assumption that larger firms generate more free cash 
flows. This suggests that larger firms (SIZE) have higher payout ratios to 
reduce free cash flows and the corresponding agency costs. Empirical research 
by Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) and Adedeji (1998) indeed find positive 
relationships between firm size and dividend payout.  
As more risky firms are expected to pay lower dividends in order to reduce the 
probability of requiring costly external finance (Rozeff 1982), we follow Rozeff 
(1982) and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) and include a firm risk (BETA) as a 
determinant of dividend payout.  
Finally, we control for firms’ growth opportunities (GROWTH). We expect that, 
in order to avoid the costs of external finance, firms with higher growth 
opportunities will retain earnings instead of distributing them either in form of 
share repurchases or dividends (Rozeff 1982; Crutchley et al. 1999). Rozeff 
(1982) and Crutchley et al. (1999) confirm the expected negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and dividends. 
(3) Share Repurchases - 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3𝑖 
Free Cash Flow Theory suggests that share repurchases are one mechanism 
for distributing excess cash flows to shareholders. This suggests a positive 
relationship between free cash flows and share repurchases. Empirical 
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research consistently supports free cash flows as one of the most important 
determinants for share repurchases (see Dittmar 2000; Oswald and Young 
2008). Indeed, managers tend to rank the existence of free cash flows as one 
of the most important motives for share repurchases (see Brav et al. 2005; 
Dixon et al. 2008; Dhanani and Roberts 2009). We therefore we control for 
firms’ cash flow (FCF). 
As Lee and Suh (2011) present international evidence that share repurchases 
are associated with large cash holdings, we also control for Cash Holdings 
(CASH).  
Signaling Theory suggests that managers might use share repurchases to 
signal positive information to the market. Vermaelen (1981) argues that 
smaller firms are more prone to suffer from information asymmetries as they 
receive less attention by the financial press and analysts. Hence, they are 
most likely to be undervalued. Therefore, share repurchases might be used to 
signal positive information to the market. This suggests a negative relationship 
between firm size and share repurchases. We therefore control for firm size 
(SIZE). However, while Dittmar’s (2000) findings support this expectation, 
Oswald and Young (2008) report a positive relationship. One explanation for 
these inconsistencies might be that both studies use different size proxies, 
specifically total assets and market capitalization respectively. 
If a company is undervalued, it will most likely exhibit a history of low returns 
(Dittmar 2000). We therefore also control for stock return (RETURN). While 
the relevant variable in the share repurchase regression of Dittmar (2000) is 
seldom negative and statistical significant, findings by Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) and De Cesari et al. (2012) suggest that share repurchases are 
negatively related to stock price returns.  
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Kahle (2002) argues that the rise in repurchases can be attributed to the rise 
in the use of stock options as a form of employee and executive compensation. 
In this context share repurchases provide the firm with shares to fund 
employee stock option plans and help managers offset potential earnings per 
share dilution attributable to employee stock option plans (Bens, Nagar, 
Skinner and Wong 2003). We therefore use stock options expenses (OPTIONS) 
as an additional control variable. Research by Fenn and Liang (1999), Kahle 
(2000) and Bens et al. (2003) confirm the expected positive relationship 
between employee stock options and share repurchases.  
In addition, we control for stock liquidity (SLIQ). Brockman et al. (2008) argue 
that, when market liquidity is low, managers might be reluctant to repurchase 
shares as this might increase transaction costs by widening the bid-ask-spread 
and by increasing the price impact of subsequent trades due to the reduced 
float. In contrast, De Cesari et al. (2011) suggest that firms might be able to 
use share repurchases to enhance their shares’ liquidity. Both Brockman et al. 
(2008) and De Cesari (2011) find evidence for a positive relationship between 
share repurchases and stock liquidity. 
Finally, we control for firm growth (GROWTH). Following the reasoning by 
Rozeff (1982) and Crutchley et al. (1999) regarding dividends, we expect 
growing firms to retain earnings instead of distributing them either in the form 
of share repurchases or dividends, in order to avoid the costs of external 
financing.  
(4) Investment - 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4𝑖  
In line with prior literature, we expect that firms’ financial constraints 
adversely affect their ability to fund investment. Since profitable firms are 
expected to be less financially constrained as they generate more funds to 
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finance investment opportunities internally (McCabe 1979; Demarzo, Fishman, 
He and Wang 2012), we expect profitability (ROA) to be positively related to 
investment.  
The previous literature advances two main reasons why depreciation (DEPRC) 
is expected to be positively related to investment. While McCabe (1979) 
suggests that depreciation identifies cash flows, which can be used to fund 
investment, Abel and Eberly (2012) argue that, as the depreciation rate 
reflects the users’ cost of capital, investment is a linear function of the 
depreciation rate.  
While Gibrat’s law suggests that firm size, (SIZE) should not be related to 
investment, prior empirical research into the relationship is inconclusive 
(Prombut et al. 2012). While research which focuses exclusively on very large 
firms tends not to find a statistically significant relationship, research which 
covers smaller firms or the whole range of size classes tends to find evidence 
that firm size is relevant to investment (Baskin 1989; Rahaman 2011; 
Prombutr et al. 2012). 
Finally, firms with more growth opportunities (GROWTH) are expected to 
invest more. Therefore we also control for firms’ growth (Rahaman 2011; 
Prombutr et al. 2012).  
Substituting each of the vectors (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4), 
with the abovementioned variables, we arrive at the following system of 
equations17: 
                                       
17As part of sensitivity testing we controlled for industry effects by re-estimating my 
system of equations including industry dummies in every equation. We did not observe 
any change in the direction of the relationships under investigation, however there were 
changes in statistical significance. Since in many cases the industry dummies were 
insignificant their inclusion most probably increased the coefficients' variance and thus 
affected their statistical significance. 
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(1) LEVi = α0+ α1DIVi + α2REPi+ α3INVi+ α4ROAi+ α5SIZEi+ α6GROWTHi+ 
α7FCFi+ α8COLTRLi+ α9ZSCOREi + ε1  
(2) DIVi = β0 + β1LEVi+ β2REPi+ β3INVi+ β4ROAi+ β5SIZEi+ β6GROWTHi+ 
β7FCFi+ β8BETAi + ε2  
(3) REPi= γ0 + γ1LEV+ γ2DIVi+ γ3INVi+ γ4SIZEi+ γ5GROWTHi+ γ6FCFi+ 
γ7OPTIONSi+ γ8RETURNi+ γ9SLIQi + γ10CASHi + ε3 
(4) INV = δ0 + δ1LEVi+ δ2DIVi+ δ3REPi+ δ4ROAi+ δ5SIZEi+ δ6GROWTHi+ 
δ7DEPRCi + ε4 
As firms’ capital structure, investment and payout decisions are expected to be 
long run decisions, we follow prior research and use cross sectional data. 
McCabe (1979) in particular reasons that the cross sectional method is more 
appropriate for investigating long-term relationships among variables. 
Furthermore, each of the variables in equations (1) - (4) is represented by its 
four-year average. We use four-year averages for two reasons. Firstly, 
average values represent more closely the long-term nature of these key 
financial decisions (Adedeji, 1998). Moreover, share repurchases are irregular 
in nature compared to dividends. Therefore, an average value over a period is 
a more sensible measurement for the relationships under investigation 
(Adedeji, 1998). Secondly, as Adedeji (1998) points out, average values are 
considered to provide more reliable results than single point estimates since 
they can help alleviate measurement errors in the data stemming from 
distortions caused by random events; they also account better for slow 
adjustments. 
The choice of control variables in each equation in the system satisfies the 
rank and order conditions of identification.  
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3.3.4 Proxy selection and definition 
For the aforementioned variables in the model, we use the following proxies: 
Regarding the leverage ratio, we use book values rather than market values. 
Barclay et al. (1995) highlight that corporate treasurers use book values in 
financial planning to prevent “distortions” from market price fluctuations. 
Furthermore, Jensen (1992) argues that book values give a more 
representative picture of a firm’s obtained financing mix.  
We choose Altman's Z Score as a proxy for firms' bankruptcy risk, as it is 
deemed to be a more ‘complete’ measure which considers more than one 
operational characteristic, rather than ‘one dimensional’ alternative proxies 
(such as the standard deviation of earnings). Frank and Goyal (2009) results 
indicate that the Altman's Z-score is one of the most reliable determinants of 
capital structure. 
For the dividend equation, we use BETA as a measure of risk. Given the 
reluctance of managers to cut dividends and consequently the long-term 
nature of this decision, we expect dividend choice to relate to the firm's 
systematic risk. Thus, we choose Beta, which is a measure of the firm's 
systematic risk and closely associated with its operating and financial leverage.  
As a profitability measure, we choose ROA over ROE because of the latter's 
sensitivity to leverage. We choose EBITDA as the numerator, however since 
EBITDA and EBIT are highly correlated, both can be suitable numerators.  
The same applies for the highly correlated Sales and the Market Capitalization 
ratio as proxies for firm size, and Sales Growth and Market Capitalization 
Growth as proxies for growth opportunities. In this study, we use Sales as a 
proxy for firm size and Sales Growth as a proxy for growth opportunities. The 
choice of Sales Growth as a proxy for growth opportunities can be criticized as 
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a backward rather than forward-looking variable. However, the alternative 
proxy for forward looking growth expectations, the Market to Book ratio was 
subject to potential distortion during the credit crunch. During the credit-
crunch, book values were influenced by rapid changes to accounting rules and 
share prices were affected by short-term financial stimuli, quantitative easing 
and falling interest rates, as well as a high level of uncertainty, which led to 
increased market volatility. This suggests that particularly during the period of 
2008-09, market to book values might have been driven by factors only 
vaguely related to individual firm’s growth prospects. 
Finally, regarding Stock Options, most studies (Dittmar 2000; Young and Yang 
2011) use the percentage of shares outstanding held in reserve to cover stock 
options as a proxy. We were not able to access this specific dataset. We 
therefore utilize the stock options expense available from Datastream as an 
alternative. As will be shown later, this proxy was found to have the expected 
positive and statistically significant effect on share repurchases, thus seeming 
to justify its selection. 
To measure share repurchases we use the cash flow statement item from 
Datastream “Purchases of common and preferred stock” as this is deemed the 
most accurate share repurchase measurement (Banyi et al. 2008). Table 5 
summarizes variable definitions. 
The descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 5 Definition of variables 
Variable name 
Variable 
acronym 
Description 
Leverage LEV 
Sum of long term debt plus short term debt 
scaled by total assets. 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
DIV 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income 
after preferred dividends18 
Share repurchase REP 
Share repurchase expenditure scaled by net 
income after preferred dividends 
Investment INV Capital expenditure scaled by total assets 
Profitability ROA 
Return on assets measured as EBITDA scaled by 
total assets 
Cash balance CASH Cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets 
Free cash flow FCF Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets 
Firm risk BETA Firm's market beta 
Collateral COLTRL 
Assets that can be used as collateral measured 
as net property, plant and equipment scaled by 
total assets 
Bankruptcy risk ZSCORE 
Altman’s Z score calculated as 
Z = 1.2
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 1.4
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 
3.3
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 0.6
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 + 
.999
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Firm size SIZE Logarithm of sales 
Growth 
opportunities 
GROWTH 
Sales Growth calculated as logSALESt – 
logSALESt-1 
Depreciation DEPRC Depreciation scaled by total assets 
Total stock return RETURN 
Stock's return calculated as the Log RIt+1 - 
LogRIt, where RI is the stock's return index from 
Datastream. 
The return index presents the theoretical growth 
in value of a theoretical stock holding. This 
holding is deemed to return a daily dividend, 
which is used to purchase new units of the stock 
at the current price. The gross dividend is used. 
RI on the base date =100, then: RIt = RIt-1*(Pit/ 
PIt-1)*(1+D*N-1), Where: RIt= return index on 
                                       
18 Negative net income observations are removed from the sample to ensure 
sensible payout observations. 
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day t, RIt-1= return index on previous day, PIt= 
price index on day t, PIt-1 = price index on 
previous day, D= dividend yield % on day t, N = 
number of working days in the year (taken to be 
260). 
Stock options 
expense 
OPTIONS Stock options expense scaled by total assets 
Stock liquidity SLIQ 
Annual trading volume scaled by the number of 
common shares outstanding 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics-US sample 
2005-2008 2008-2011  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Diff= mean(2005-08) - 
mean(2008-11), 
HO Diff=0 
DIV 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.69 DIV 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.68 
 
-0.03*** 
REP 0.71 0.54 0.00 1.83 REP 0.54 0.39 0.00 1.33 
 
-0.17*** 
INV 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.19 INV 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.15 
 
0.01*** 
LEV 0.21 0.16 0.00 1.20 LEV 0.24 0.23 0.00 1.88 
 
-0.02*** 
BETA 1.13 0.47 0.35 1.98 BETA 1.13 0.47 0.35 1.98 
 
 
GROWTH 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.15 GROWTH 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.09 
 
0.02*** 
SIZE 6.88 0.50 6.04 7.79 SIZE 6.95 0.49 6.15 7.89 
 
-0.07*** 
ROA 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.31 ROA 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.32 
 
0.01*** 
RETURN 0.00 0.05 -0.11 0.10 RETURN 0.00 0.04 -0.09 0.09 
 
0 
CASH 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.45 CASH 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.45 
 
-0.01*** 
FCF 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.25 FCF 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.25 
 
0 
SLIQ 2.59 1.43 1.06 6.40 SLIQ 3.22 1.38 1.51 6.45 
 
-0.99*** 
DEPRC 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 DEPRC 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 
 
0 
ZSCORE 2.22 1.06 0.55 4.37 ZSCORE 2.19 1.04 0.63 4.39 
 
0 
COLTRL 0.26 0.20 0.05 0.74 COLTRL 0.26 0.21 0.04 0.76 
 
0 
OPTIONS 0.55 0.50 0.08 1.85 OPTIONS 0.56 0.49 0.10 1.86 
 
0 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets, DIV: Common 
cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock repurchases 
to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: 
capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, 
BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, 
ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth 
(logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's 
return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return 
index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets. 
 
Before estimating the model we examine if the data follow the normal 
distribution since normality is a basic assumption of OLS, 2SLS and 3SS 
methodology. Table 7 shows the results of the three normality tests. The null 
hypothesis for first two is that the skewness and kurtosis of the sample data is 
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that of a normal distribution. The third test combines the two statistics in an 
overall test statistic similar to the Jarque-Bera normality test. The normality 
tests results suggest a non-normal distribution of our data. In order to deal 
with this we use three measures.  
As a first measure we winsorize19 the data at the conventional 5% level to deal 
with potential outliers before using OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation. Secondly, 
we use two alternative non-parametric estimation techniques, median 
regression and regression with bootstrapped standard errors. Hao and Naiman 
(2007) point out that median-regression estimation, similar to conditional-
mean-regression modelling, can represent the relationship between the central 
location of the response and a set of covariates. Furthermore, Hao and Naiman 
(2007) argue that in cases like our own, when the distribution of the data is 
substantially skewed, the mean is not appropriate for interpretation while the 
median remains highly informative. Therefore, conditional-median estimations 
are more practical.  
As an additional alternative, we use regression estimations with bootstrapped 
standard errors. Guan (2003) and Fox (2008) underline that regression 
estimations with bootstrapped standard errors do not require distributional 
assumptions such as the residuals to be normally distributed and in addition it 
can provide more accurate inferences. This method is based upon resampling 
the regression’s residuals in order to approximate their underlying distribution 
rather than assuming it (e.g normal distribution). Non-parametric estimations 
deal with the non-normality of our data; however, they do not deal with the 
                                       
19 Regression results from the winsorized data have produced more statistically 
significant variables and higher R-squares compared results from to the non-winsorized 
data confirming the distortion from outliers. 
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endogeneity expected to be present in our system of equations. 
We also test for multicollinearity. Tables 16-19 present the VIF 20factors for 
each of the variables in the dividend, share repurchases, investment and 
leverage regressios for the 2005-08 and 2008-11 periods respectively. Results 
indicate no multicollinearity problems. The relevant rule of thumb suggests 
that if a variable has a VIF factor greater than 10 the variable may merit 
further investigation, Gujarati (2004). These variables have a max of 3.94. 
Furthermore, in order to establish the validity of the instruments we employ 
two instrument tests. We use the Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak 
identification. Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are 
weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. Consequently, estimators 
can perform poorly. Low values of the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (i.e lower 
than 10) indicate weak instruments (Stock and Yogo 2005). In addition, we 
use the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that 
all instruments are valid i.e., uncorrelated with the error term. If the computed 
chi-square exceeds the critical chi-square value, we reject the null hypothesis, 
which means that at least one instrument is correlated with the error term and 
therefore the estimates based on the chosen instruments are not valid. Table 
9 presents the instrumental variable tests’ results for each 2SLS regression. 
The weak identification test, as it can be seen from Table 15, indicates that we 
have a weak instrument problem, in every regression, in both periods. The 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is quite low ranging from 1.13 in the investment 
regression in 2005-08 to 5.22 in the dividend regression in 2005-08. Stock 
and Yogo (2005) report that, as a rule of thumb Cragg-Donald Wald F-
                                       
20 VIF factors have been calculated from OLS estimations. 
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statistics below 10 indicate weak instruments. In addition, Sargan test’s 
results indicate that the instruments are correlated with the error term in most 
of the regressions. The exception being the share repurchases and leverage 
equations in 2005-08 and the share repurchases equation in 2008-11.  
The instrumental variables tests cast doubt on instrument validity. The 
problem of weak instruments is common in similar studies. Most studies which 
employ instrumental variables do not report tests regarding their validity (see 
Jensen et al. 1992; Noronha et al. 1996; Adedeji 1998; Crutchley et al. 1999; 
Ding and Murinde 2010, Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). Furthermore, regression 
results from some of the aforementioned studies indicate weak instrument 
problems. A typical example is in Jensen (1992) where the variable fixed 
assets, serving as an instrument for leverage, is not statistically significant in 
the leverage equation21. Similar cases are reported in the majority of the 
aforementioned studies. However, instrument validity is not usually discussed 
or tested. This might be due to the difficulty of finding valid instruments 
underlined by Gujarati (2004). 
Invalid instruments can produce poorer results than OLS as the relevant 2SLS 
and 3SLS estimators can have large standard errors and large asymptotic bias 
(Woolridge 2006). Therefore, l consider both the results from the OLS 
regressions and the non-parametric regression to consider the robustness of 
the results. Non-parametric estimations, are expected to produce more valid 
results than OLS as they deal with non-normality issues in our data. 
 
                                       
21 The authors investigate simultaneity between leverage, dividends, insider and 
institutional ownership in two periods 1982 and 1987. Fixes assets is statistically 
insignificant in the 1987 estimations. 
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Table 7 Normality Tests-US sample 
  2005-08   2008-11 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Prob>chi2 Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Prob>chi2 
BETA 272 0.59 0.00 0.00 BETA 272 0.59 0.00 0.00 
DIV 272 0.00 0.48 0.00 DIV 272 0.01 0.00 0.00 
ROA 272 0.63 0.01 0.03 ROA 272 0.00 0.42 0.01 
DEPR 272 0.00 0.27 0.00 DEPR 272 0.00 0.25 0.00 
INV 272 0.00 0.00 0.00 INV 272 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COLTRL 272 0.00 0.79 0.00 COLTRL 272 0.00 0.48 0.00 
LEV 272 0.02 0.00 0.00 LEV 272 0.01 0.03 0.01 
REP 272 0.00 0.00 0.00 REP 272 0.01 0.00 0.00 
RETURN 272 0.31 0.10 0.15 RETURN 272 0.98 0.06 0.17 
OPTION 272 0.00 0.01 0.00 OPTION 272 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CASH 272 0.00 0.56 0.00 CASH 272 0.00 0.69 0.00 
FCF 272 0.01 0.00 0.00 FCF 272 0.00 0.09 0.00 
SIZE 272 0.25 0.00 0.00 SIZE 272 0.05 0.00 0.00 
GROWTH 272 0.00 0.30 0.00 GROWTH 272 0.00 0.81 0.01 
SLIQ 272 0.00 0.02 0.00 SLIQ 272 0.00 0.66 0.00 
ZSCORE 272 0.03 0.00 0.00 ZSCORE 272 0.00 0.02 0.00 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets. , DIV: Common cash dividends scaled by net income after 
preferred dividends, REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: 
capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s 
Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: 
stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock 
options expense to total assets 
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3.4 Findings and Analysis 
3.4.1 Non-parametric estimations 
Tables 10-12 report the non-parametric estimation results.  
Both the median and the bootstrapping regression show that share 
repurchases do have an impact on investment, as the respective coefficient is 
statistically insignificant in both periods. This suggests that, all else equal, 
when firms increase their share repurchase payouts they invest less and vice 
versa. This supports concerns that share repurchases might limit the 
availability of firms to engage in productive investment (FINNOV, 2012).  
The non-parametric results show moderate support towards dividend 
substitution. The coefficient of share repurchases in the dividend regressions is 
generally negative however; it is statistically significant only in the median 
regression in 2008-11. However, as it will be shown later the aforementioned 
coefficient is consistently negative and statistically significant in both periods 
in the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimations providing additional support to the 
dividend substitution hypothesis. 
The influence of share repurchases on investment and on dividends is in 
accordance with the Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) where share 
repurchases as a use of funds have a negative impact on other uses of funds 
(i.e investment and dividends).  
There are also signs that share repurchases have a positive effect on leverage 
however this is statistically significant only in the bootstrapping estimations in 
2005-8 and in the median estimations in 2008-11. Again this is in line to the 
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Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) where share repurchases as a use 
of funds have a positive impact on sources of funds (i.e. debt financing). 
The effect of dividends on investment is consistent between periods. Dividends 
exhibit a negative and statistically significant impact on investment in both 
periods according to both non-parametric estimations methods.  
Dividends seem to impact on share repurchases. According to both non-
parametric estimations in 2005-08, dividends’ effect on share repurchases is 
statistically significant and negative. This is supportive of the dividend 
substitution hypothesis by Grullon and Michaely (2002). In 2008-11, the 
relevant coefficient is still negative but statistically insignificant.  
Finally, the effect of dividends on leverage is not consistent between periods 
and estimation techniques. Only in 2005-08 and in the median regression 
dividends have a positive effect on leverage. This supports the Budget 
Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) as a greater use of dividends leads to a 
greater use in debt financing. It is also supportive of the Pecking Order theory, 
which suggests that firms with higher dividend payout ratios will have lower 
retained earnings and thus need to rely more on debt financing to fund 
investment opportunities. In 2008-11, the coefficient on dividends is 
insignificant in both the median and the bootstrapping estimations.  
Leverage does not seem to impact on investment. The coefficient of the 
leverage variable in the investment equation is statistically insignificant it both 
periods and across both non-parametric estimation techniques. The effect of 
leverage on dividends seems to be positive. However, only according to the 
median estimations this positive effect is statistically significant effect on 
dividends in 2005-08. However, in the bootstrapping estimations this effect is 
Chapter 3. Are share repurchases an integral part of US financial decision-
making? 
114 
 
statistically insignificant. This is in accordance to the Budget Constraint Theory 
of McCabe (1969) where sources of funds have a positive impact on uses of 
funds. 
Investment has a robust negative impact on dividends in both periods. In 
support of the Budget Constraint theory, the coefficient of the investment 
variable in the dividend non-parametric regressions is always negative and 
statistically significant. In addition, investment seems to have a negative 
impact on share repurchases. However, this impact seems to be statistically 
significant only in the bootstrapping estimations.  
Regarding the control variables, findings are in accordance to earlier research. 
Free cash flows show a consistent, positive and statistically significant effect 
on share repurchases. This is in line with Free Cash Flow Theory. Similar 
results are reported by earlier studies (see Dittmar 2000; Oswald and Young 
2008; Dixon et al. 2008; Dhanani and Roberts 2009). Moreover, the findings 
confirm the significance of stock options. The coefficient on stock options is 
consistently positive and statistically significant supporting the option funding 
hypothesis of Kahle (2000). In addition, growth opportunities seem to have a 
consistent negative effect on share repurchases. US firms appear to reduce 
share repurchases in the presence of growth opportunities. This is in line to 
Rozeff (1982) and Crutchley et al (1999) who suggest that firms with growth 
opportunities are likely to retain earnings instead of distributing them in order 
to avoid the costs of external financing. Regarding the stock return variable it 
is negative and statistical significant only in the 2005-08. This is in support of 
the undervaluation motive as in Dittmar (2000). We find no evidence of cash 
and stock liquidity to have a consistent effect on share repurchases. 
Chapter 3. Are share repurchases an integral part of US financial decision-
making? 
115 
 
In the dividend regressions, the findings show that free cash flows (FCF) and 
profitability (ROA) are significant dividend determinants. These variables have 
respectively a consistent negative and positive effect on dividends. The 
positive effect of profitability on dividends is in line with Pecking Order Theory. 
However, US firms do not seem to distribute free cash flows via dividend 
payouts. Firm risk has the expected negative effect on dividends however, this 
is statistically significant only in the median estimations. In addition, growth 
opportunities (GROWTH) are not consistently negatively related to dividends. 
Finally, firm size does not have a statistically significant effect on dividends. 
In the leverage regressions, non-parametric estimations indicate that 
bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE), firm size (SIZE) and free cash flows are significant 
capital structure determinants. Bankruptcy risk has a negative impact while 
size a positive one. These relationships are in line with the Trade Off theory. 
This result is in accordance to Frank and Goyal (2009) who argue that 
Altman's Z-score is one of the most reliable capital structure determinants. In 
addition, non-parametric estimations suggest that collateral (COLTRL) has as 
significant effect on capital structure. Collateral (COLTRL) is positive and 
statistically significant in both bootstrapping and median estimations. Jensen 
(1976) argues that firms with tangible assets can use them as collateral when 
a firm is taking on debt, thus reducing debt’s agency costs. Profitability, 
growth opportunities and size do not seem to have a consistent effect on 
capital structure.  
In the investment equation profitability, growth opportunities and depreciation 
seem to have the expected positive effect on investment. The positive effect of 
profitability on investment is in accordance to McCabe (1979) who argues that 
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sources of funds (earnings) have a positive effect on uses of funds 
(investment). In addition, McCabe (1979) suggests that depreciation identifies 
cash flows, which can be used to fund investment. This finding is also in line to 
Abel and Eberly (2012) who argue that, as the depreciation rate reflects the 
users’ cost of capital, investment is a linear function of the depreciation rate. 
Firm size and growth opportunities do not seem to have an effect on 
investment. 
3.4.2 Parametric estimations 
Table 13-15 presents the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS results regarding the 
relationships between share repurchases, dividends, investment and capital 
structure.  
In general, the employed methodologies have produced generally similar 
results with a few differences regarding interactions between financial 
decisions. Results differ mainly between methods, which deal with endogeneity 
(2SLS, 3SLS), and methods which do not (OLS, median regression, regression 
with bootstrapped standard errors).  
The results indicate that share repurchases do have an effect on investment, 
dividends and leverage for both the period before and after the credit crunch. 
Considering the reverse relationship between investment and share 
repurchases we also find an equally robust negative relationship for both 
periods. This suggest that, ceteris paribus, when firms engage more in share 
repurchases they tend to invest less and vice versa. This suggests that 
concerns that market pressure for share repurchases might limit the 
availability of firms to engage in productive investment (FINNOV, 2012) might 
be substantiated. However, the fact that growth opportunities (GROWTH) are 
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related consistently and negatively to share repurchases mitigates these 
concerns to some extent. It appears that managers do not starve their firms of 
opportunities to engage in positive revenue development in order to fund 
share repurchases. 
The results also consistently indicate that share repurchases have a negative 
effect on dividends for both, the period before and after the credit crunch. 
With the exception of the 2SLS regression for the 2008-11 period we also find 
a statistically negative impact of dividends on share repurchases for both 
periods. These findings therefore provide further evidence for dividend and 
share repurchase substitution (Grullon and Michaely 2002; Jiang et al. 2013; 
Kulchania 2013). 
While the research suggests a consistently significant negative impact of 
investment on dividends, interestingly, with regard to the impact of dividends 
on investment, we only establish a statistically significant negative relationship 
in the period of 2005-2008. After the credit crunch, many firms were reluctant 
to invest due to uncertainties about the timing and pace of the economic 
recovery. While in many firms this lead to surplus cash accumulation, 
managers are likely to have been reluctant to reduce the cash surplus by 
increasing dividends due to their sticky nature (Jensen 1986) and the intention 
to expand investment once the economic recovery had stabilized.  
Overall, these results suggest that financial decisions about share repurchases, 
dividends and investment are interrelated in line with Pecking Order and Free 
Cash Flow theory. The findings therefore support the validity of the extension 
of earlier research e.g. by McCabe (1979) and Adedeji (1998) by including 
share repurchases rather than merely dividends when considering firms’ pay-
out and investment policies. The results provide further support for McCabe's 
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(1979) Budget Constraint Hypothesis, which suggests that payout policies and 
investment are competing uses of funds. 
In line with Free Cash Flow theory, we find that free cash flow is consistently 
positively and sales growth consistently negatively related to share 
repurchases. This suggests that firms with limited growth opportunities utilize 
share repurchases to return surplus funds to investors. In general, these 
results confirm previous evidence regarding the main determinants of share 
repurchases (see Dittmar 2000; Dixon et al. 2008; Dhanani and Roberts 2009; 
Young and Yang 2011). 
With regard to the relationship between capital structure and pay-out policies 
and investment we do not find any statistically significant impact of leverage 
on investment. With regard to the impact of leverage on share repurchases 
only the 3SLS estimation for the period of 2005-2008 indicates a clear 
statistically positive relationship. Concerning the impact of investment and 
share repurchases on leverage, only the 3SLS estimation for the period of 
2005-2008 indicates a clear statistically positive relationship. 
By contrast, we find consistent evidence for a statistically significant positive 
impact of leverage on dividends which holds across periods and estimation 
techniques. With the exception of the OLS regression for the period 2008-
2011, the findings also consistently suggest a statistically significant positive 
impact of dividends on leverage. The positive relationship between dividends 
and leverage suggests that both mechanisms are complementary, rather than 
substitutive, i.e. firms with higher (lower) leverage also tend to have higher 
(lower) dividend payout ratios and vice versa. However, this relationship 
cannot be explained by agency theoretical considerations, which suggest that 
managers respond to market pressures to reduce free cash flow by increasing 
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leverage and returning cash to investors via dividends (Jensen, 1986), as in 
this case one would expect free cash flows (FCF) to have a statistically 
significant positive relationship with both leverage and dividends. By contrast, 
the findings suggest a significant negative relationship between free cash flows 
and leverage and no statistically significantly impact of free cash flow on 
dividends. The negative relationship between free cash flows and leverage 
supports the contention of Pecking Order theory that ceteris paribus managers 
prefer to use internally generated funds over external finance.  
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Table 8 Summary of Non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Dependent variables, US sample 
 
 *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively 
LEV: long term debt to total assets (book values), DIV: dividend payout (Common Dividends (Cash) to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - 
Preferred Dividend Requirement), REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital 
expenditures to total assets, 
 
2005-2008 Median regression Bootstrapping regression 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV  -1.93*** -0.29 -0.88**  -1.82*** -8.34*** -0.74*** 
DIV -0.010***  -0.19*** 0. 15*** -0.02**  -2.67*** -0.01 
REP -0.01*** -0. 01  0.01 -0.02*** 0.01  0.13** 
LEV 0.01 0.13* 0.64***  0.01 0.85 0.23  
2008-11 
Median regression Bootstrapping regression 
INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 INV  -1.75*** --0.01 -0.78***  -2.62*** -0.83* -0.70* 
DIV -0.01*  -0.07 -0.02 -0.01  -0.02 -0.01 
REP -0.01*** -0.06**  0.05** -0.03*** -0.02  0.03 
LEV 0.01 0.12** 0.18  0.01 0.02 0.02*  
 
No. observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
Chapter 3. Are share repurchases an integral part of US financial decision-making? 
121 
 
 
Table 9 Summary of Non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Control variables 2005-08, US sample 
 Dependent Variables 
2005-2008 Median regression Bootstrapping regression 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.17*** -0.01 -4.01*** 0.16 0.19*** -0.19 -0.46 0.03 
SIZE 
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.12* -0.01 
ROA 
0.02 1.54***  0.19 0.05* 
1.68*** 
 0.04 
FCF 
 -2.18*** 3.1*** -0.85***  -2.07** 2.53*** -0.71*** 
COLTLR 
   0.19***    0.15*** 
ZSCORE 
   -0.03***    -0.02** 
BETA 
 -0.03*    -0.02   
OPTIONS 
  0.18***    0.10  
RETURN 
  -1.54***    -2.72***  
CASH 
  0.03    0.20  
SLIQ  
  -0.05*    -0.03  
DEPRC 
1.34***    0.97**    
constant 
-0.02 0.12 0.61 0.32** 0.04 -0.12 1.54*** 0.35*** 
 
No. observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 R-squared 
0.30 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.38 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, 
RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets, SLIQ: annual trading volume to number of common shares outstanding 
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Table 10 Summary of Non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Control variables 2008-11, US sample 
2008-2011 Dependent Variables 
Median regression Bootstrapping regression 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.10*** -0.92*** -2.08** -0.46* 0.08 -0.87 -2.53*** -0.67* 
SIZE 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.11** -0.01 -0.06 -0.10** 0.11*** 
ROA 0.04*** 1.20***  0.14 0.01 
1.23*** 
 0.14 
FCF  -2.32*** 2.84*** -0.68**  
-3.37*** 
2.18*** -0.72*** 
COLTLR    0.14**    0.15* 
ZSCORE    -0.04***    -0.03 
BETA  -0.68***    -0.02   
OPTIONS   0.16 **    0.13**  
RETURN   0.53    0.15  
CASH   -0.41    0.43  
SLIQ   -0.03    -0.02  
DEPRC 1.07***    0.84***    
constant -0.02 0.44** 0.42 -0.42*** 0.09** 0.90** 1.29*** -0.46** 
 No. observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.22 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, 
RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets, SLIQ: annual trading volume to number of common shares outstanding.
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Table 11 Summary of OLS,2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Dependent variables, US sample 
2005-2008 
Dependent Variables 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV  -0.75*** -3.30*** -0.24  -1.23** -3.57*** 0.69  -2.86*** -8.34*** 2.20*** 
DIV -0.03***  -0.48*** 0.12*** -0.10*  -1.58* 0. 40* -0.15***  -2.67*** 0.84*** 
REP -0.02*** -0.06***  0.01 -0.07*** -0. 21**  0.17 -0.08*** -0.38***  0.36*** 
LEV 0.01 0.25*** 0.07  0.03 0.54* 1.01  0.05 0.69*** 1.90***  
2008-2011  
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 INV  -0.60* -3.17*** 0.11  -0.98* -3.27*** 4.30*  -2.00*** -5.90*** 2.90* 
DIV -0.01  -0.21* 0.08 0.02  -0.65 0.68** -0.02  -1.40*** 0.91*** 
REP 
-0.02*** -0.08***  0.06* -0.09*** -0.27***  0.05 -0.12*** -0.42***  0.11 
LEV 
0.01 0.10* 0.18*  -0.02 0.26* 0.01  -0.02 0.38*** 0.35  
 No. 
observations 
272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively  
LEV: long term debt to total assets (book values), DIV: dividend payout (Common Dividends (Cash) to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - 
Preferred Dividend Requirement), REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital 
expenditures to total assets.  
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Table 12 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Control variables 2005-08, US sample 
 Dependent variables 
2005-2008 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.26** -1.80*** -4.06*** -0.85** -0.07 -1.90*** -5.35*** 0.15 -0.23* -1.90*** -5.77*** 1.39** 
SIZE 
0.01 0.03 -0.12** -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
ROA 
0.04 0.60***  0.07*** 0.11* 0.17  0.68 0.11*** 
0.09 
 0.36 
FCF 
 -0.01 2.26*** -1.67***  0.19 3.73*** -2.50***  0.03** 4.49** -2.66*** 
COLTLR 
   0.16**    0.10    0.09 
ZSCORE 
   -0.05***    -0.03**    -0.01* 
BETA 
 -0.06***    -0.03    -0.01   
OPTIONS 
  0.23***    0.15    -0.02  
RETURN 
  -1.84***    -1.85***    -0.37  
CASH 
  -0.18    0.08    0.05  
SLIQ  
  -0.02    -0.05*    -0.02  
DEPRC 
1.51***    1.38***    0.94***    
constant 
-0.13 0.06 1.70*** 0.44*** 0.08 0.11 1.32*** 0.13 0.12** 0.42* 1.98*** -0.20 
 
No. observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
R-squared 0.54 0.32 0.35 0.31 - - - - - - - - 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, 
RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets, SLIQ: annual trading volume to number of common shares outstanding. 
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Table 13 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Control variables 2008-11, US sample 
 Dependent variables 
2008-2011 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.13** -2.47*** -2.65*** -1.58*** 0.02 -2.64*** -3.87** -0.62 -0.15 -2.52*** -3.97*** 0.35 
SIZE -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.14** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.11*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.09** 
ROA 0.05** 0.41  1.16*** 0.07 0.25  0.59 0.07* 
0.01 
 0.50 
FCF  -0.13 1.84*** -1.26***  0.45 2.00** -1.05**  
0.11*** 
2.00*** -1.56*** 
COLTLR  -  0.09    -0.45    -0.25 
ZSCORE    -0.10***    -0.08***    -0.06*** 
BETA  -0.08    -0.10***    -0.04   
OPTIONS   0.26***    0.22 ***    -0.06  
RETURN   0.23    0.38    -0.37  
CASH   -0.68**    -0.73**    0.09  
SLIQ    -0.01    -0.02    -0.01  
DEPRC 1.19***    1.24***    0.81***    
constant 0.02 0.17*** 0.88** -0.64*** 0.09** 0.47* 0.94** -0.58** 0.15*** 0.56*** 1.39*** -0.52** 
 
No. 
observations 
272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 R-squared 0.50 0.22 0.30 0.35 - - - - - - - - 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, 
RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets, SLIQ: annual trading volume to number of common shares outstanding. 
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Table 14 Instrumental variables overidentification and weak identification test - US sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The null hypothesis for the overidentification test is that instruments are valid  
                * As a rule of thumb Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics below 10 indicate weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 2005-08 
 Overidentification test for all 
instruments -Sargan statistic (p-
values) 
Weak identification test - Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistic 
REP 0.43 1.41 
DIV 0.03 5.22 
INV 0.00 1.13 
LEV 0.29 1.24 
 2008-11 
REP 0.40 3.06 
DIV 0.03 3.05 
INV 0.03 2.20 
LEV 0.00 1.43 
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Table 15 Dividend regressions (2005-08, 2008-11) VIF factors 
VIF 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
FCF 3.38 3.34 
ROA 2.88 3.21 
GROWTH 1.46 1.26 
REP 1.39 1.24 
INV 1.35 1.23 
LEV 1.34 1.21 
SIZE 1.18 1.2 
BETA 1.12 1.14 
Mean VIF 1.76 1.73 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets 
 
Table 16 Share repurchases regressions (2005-08, 2008-11)  VIF factors 
VIF 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
CASH 2.46 2.67 
OPTION 2.37 2.63 
FCF 2.11 2.17 
GROWTH 1.88 1.49 
INV 1.47 1.45 
LEV 1.45 1.37 
DIV 1.42 1.31 
LIQ 1.38 1.3 
RETURN 1.35 1.24 
SIZE 1.24 1.23 
Mean VIF 1.71 1.69 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets 
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Table 17 Investment regressions (2005-08, 2008-11)  VIF factors 
VIF 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
GROWTH 1.64 1.36 
DIV 1.39 1.23 
ROA 1.32 1.23 
LEV 1.24 1.22 
SIZE 1.19 1.12 
DEPR 1.16 1.06 
REP 1.16 1.06 
Mean VIF 1.3 1.18 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets 
 
Table 18 Leverage regressions (2005-08, 2008-11) VIF factors 
VIF 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
ROA 3.94 3.85 
INV 3.68 3.82 
COLTRL 3.09 3.45 
FCF 2.99 3.28 
ZSCORE 2 1.87 
GROWTH 1.68 1.37 
REP 1.44 1.26 
DIV 1.43 1.23 
SIZE 1.35 1.18 
Mean VIF 2.4 2.37 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study investigates the effect of share repurchases on other key financial 
decisions and the resulting interactions for a sample of S&P 500 companies. 
Despite the increasing popularity of share repurchases, such a study has 
previously been missing from the literature, so that the impact of share 
repurchases on other key financial policies, and particularly on investment, 
remained unaddressed. Following relevant theoretical considerations and prior 
empirical evidence, this study is the first to introduce share repurchases as an 
endogenous variable in a system of equations to simultaneously assess four 
key financial decisions, namely share repurchases, dividends, leverage and 
investment.  
The research finds clear evidence that share repurchases have become an 
integral part of large US firms’ financial decision-making. The fact that share 
repurchases are not merely driven by free cash flows but also by decisions 
about investment and dividends, and that both dividends and investments are 
in turn affected by repurchases, indicates that share repurchases have become 
an essential consideration when managers in large US firms take financial 
decisions. 
The fact that these results hold both for the period before and subsequent to 
the credit crunch suggests that, while firms’ overall pay-out ratios fell, in 
general the credit crunch did not lead managers to marginalize share 
repurchases over dividend payments or vice versa. The substitution effect 
between dividends and share repurchases is evident both for the period prior 
to and after the credit crunch. 
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Our findings are expected to be of interest to academics and regulators this 
research is the first to provide empirical support to concerns that share 
repurchases might undermine managers’ ability to engage in investment 
(Lazonick 2008; FINNOV 2012). However, the fact that growth opportunities 
are related consistently and negatively to share repurchases mitigates these 
concerns to some extent.  
Our findings regarding the relationship between leverage, dividends and free 
cash flows suggest that managers prefer to use internally generated funds 
over new debt or equity, as suggested by Pecking Order Theory in both 
periods. 
In addition, this study is of importance to academics from a methodological 
point of view. Given the clear evidence of interdependence in financial 
decision-making, our results provide further support for recommendations by 
previous researchers (see McCabe 1979, Adedeji 1998, Aggarwal and Kyaw 
2010) regarding the need for joint investigation of financial policies and 
consequently the employment of simultaneous equation techniques in order to 
avoid model misspecification (De Angelo and De Angelo, 2007).  
Our findings appear robust against a number of different estimations 
techniques. More specifically, we have employed both parametric (OLS, 2SLS, 
3SLS) and non-parametric estimations (median regressions and regressions 
with bootstrapped standard errors). Our instrumental variables appear to be 
weak in every equation and hence the 2SLS and 3SLS may perform poorly 
(see Gujarati 2004; Stock and Yogo 2005). Thus, we based our conclusions on 
our non-parametric estimations. Nevertheless, we did not observe significant 
discrepancies between different estimation methods, which suggest that our 
findings are robust. 
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The integration of share repurchases into financial decision-making, according 
to the findings, seems quite robust for US firms. However, might not be 
generalizable since a different institutional setting might produce different 
results. Therefore, in the next chapter I plan to investigate the integration of 
share repurchases into the UK. The UK is the ideal market to further this study 
because of two reasons. First, share repurchases are comparatively well 
established in the UK. Secondly, as it will be explained in the next chapter, the 
UK displays a number of differences compared to the US regarding its 
institutional and regulatory environment. 
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4. Are share repurchases an integral part of UK firms’ 
financial decision-making? 
4.1 Introduction 
As identified in the previous chapter, our research findings suggest that in US 
firms financial decisions regarding capital structure, dividends, share 
repurchases and investment are closely related. The documented negative 
interaction between share repurchases and investment is of particular interest 
to policymakers and shareholders as it supports economists’ concerns that 
share repurchases might undermine productive investment (see Laurent 2015; 
FINNOV 2012). This concern is equally important for other markets, where 
share repurchases are well established. However, it is not feasible to 
generalise the US findings because they could be related e.g. to culture, 
managerial experience or differences in financial, labour and capital markets 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et al., 1996; Short and Keasey 1999; La 
Porta et al., 2000 Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 2005; Bennedsen & Nielsen 
2010). 
Prior literature (e.g. Bennedsen & Nielsen 2010, La Porta et al., 2000) 
suggests that national differences in the development of capital, financial and 
goods markets as well as regulatory frameworks and corporate governance 
systems are likely to influence corporate behaviour. La Porta et al. (2000) 
study the relationship between investor protection in various countries and the 
level of dividend payout. They find that in countries with better minority 
shareholder protection (e.g. countries where investors have the right to vote 
on the election of managers or vote on other significant firm issues, the right 
to take legal action against the company) firms generally pay more dividends. 
In line with agency theory, this indicates that minority shareholders are able to 
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force managers to disgorge cash and thereby protecting their investment by 
insiders (managers and large shareholders) expropriation. La Porta et al. 
(1998) find that common law countries generally have the strongest legal 
protections of shareholders. La Porta et al. (1997) also find that firms in 
common law countries have greater access to external finance such as equity 
and bank financing. Financial market development can also affect financing 
and investment decisions as it can fuel economic growth by increasing savings 
and directing these into productive investment (La Porta et al. 2000). The 
bankruptcy code has been argued to have an effect on capital structure as a 
strict creditor-friendly code may affect the financing decision towards equity 
financing (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Acharya et al 2004). Payout and 
investment decisions can also be influenced by differences in ownership 
structure (Short et al. 2002; Davis 2002; Dhanani 2005). High institutional 
ownership leads to increased dividend payments as these accommodate the 
need of institutional investors to maintain cash flows in order to serve their 
activities (e.g paying out pensions) (Short et al. 2002). Moreover institutional 
investors may discourage investment due to the risk that it can prove 
unprofitable (Davis 2002).  
While most literature follows the approach popularised by La Porta et al (1998, 
1999, 2000) which explores how differences in legal system affect firm’s 
behaviour, there is very little research which considers the similarities or 
differences between countries which fall into the same general legal framework 
and display a similar level of economic development.  
Considering the above another established market might lead to different 
results regarding the integration of share repurchases into financial decision-
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making. The purpose of this chapter is to test the US findings against the UK 
market. The UK market seems the ideal market to further this study. Financial 
markets corporate behaviour in the USA and the UK might often be perceived 
to be similar since both are common law countries with market-oriented 
economies and they are comparatively similar in terms of market maturity and 
sophistication (La Porta et al. 1998; Ferris et al. 2006). Considering these 
similarities, one might expect the empirical relationships identified in US listed 
firms also to be present in their UK peers.  
However, both countries display noticeable differences in terms of their 
bankruptcy codes, taxation, corporate governance, ownership structure and 
dividend policy which suggest otherwise (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et 
al., 1996; Short and Keasey 1999; Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 2005; DWS, 
2012). Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that, the US and the UK bankruptcy 
codes are diametrically opposed, where the former is shareholder-friendly and 
the latter creditor-friendly. Moreover, UK firms historically exhibit higher 
dividend payouts (Bond et al. 1996; DWS 2012) than US firms. This 
characteristic might be associated to differences in ownership structure as 
mentioned earlier. Pension funds and insurance companies were holding on 
average 40% - 50% of UK equities for the 1994 - 2000 period (See Figure 1). 
Although institutional ownership in the UK decreased after 2000 high dividend 
payouts persisted possibly to the reluctance of managers to cut dividends 
(Allen and Michaely, 2003). Finally, the UK exhibits lower corporate tax than 
the US as during 2006-2013 corporate tax rates in the USA remained stable at 
40% while in the UK tax rates gradually declined from 30% during 2006-08 to 
23% in 2013, (KMPG, 2013). All else equal lower corporate taxes lead to lower 
tax shields and therefore provide less incentive to UK firms for debt financing. 
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Considering all the above the integration of share repurchases in the UK may 
differ from the US. 
Share repurchases have been well established in the UK. In the UK share 
repurchases became increasingly popular throughout the 1990s and indeed 
exhibited an upward trend until 2005 (Eije and Megginson, 2008). Throughout 
the 1990s, UK firms exhibited Europe’s largest share repurchase activity, 
(Stonham, 2002). During this period, the UK accounted for between 60% and 
80% of EU share repurchases (Rau and Vermaelen 2002; Stonham 2002). 
Dhanani and Roberts (20009) report that in the UK share repurchases rose 
from £10 billion in the late 1990s to £46 billion in 2006, while the number of 
listed companies buying back shares rose from 14% in 1997 to 58% in 2006. 
Like in the USA, share repurchase activity fell in the UK during the financial 
crisis. Between 2008 and 2009, share repurchases by FTSE 100 companies 
decreased from £38 billion to £22 billion, i.e. by 43% (Dhanani and Roberts, 
2010). However, subsequently share repurchases began to become more 
popular again, possibly due to uncertainty about the economic development 
and a lack of investment opportunities (Kelleher, 2012).  
Due to the magnitude and frequency of share repurchases in the UK, 
economists have expressed similar concerns, as in the US, regarding the 
impact of share repurchases on investment (FINNOV 2012 a, b). This form of 
payout has been associated with distorted incentives such as to mitigate the 
EPS dilution effect of stock options and has been argued to undermine 
productive investment (see (FINNOV, 2012 a, b). Share repurchases decrease 
the number of shares outstanding while this increases when stock options are 
exercised. Therefore, a firm’s EPS is respectively increased/decreased as 
Chapter 4. Are share repurchases an integral part of UK firms’ financial decision-
making? 
136 
 
earnings are distributed across a lower/higher number of shares. Consequently 
firms which use stock options as a form of remuneration for employees and 
executives and which are concerned about EPS stability or growth can use 
share repurchases to moderate this dillution effect. Moreover, US and EU firms 
have been criticized to use share buybacks as a mean to recycle capital and 
propping up share prices instead of investing in CAPEX and promoting growth 
(Laurent, 2015). Therefore, an investigation regarding the relationship 
between share repurchases and investment is equally important in the UK. In 
addition, research in the UK has not provided clear empirical evidence whether 
or not UK firms substitute dividends for share repurchases. 
The aforementioned relationships are of a particular interest in a UK context. 
UK firms have traditionally exhibited high and inflexible dividend payouts 
which has raised concerns about funds available for investment especially in 
times of recession (Griffiths and Wall, 2007). A House of Commons Trade and 
Industry (1994, p.70) report identified high dividend payments as a ''… 
weakness in the UK economy''. Dividends are considered to be ‘‘sticky’’, partly 
probably because dividend decreases tend to lead to share price reductions 
(Allen and Michaely, 2003). By contrast, share repurchases appear to be a 
more flexible form of payout. This might be related to the fact that reduced 
repurchase activities do not tend to have any negative impact on share prices 
(Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Allen and Michaely 2003). From this point of 
view share repurchases can be a practical tool which provides management 
with flexibility, especially helpful in periods of economic uncertainty. The 
aforementioned advantages might explain evidence of dividend substitution 
reported by a number of US studies (Grullon and Michaely 2002; Jiang, Kim, 
Lie and Yang 2013; Kulchania 2013). Share repurchases are also linked to a 
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firm’s capital structure. This form of payout might be used to increase firm’s 
gearing ratio, either in order to reduce agency problems related to the 
generation and use of (free) cash flow, or to pursue a cost efficient capital 
structure, e.g. in relation to changes to the relative cost of debt and equity 
capital (Jensen 1986; Dixon et al. 2008). Considering the frequency and 
magnitude of share repurchases in the UK, the aforementioned interrelations 
in UK financial decision-making concern not only domestic but also foreign 
investors. Since 2008, foreign investors hold almost half of UK quoted shares 
(OEE, 2013). Within this context, it is worthwhile to investigate how share 
repurchases fit within the payout, finance and investment policies of UK firms. 
While previous research into financial decision-making in UK non-financial 
firms identified linkages between dividends and investment (Adedeji, 1998) 
and leverage and dividends (Ding and Murinde, 2010), these studies did not 
consider the impact of share repurchases, despite the fact that they were 
prevalent during the time these were conducted (1993-2003). As firms have 
limited financial resources, firms engaging in share repurchases either need to 
raise additional funds or to curtail their other expenditure. This suggests that 
decisions about share repurchases need to be made in conjunction with firms’ 
other financial policies. This raises the question about the interrelation 
between decisions about investment, gearing, dividend payments and share 
repurchases and suggest the need for a joint investigation of share 
repurchases, dividends, investment and leverage within a simultaneous 
equation framework (see McCabe, 1979). As it was mentioned earlier this is of 
particular concern as decisions in favor of share repurchases have been 
criticized as detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment 
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(FINNOV, 2012) and for leading to the excessive leverage of companies 
(Foroohar, 2013).  
This study aims to empirically assess the aforementioned relationships using 
recent data (2005-2011) from non-financial UK listed companies and enrich 
the comparatively under-researched UK market literature on financial decision-
making. The global recession originating in 2008 provides this study with a 
unique time framework. It will allow us to provide evidence to the relationship 
between investment and both dividends and share repurchases in times of 
recession. As discussed earlier these relationships have been highlighted as a 
major concern in a UK setting (Trade and Industry report 1994; FINNOV 
2012). Moreover, observing possible changes in the relative importance of the 
determinants of corporate financial decision-making, before and after 2008 
might provide us with more insight into corporate strategic behaviour and it is 
expected to be of interest to policy makers. Potential interdependence in UK 
corporate financial decision-making should further the use of simultaneous 
equation techniques. Secondly, the interaction between investment and share 
repurchases should be of concern to policymakers and shareholders given the 
magnitude and frequency of share repurchases in the UK (See Lazonick, 
2008). 
Therefore, it is of interest to explore, whether share repurchases are indeed an 
integral part of financial decision-making or if they are merely an ex-post 
adjustment of payout policies. The understanding of corporate behaviour in 
terms of its financial decisions especially during a crisis might be worthwhile to 
regulatory authorities.  
Finally, this research contributes to knowledge from a methodological point of 
view. In addition to parametric estimations, we employ non- parametric 
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estimation (median regressions and regression with bootstrapped standard 
errors). Non-normality of financial data has been ignored in earlier research as 
most studies use parametric estimations. This study’s approach is expected to 
produce more valid estimations as it accounts for non-normality in the data. 
Drawing on the theoretical framework on financial decision-making discussed 
in detail in chapter 2, the rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: part 2.2 
discusses financial decision-making in the UK; part 2.3 provides a description 
of the data and the chosen research methodology. Part 2.4 describes and 
interprets the empirical results. Part 2.5 presents the conclusion. 
4.2 Financial decision-making in the UK 
Payout policy and capital structure have been widely excessively researched in 
the US market (Allen and Michaely 2003; Frank and Goyal 2009). Related 
research has focused mainly on two directions. Firstly, research investigated if 
there is a link between financial policies and firm value. Modigliani and Miller’s 
’’Capital structure irrelevance theorem’’ (1958) and ’’Dividend irrelevance 
theorem’’ (1961) suggest that in a frictionless market financial policies do not 
have an impact on firm value. However, when market frictions are taken into 
consideration financial policies do matter (Barclay et al. 1995; Allen and 
Michaely 2003). The second area of research investigated the determinants of 
capital structure and payout policies. In this research area, the UK market has 
not been as extensively researched as the US. This is especially the case 
regarding share repurchase determinants. In addition, as explained in the 
previous part, differences between the US and the UK might lead to 
differences in financial decision-making. Therefore, this section will present an 
overview of UK based studies regarding financial decision-making in order to 
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draw conclusions regarding the empirical methodology and model. 
4.2.1 Share repurchases 
Share repurchases became legal in the UK under the Companies Act of 1981. 
However, as initially, UK firms had to cancel all repurchased shares (Dixon et 
al. 2008); they were unable to hold repurchased shares to facilitate future 
executive share or option claims. This was changed by an amendment of the 
UK Company Law in 2003, which permitted firms to hold repurchased shares 
as treasury stocks. 
Share repurchases only became popular as a payout method from the mid 
1990's. Between the late 1990s and 2006, the volume of share repurchases in 
the UK increased from £10 billion to £64 billion (Dhanani and Roberts, 2010). 
There are a number of ways in which a company can repurchase its shares, 
such as open market share repurchases, fixed price tender offers and Dutch 
auction offers. In open market share repurchase programs, the firm 
repurchases its shares through a broker on the open market in the same 
manner as an individual investor. In a fixed price, tender offer the firm will 
state the number of shares that it is willing to repurchase at a specific price by 
a certain date. In case that the program is oversubscribed, the firm can 
increase the number of shares repurchased or it can buy back its shares on a 
pro-rata basis. Finally, at a Dutch auction offer the firm specifies a price range 
in which it is willing to buy a certain number of shares. Potential investors 
must declare the number of shares they are willing to sell and state a selling 
price. The final repurchase price is the lowest price that will enable the firm to 
reach the number of shares specified in the offer. The final price will be paid to 
all investors who tendered at or below that price. In the UK tender offers are 
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relatively rare and open market share repurchases account for roughly 90 
percent of share buyback activity (Oswald and Young 2004; Dhanani and 
Roberts 2009). 
The aforementioned popularity of share repurchases lead to a number of UK-
based studies (Hjelmstad et al.'s 2006; Dixon et al. 2008; Oswald and Young 
2008; Dhanani and Roberts 2009; Young and Yang 2011). UK survey based 
studies and regression based studies have produced similar results to US ones 
regarding share repurchase determinants. 
Drawing on the Agency Theory of Free Cash Flows, a number of US-based 
studies utilising regression analysis, suggest that share repurchases are a 
flexible form of payout used in order to reduce the agency costs of free cash 
flows (Dittmar, 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Wang et al., 2009). In the UK, 
Oswald and Young (2008) document strong positive associations between 
repurchase activity and surplus cash. Moreover, Hjelmstad et al.'s (2006) UK 
study shows that the market reaction is more favorable to repurchase 
announcements by firms with low growth opportunities. This seems consistent 
with the free cash flow theory since firms with low growth/investment 
opportunities are more likely to have more excess cash. In surveys by Bancel 
et al. (2004) and Brav et al. (2005), 60 - 65% of US and European firms’ 
managers viewed the ’’having extra cash/liquid assets relative to my desired 
shareholdings’’ as an ’’important or very important’’ motive for share 
repurchases. Similar results have been reported by UK-based studies. Dhanani 
and Roberts (2010) report that the recurrent motivation expressed by UK 
executives regarding share repurchases was the opportunity to return excess 
cash flows to shareholders. Similarly, the statement ’’to return excess cash to 
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shareholders’’ ranks second in the responses of UK manager motives for share 
buybacks in the survey of Dixon et al. (2008).  
The option-funding hypothesis and the counter EPS dillution motive have also 
received support from both US and UK empirical studies. In the US, Kahle 
(2002) finds that that a firm is more probable to engage in share repurchases 
as the amount of executive options increases and that the size of actual 
repurchases is positively affected by the total number of options exercisable. 
Fenn and Liang (1999) and Weisbenner (2000) who find a positive relationship 
between managerial stock options and share repurchases and total stock 
options and share repurchases respectively report similar results. Moreover, 
Weisbenner (2000) highlights that the exercise of stock options decreases 
EPS. The author argues that managers are trying to mitigate this dilution 
effect by engaging in share repurchases. The reason is that, EPS is used in 
equity valuations and executive compensation is often EPS performance 
related. 75% of US managers surveyed by Bancel and Mittoo's (2005) see 
’’increasing EPS’’ as an important or very important reason to repurchase. In 
addition, 67% of the sample agreed that ’’offsetting the dillutionary effects of 
stock option plans’’ (p.38) was an important or very important reason to 
repurchase. Similar results are reported by the UK based survey of Dhanani 
and Roberts (2010). Dhanani and Roberts (2010) report that increasing EPS is 
the second most frequently reported motive to repurchase stock, mentioned 
by 49% of the managers they surveyed. Young and Yang (2011) investigate 
the effect of EPS related compensation on share repurchases in a sample of UK 
firms. Their research indicates that the presence of EPS-based performance 
conditions in executive compensation contracts has a positive effect on share 
repurchases. This is also line with the aforementioned managerial responses. 
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Clientele Theory suggests that taxes preferences of investors affect firms’ 
payout policies, as investor groups will invest in companies that have a payout 
policy which are most beneficial to them given their different which incur 
different tax treatment. In support of Clientele Theory, Blouin et al. (2011) 
find that after the 2003 tax cut in the US individuals rebalanced their portfolios 
to maximize their after tax returns. Blouin et al. (2011) also show that firms 
adjust their payout policies in order to match their shareholders preferences. 
The authors report that during the same period firms with a large percentage 
of individual shareholders increased their dividend payments. Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) investigate the effect of taxes on share repurchases in the 
UK. During the period under investigation (1985-1998), the tax code in the UK 
changed considerably enabling the authors to test its effect on payout policy. 
The first significant change occurred on October 1996 and concerned the tax 
treatment of share repurchases for pension funds. Before this change pension 
funds were able to practice a tax-appealing form of share repurchases, the 
agency buyback. In an agency buyback an agent, (e.g an investment bank) 
acting for the repurchasing firm buys the firm's shares and initially contacts 
pension funds giving them priority over individual shareholders. The basic 
difference between an open market share repurchase and an agency buyback 
is that in the latter the seller (i.e. pension fund) is aware that it is selling to 
the firm. Therefore, the generated income will not be taxed as capital gains 
but as a distribution entitled to a tax credit. In 1996, the U.K. tax authorities 
identified and subsequently abolished this tax loophole. As a result, investors 
such as pension funds could no longer recover any tax credits. Rau and 
Vermaelen’s (2002) (2002) findings are in line with the hypothesis that payout 
policy is affected by taxation. The authors report a significant increase in share 
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repurchases during 1994-1996, which was followed by a sharp decrease after 
1996 when the change in the tax code prevented investors such as pension 
funds to recover tax credits related to the agency buyback. These findings also 
support the hypothesis of Rau and Vermaelen (2002) that share repurchase 
activity in the United Kingdom is driven by tax considerations of pension 
funds. Finally, the authors explore the impact of the elimination of tax credits 
for dividends in 1997 by the UK tax authorities, which made pension funds 
indifferent between dividends and share repurchases. Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) suggested that the growth in the volume of share buy backs between 
1997 and 1998 supported their contention that the change in the relative 
attractiveness of share repurchases to dividends affected form’s payout 
policies. However, in a later study Oswald and Young (2004) re-examine Rau 
and Vermaelen’s (2002) findings using alternative sources of data22, which 
allowed them to capture firms’ repurchase activities much more 
comprehensively. Based on the data Oswald and Young (2004) were unable to 
replicate Rau and Vermaelen’s (2002) findings. 
US research (Baker et al. 2003; Bancel et al. 2005) suggests that, another 
issue which might affect firms’ share repurchase policy is the desire of 
managers to benefit from temporary undervaluation of their shares. Brockman 
and Chung (2001) in a Hong Kong based study compared the actual 
repurchase costs to a bootstrapping method - generated ’’naïve’’ accumulation 
plan and showed that the managers share repurchase strategy outperformed 
the uninformed one in every single year of their 1991-1999 period.  
                                       
22In addition to Rau and Vermaelen’s (2002) Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
database, Oswald and Young (2004) use the London Stock Exchange Regulatory News 
Service, The Financial Times and firms' financial statements. 
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Rau and Vermaelen (R&V) (2002), results do not support the undervaluation 
hypothesis as they show that share repurchase announcements in the UK i) 
are not preceded by significant negative excess returns and ii) they are not 
followed by significant positive ones. In addition, the authors report that the 
average stock market reaction to repurchase announcements in the UK is less 
than half of the one reported in similar US studies; a result consistent with a 
less evident undervaluation effect. However, the research by Oswald and 
Young (2004) using the same sample but more comprehensive data on share 
repurchases contradicts Rau and Vermaelen’s (2002) results. Their findings 
not only suggest that share repurchases in the UK are not significantly lower 
than in the USA, they also indicate that share repurchase announcements and 
actual share repurchases in the UK are also preceded by significantly negative 
12-month excess returns, and that share repurchase announcements are 
followed by significantly positive 12-month excess returns. Oswald and Young 
(2004) conclude that, like in the USA, taking advantage of undervaluation is 
still a key factor in UK firms’ repurchase decisions. Their findings are 
supported by the survey-based study of UK managers by Dixon et al. (2008). 
In this study executives rank the undervaluation motive as the second most 
important motive for share repurchases 
Rau and Vermaelen (2002) attribute their findings to the stricter regulatory 
environment in the UK. In support of their contention, Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) highlight that although share repurchases are much more widely 
employed in the UK than in the rest of the EU compared to the USA the 
practice is still much less widely used. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) report that 
the London Stock Exchange Model Code has timing restrictions in place in 
order to prevent insider trading during open market share repurchases; that is 
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to prohibit firms to repurchases their share only when they are undervalued. 
The Model Code prohibits firms to repurchase shares during ‘‘close periods’’ 
which are non-trading windows when officers and directors are not allowed to 
trade in their firm's shares. These non-trading windows include the two 
months before the publication of annual or semi-annual earnings and one 
month before the publication of quarterly results. Moreover, the LSE requires 
repurchasing firms to report the repurchase by 8:30 on the day following the 
transaction. This is supposed to make shareholders and potential investors 
aware of the firm’s actions in the market and their potential influence and 
allow them therefore to take more informed investment decisions. Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) argue that these regulations make it more difficult for UK 
companies to use open market repurchases to exploit perceived 
undervaluation than their US counterparts. 
Therefore, while prior literature suggests that share repurchases in the UK are 
affected by the same factors as in the US, there appear to be differences in 
their importance.  
The use of share repurchases is also linked to major financial decisions as 
capital structure, dividends and investment. Share repurchases might be used 
to increase firm’s gearing ratio, either in order to reduce agency problems 
related to the generation and use of (free) cash flow, or to pursue a cost 
efficient capital structure. Share repurchase reduce the value of shares 
outstanding and can cause rapid capital structure changes if funded by debt 
(Dhanani 2010). Stothard (2013) supports that firms given the correct market 
timing are replacing expensive equity in their capital structure for cheap tax-
deductible debt. Surveys of executives in the USA and the UK suggest that 
gearing is not one of the main objectives of share buy-backs. E.g. Baker et 
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al.’s (2003) suggested that only 10% of US managers think that ’’changing the 
capital structure of the firms’’ is a highly important reason for a share 
buyback, while 54% state that it does not have any effect on their repurchase 
decision (Baker et al. 2003). In the UK, Dhanani and Roberts (2010) report 
that 36% of the managers of the repurchasing firms’ sample agreed that 
’’increasing the firm’s gearing’’ is a repurchase motive. It seems that the 
gearing hypothesis is dominated by the Free Cash theory, the EPS dillution 
motive and the undervaluation-investment hypothesis as it is ranked 4th 
behind the incentives ‘‘To return excess cash to investors’’, ‘‘To improve the 
firms reported EPS’’ and ‘‘To signal undervaluation of the company’s shares to 
investors’’. By contrast, Dixon et al.’s (2008) survey of UK firms finds that 
managers rank the use of share repurchases as a means to increase the firm’s 
gearing as the most important reason. The difference in the survey results 
might be explained by the fact that Dixon et al.’s (2008) survey was 
conducted prior to 2003, when UK companies were required to cancel all 
repurchased shares. Therefore, unlike US firms, UK ones were not to able buy 
shares at a low price and reissue them to executives in the future after the 
share price has appreciated. By contrast, Dhanani and Roberts’ (2009) survey 
was conducted after the change in UK Company Law in 2003, when companies 
were able to hold repurchased shares as treasury stock. 
Share repurchases can also substitute dividends since Jensen (1986) argues 
that in markets with limited control via competitive markets, managers are 
likely to prefer reducing free cash flow via share repurchases, over dividends 
and over leverage. As explained by the Clientele theory earlier share 
repurchases might be a more tax efficient form of payout compared to 
dividends. Nevertheless, dividend policy is considered to be inflexible in both 
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the US and the UK (Allen and Michaely 2003; Griffiths and Wall 2007). 
However, UK firms tend to have higher dividend payouts (Bond et al. 1996; 
DWS 2012) than US firms. In this context, and given the inherent flexibility of 
share repurchases, it is of interest to investigate their relationship between 
share repurchases and dividends and the degree of possible dividend 
substitution already indicated by US based empirical studies (see Grullon and 
Michaely 2002; Jiang et al. 2013). Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that 
figures show a decline in the dividend payout ratio of US firms the total payout 
ratio seems constant indicate dividend substitution (after the 1980’s). 
Moreover, the authors support that the market shows signs that it perceives 
repurchases as dividend substitutes since the market’s reaction of dividend 
cuts from firms that repurchase is not significantly different from zero. Jiang et 
al.’s (2013) argue that managers consider dividends and share repurchases to 
be substitute payout mechanisms as well. Their findings show that the 
dividend premium has a negative effect on the repurchase choice; whereas the 
repurchase premium has a negative effect on the dividend choice. This is 
consistent with the substitution hypothesis. Extant theories suggest 
interactions not only between share repurchases, dividends, and capital 
structure but also with share repurchases and investment. The Budget 
Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) predicts that share repurchases a use of 
funds should negatively interact with other uses of funds (as in dividends and 
investment) and positively to sources of funds (leverage). Moreover, the 
Pecking Order Theory predicts that firms, which engage in share repurchases, 
will in the long-run decrease dividends and/or increase their leverage in order 
to fund investment while avoiding the costs of equity financing.  
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 As discussed above, share repurchases are expected to be influenced by other 
key financial decisions, in particular dividends, investment and capital 
structure.  
However, so far research in the UK has investigated share repurchases in 
isolation (Oswald and Young 2008; Young and Yang (2011).  
 
4.2.2 Dividends  
UK firms tend to have higher dividend payouts than their counterparts in other 
developed markets, such as the USA and Europe (Cook 2014; Jones 2014). 
Moreover, in the UK (like in other countries) dividend payments tend to be 
fairly inflexible (sticky) – (Griffiths and Wall, 2007), with heavy penalties for 
negative dividends surprises (Braggion and Moore, 2011). 
The literature has investigated the relationship between dividend payouts and 
firms specific factors (i.e. profitability, free cash flows) drawn from extant 
theories. Profitability is expected to have a positive effect on dividend payouts 
according to the Pecking Order Theory. Firms that are more profitable 
generate more internal funds and thus can afford to maintain a higher level of 
dividend payout without the risk of resorting to external financing. US based 
studies by Jensen et al. (1992) and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) indeed report 
a positive relationship between dividends and profitability. The same effect is 
reported by Adedeji (1998) for a panel of UK firms.  
Free Cash Flow Theory predicts a positive relationship between dividends and 
size, assuming that larger firms generate more free cash flows. In this case 
dividends are used to reduce free cash flows and the corresponding agency 
costs. Firm size is reported to have a positive effect on dividend payout by 
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Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) and Adedeji (1998) for the US and the UK 
respectively. However, Bancel et al.’s (2004) and Brav et al.’s (2005) survey 
European and US managers respectively regarding payout policy provide weak 
to moderate support to the Free Cash Flow Theory. In the US 30.3% of firms’ 
managers view the ’’having extra cash/liquid assets relative to my desired 
cash holdings’’ as an ’’important or very important’’ dividend incentive. In 
addition, only 13.3% view ‘‘Paying out to reduce cash, thereby disciplining my 
firm to make efficient decisions’’ as an ‘‘important or very important’’ 
incentive. The respective figures from the survey of European managers by 
Bancel et al. (2004) are 28.09% and 21.74%. Similar results have been 
reported by UK-based studies. The survey of UK managers regarding dividend 
policy by Dhanani (2005) does not support the notion that dividend policy is 
used to mitigate agency problems. Only 15.5% of managers agree that 
dividends can be used as a ''bonding mechanism, encouraging managers to act 
in the interests of outside shareholders'' (pp. 1658).  
The UK dividend literature has also focused on investigating how possible 
country-specific characteristics (i.e. tax code, ownership structure) affect 
dividend policy. As far as the tax code is concerned, the UK operated under a 
partial imputation system between 1973 and 1999. This system provides some 
tax relief to shareholders in recognition of corporation tax paid by the firm. As 
Lasfer (1966) explains, assuming that a firm pays a net cash dividend d, it 
must also pay an advanced corporation tax (ACT) equal to the basic rate of 
income tax on the gross dividend D. If τ is the standard rate of income tax, 
the gross dividend D, is defined as d/(1-τ) and ACT is τD, i.e., τd/(1 - τ). The 
ACT is first paid to the Inland Revenue fourteen days after the end of the 
quarter in which the dividend is paid and then deducted from the firm's 
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corporation tax liability, usually payable nine months after the end of the 
accounting period. Shareholders pay tax pD, where p is their personal rate of 
income tax and receive a tax credit of τD. Thus, shareholders' dividend tax is 
(p- τ)D, i.e., d(p- τ)/(1- τ). As Short et al (2002) report, tax-exempt 
shareholders such as pension funds received a cash refund of the tax credit 
from the tax authorities. They therefore prefer dividends to profit retentions. 
Given the tax system while basic rate taxpayers are neutral between dividends 
and retentions, higher rate taxpayers prefer retentions over dividends. 
However, as Rau and Vermaelen (2002) report, in 1997 pension funds lost 
their ability to reclaim tax credits for dividends as UK authorities abolished 
ACT. 
However even without a tax incentive pensions funds and insurance companies 
are likely to prefer the stable inflow of dividends payments (over share 
repurchases or retentions) due to prudent-man rule restrictions23 (see Brav 
and Heaton, 1998). Such restrictions aim to protect investors from risky 
investments. Dividends accommodate their need to maintain cash flows in 
order to serve their activities (e.g paying out pensions). Institutional investors 
such as pension funds have traditionally owned a significant percentage of UK 
equities. For example, pension funds and insurance companies were holding 
on average 40% - 50% of UK equities for the 1994 - 2000 period (See Figure 
4). This phenomenon might explain the higher dividend yields reported in the 
UK when compared to other developed markets. However after 2002 domestic 
                                       
23Brav and Heaton (1998) report that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA) subjected private pension funds to a more strict "prudent man" rule. In 
addition, the US case law approved prudent investments as investments that paid steady 
dividends. Therefore the investment of pension funds seems to be guided to the 
direction of medium or high dividend paying firms. 
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pension funds have been moving out of the domestic equity market (see 
Figure 1) possibly due to its underperformance compared to the bond market 
(FT, 2012 a,b). The decrease in institutional ownership is more profound 
during the financial crisis possibly due to the additional safety provided by 
fixed income investments.  
The fact that dividend yields remain high even after the decrease in 
institutional ownership might be attributed to the reluctance of managers to 
reduce dividends (see Allen and Michaely, 2003). Allen and Michaely (2003) 
survey the literature on payout policy and report that empirical research 
agrees that markets dislike dividend reductions and that these are followed by 
share price reductions. Therefore, managers generally avoid cutting dividends.  
Empirical research in the UK has produced conflicting results regarding the 
effect of taxes and ownership structure on payout policies. Lasfer's (1996) 
findings show that in the UK taxes affect payout policy, as a lower tax burden 
on dividends is associated with higher dividend payouts. A recent study by 
Jacob and Jacob (2012) on a number of countries, including the UK, finds that 
taxes are first-order determinants of payout policy, but that effects are smaller 
than reported in recent single-country, single-event analyses. Similarly, US 
and European financial executives’ responses in the surveys by Bancel et al. 
(2005) and Brav et al. (2003) give weak to moderate support to the impact of 
taxation on dividend policy. The percentage of financial executives that rate 
’’the personal taxes of my shareholders when receiving dividends’’ as 
’’important or very important’’ factor affecting dividend policy is around 21% in 
both the US and Europe.  
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Figure 4 Insurance companies and pension funds percentage ownership of UK 
listed companies 
 
 Source: ONS (2013) Share Ownership 2012, Office for National Statistics: Cardiff. 
Brav et al. (2007) explain that managers identified other factors to be more 
significant payout determinants and suggest that firms who initiated or 
increased dividends were ‘‘on the fence’’ to do so before the tax cut. In 
general, research so far seems to indicate that tax and clientele considerations 
affect dividend policy but are of second order importance when compared to 
other payout policy determinants. 
Empirical research in the UK seems to indicate that the same firm specific and 
country specific considerations drive dividend policy in the UK, as in other 
countries. Moreover, extant theories identify linkages between dividends, 
share repurchases, investment and dividends. Pecking Order Theory suggests 
that firms might cut dividends in order to avoid asymmetric information costs 
of external financing, (Myers, 1984). However, since dividends are ‘‘sticky’’ 
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firms will resort to debt financing in order to fund investment opportunities. 
Therefore, according to this theory we expect a strong positive impact of 
investment on leverage.  
Moreover, Free Cash Flow Theory suggests that, since dividend payouts are 
high, UK firms will use less debt and share repurchases to mitigate the related 
agency costs. Finally, the Budget Constraint hypothesis of McCabe (1979) 
suggests that dividends are negatively influenced by uses of funds (share 
repurchases and investment) and positively by sources of funds (leverage). 
 Adedeji (1998) tests the Pecking Order Theory in a sample of UK firms and 
identifies interactions between dividends and investment. In addition, 
Aggarwal and Kyaw’s (2010) findings show interactions between dividends and 
capital structure. Finally, empirical research in the US market regarding share 
repurchases indicates dividend substitution, (Grullon and Michaely 2002; Jiang 
et al. 2013). However, dividend related research in the UK so far has largely 
ignored this interdependence. 
4.2.3 Capital structure  
One of the most basic financial decisions of a firm’s management is to decide 
its financing mix (Barclay et al. 1995). In Modigliani and Miler’s (1958) perfect 
and frictionless capital markets, this decision is irrelevant and does not affect 
firm value. However, theories, which take into account market frictions, have 
identified factors that matter and therefore must be taken into consideration 
when financing mix is decided. Moreover, these theories, namely the Pecking 
Order Theory (Donaldson 1961; Myers 1984), Free Cash Flows theory (Jensen 
1986), Trade Off theory (Myers 1984) and the Budget Constraint theory 
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(McCabe 1979) suggest interactions between capital structure and other basic 
financial decisions such as payout and investment. 
Prior research into capital structure in UK listed companies suggests that, that 
similar to the US, Pecking Order Theory, Free Cash Flows Theory and the 
Trade Off Theory all contribute to explain a significant part of capital structure 
decision-making. The study of Rajan and Zingales (1995) looks at capital 
structure determinants for the G-7 countries. The authors conclude that a 
firm's profitabilty, tangibility, size and growth opportunities correlate to firm 
leverage in a similar way in each of these countries. Specifically, their results 
suggest that in the UK capital structure is positively influenced by firm's asset 
tangibility and size while negatively influenced by a firm's growth opportunities 
and profitability. The same results regarding UK listed firms are reported by 
De Jong et al. (2007). The positive relationship between leverage and 
tangibility supports the Agency Theory. Jensen (1979) argues that firms with 
tangible assets can use them as collateral when a firm is taking on debt, thus 
reducing debt’s agency costs. Also, in favor of Agency Theory is the negative 
effect of growth opportunities on leverage. Agency Theory suggests that firms 
with good growth opportunities tend to rely more on equity financing due to 
the potential agency costs of debt. 
The positive relationship between leverage and size supports the Trade-Off 
Theory. Larger firms are expected to have a lower default probability and 
therefore can use more debt in their capital structure.  
Finally, the Pecking Order Theory suggests that more profitable firms prefer 
internal financing to reduce costs associated with information asymmetry. This 
is in accordance to Rajan and Zingale’s (1995) the reported negative impact of 
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firm profitability on leverage. 
In addition to firm specific determinants there is also a strand of capital 
structure literature, which examines how institutional differences among 
countries affect corporate financing decisions. For example, bankruptcy codes 
differ around the world in terms of their creditor-friendliness and can have an 
effect on capital structure decisions. The UK bankruptcy code is characterized 
as creditor- friendly (Franks and Taurus 1993; Rajan and Zingales 1995). 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that under such a bankruptcy code factors, 
which affect a firm’s bankruptcy risk, are likely to impact particularly 
negatively on gearing. In addition, Rajan and Zingales (1995), De Jong et al. 
(2007) and Antoniou et al. (2008) report that UK listed firms appear to have 
relatively lower gearing ratios when compared to their G-7 counterparts and 
argue that this might be related due to the stricter UK bankruptcy code. UK 
managers might want to avoid carrying too much debt in their capital 
structures in order to reduce their bankruptcy risk. 
Another factor, which influences capital structure, is taxation. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) argue that debt financing has the advantage of interest expenses 
being tax deductible. Survey research in European and US firms reports that 
roughly 50% of firm managers describe the ’’tax advantage of interest 
deductibility’’ as an ’’important or very important’’ factor affecting capital 
structure (see Graham and Harvey 2002 a,b; Bancel and Mittoo 2004; 
Brounen et al. 2005). In the UK tax rates gradually declined from 28% in 2008 
to 21% in 2013 (Figure 5). According to the Trade-Off Theory and all else 
equal, this differential in corporate tax gives UK firms weaker incentives to 
increase their leverage in order to shield their income from the tax rate.  
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Figure 5 Corporate Tax Rates 
 
Source: KPMG (2013) Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG International. 
International studies have shown firm leverage of UK firms is similarly 
correlated capital structure determinants identified in other countries. 
Specifically, in the UK capital structure has been found to be positively 
influenced by a firm's tangibility and size while negatively influenced by a 
firm's growth opportunities and profitability. However, UK listed firms also 
appear to have relatively lower gearing ratios when compared to other 
developed economies, possibly due to regulatory and tax differences. 
Existing theories support that capital structure interacts with basic financial 
decisions as dividends, share repurchases and investment. From an Agency 
Theory perspective UK firms’ higher dividend ratios might lead to lower 
gearing as the related agency costs are reduced by high dividend payments. 
Moreover, the budget constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) would support that 
high dividend ratios mean more uses of funds and therefore a greater need for 
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sources of funds (leverage) and or greater interdependence between uses of 
funds (investment, dividends and share repurchases). However, similar to the 
US, the majority of UK empirical research has investigated capital structure in 
isolation (see Rajan and Zingales 1995; Frank and Goyal 2009) from other 
financial decisions potentially leading to misspecification and endogeneity 
problems.  
4.2.4 Investment 
In perfect capital markets, investment should be independent of the firm’s 
choice of financing (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). On the contrary, the Pecking 
Order Theory (Donaldson 1961; Myers 1984), Free Cash Flows theory (Jensen 
1986), Trade Off theory (Myers, 1984)and the Budget Constraint theory 
(McCabe, 1979) suggest that investment affects and is affected by capital 
structure, dividends and share repurchases. Moreover, these theories indicate 
factors that affect firm investment. 
The Budget Constraint theory and the Pecking Order theory support that 
pprofitable firms are expected to be less financially constrained as they 
generate more funds to finance investment opportunities internally (McCabe 
1979; Demarzo, Fishman, He and Wang 2012). Regarding the relationship 
between firm size and investment research which focuses exclusively on very 
large firms tends not to find a statistically significant relationship. However 
research which covers smaller firms or the whole range of size classes tends to 
find evidence that firm size is relevant to investment (Baskin 1989; Rahaman 
2011; Prombutr et al. 2012). Finally the previous literature suggests that 
depreciation is expected to be positively related to investment. McCabe (1979) 
supports that depreciation identifies cash flows which can be used to fund 
investment. In addition, Abel and Eberly (2012) argue that, as the 
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depreciation rate reflects the users’ cost of capital, investment is a linear 
function of the depreciation rate. 
Moreover, a number of theories suggest interactions between investment and 
payouts and capital structure. McCabe’s (1979) Budget Constraint theory 
supports that in imperfect capital markets firms the financing choice should be 
accounted for when investment is set. The Budget Constraint Hypothesis of 
McCabe (1979) and the Pecking Order Hypothesis also suggest interactions 
between investment and other financial decisions. This has been acknowledged 
in the UK, where firms’ high and inflexible dividend payments have raised 
concerns regarding funds available for investment in times of recession (House 
of Commons Trade and Industry report 1994; Griffiths and Wall, 2007). 
McCabe’s Budget Constraint Theory suggests that ceteris paribus UK firms will 
need more debt financing to fund share repurchases and investment since 
they do not usually obtain funds by dividend reductions. However, UK firms 
appear to rely less on debt financing (see Rajan and Zingales 1995; De Jong et 
al. 2007; and Antoniou et al. 2008). Therefore, a strong interaction between 
investment and share repurchases is expected in the UK. 
The same would be expected by the Pecking Order Theory. Since dividends are 
considered inflexible UK firms are expected to cut share repurchases in order 
to avoid the asymmetric information costs of obtaining external financing. 
As in the case with capital structure, dividends and share repurchases, 
investment has been studies mostly in isolation thereby ignoring the 
aforementioned interdependence (Baskin 1989; Rahaman 2011; Prombutr, 
Phengpis and Zhang 2012; Abel and Eberly 2012).  
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4.2.5 Summary 
This part has reviewed four basic financial decisions namely share 
repurchases, dividends, capital structure and investment in a UK setting. There 
are noticeable differences between the US and the UK in terms of their 
bankruptcy codes, taxation, corporate governance, ownership structure and 
dividend policy (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et al., 1996; Short and 
Keasey 1999; Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 2005; DWS, 2012). As prior 
literature (e.g. Bennedsen & Nielsen 2010, La Porta et al., 2000) suggests 
such differences are likely to influence corporate behaviour. This review has 
shown that in the UK share repurchases, dividends, capital structure and 
investment seem to be driven by the same firm specific factors but with 
differences regarding their importance. Moreover, extant theories identify 
linkages between dividends, share repurchases, investment and dividends. 
Financial decision-making related research in the UK so far has largely ignored 
this interdependence.UK based empirical studies, which do provide evidence of 
interdependence between dividends and investment (Adedeji 1998) and 
dividends and capital structure (Ding and Murinde 2010). However, these 
studies do not take into account the phenomenon of share repurchases leading 
to misspecification concerns. Therefore, a joint investigation into UK financial 
decision-making, which accounts for share repurchases is worthwhile as it will 
deal with endogeneity and misspecification concerns. Finally, this study aims 
to investigate this interdependence before and after the credit crunch. Due to 
the liquidity originating in September 2008 firms might have readjusted their 
corporate policies. The understanding of corporate behaviour in terms of its 
financial decisions especially during a crisis might be worthwhile to regulatory 
authorities.  
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4.3 Data and methodology 
In the previous section, we reviewed the determinants of each of the financial 
decisions under investigation from a UK perspective. We have seen that share 
repurchases, dividends, leverage and investment in UK firms are affected by 
the same factors identified in the US. Moreover, the theoretical framework for 
a joint investigation of these four financial decisions holds equally for the UK 
market. Therefore we follow a similar methodological approach to the one 
followed for the US chapter study. 
4.3.1 The empirical model 
Taking into consideration this study’s objectives, we formulate the following 
system of equations, consisting of one equation for each financial decision 
under investigation. For every company i, each financial decision is a function 
of the remaining ones, plus a vector of exogenous control variables related to 
the specific financial decision. Thus, we arrive at the following system of 
equations, 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓1(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1𝑖) + 𝜀1𝑖 (1) 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓2(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2𝑖) + 𝜀2𝑖 (2) 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖 = 𝑓3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3𝑖) + 𝜀3𝑖 (3) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓4(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4𝑖) + 𝜀4𝑖  (4) 
where ε1i , ε2i, ε3i, ε4i are stochastic zero mean error terms. 
The dependent variables LEV, DIV, REP and INV represent Leverage, 
Dividends, Share Repurchases and Investment respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4i are the respective vectors of exogenous 
control variables for each dependent variable. The control variables included in 
each vector have been identified based on relevant theories and prior 
empirical research as discussed in chapter 2. Therefore 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4i include the same variables as described in Table 16.  
Substituting each of the vectors (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4) 
with the abovementioned variables we arrive at the following system of 
equations24: 
(1) LEVi = α0+ α1DIVi + α2REPi+ α3INVi+ α4ROAi+ α5SIZEi+ α6GROWTHi+ 
α7FCFi+ α8COLTRLi+ α9ZSCOREi + ε1  
(2) DIVi = β0 + β1LEVi+ β2REPi+ β3INVi+ β4ROAi+ β5SIZEi+ β6GROWTHi+ 
β7FCFi+ β8BETAi + ε2  
(3) REPi= γ0 + γ1LEV+ γ2DIVi+ γ3INVi+ γ4SIZEi+ γ5GROWTHi+ γ6FCFi+ 
γ7OPTIONSi+ γ8RETURNi+ γ9SLIQi + γ10CASHi + ε3 
(4) INV = δ0 + δ1LEVi+ δ2DIVi+ δ3REPi+ δ4ROAi+ δ5SIZEi+ δ6GROWTHi+ 
δ7DEPRCi+ ε4 
4.3.2 Sample and Data  
In order to investigate if share repurchases are related to managers’ other 
principal financial decisions in UK firms we use the FTSE All-Share Index as the 
initial sample. We obtain data from the Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database. We exclude from the sample financial and utilities firms as they are 
heavily regulated and have special capital structures (see Rajan and Zingales 
1995), leaving us with 339 firms. After removing firms with missing 
observations the final sample consists of 214 firms. In order to use recent data 
for our analysis we collect data from the period 2005-2011. While taking into 
the UK recession originating in Q.2 2008 (see Figure 6) we split this period 
into two subsamples 2005-2008 and 2008-2011. Keeping this in mind and 
assuming the long-term nature of financial decisions we expect that during 
2008 many firms readjusted their financial policies in light of the liquidity crisis 
                                       
24 As part of sensitivity testing we controlled for industry effects by re-estimating my system of equations 
including industry dummies in every equation. We did not observe any change in the direction of the 
relationships under investigation, however there were changes in statistical significance. Since in many cases 
the industry dummies were insignificant their inclusion most probably increased the coefficients' variance and 
thus affected their statistical significance. 
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triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the 
2008-2009 recession. We therefore included 2008 in both periods.  
Moreover, since decisions about investments, capital structure and pay-put 
policies are deemed long-term decisions (Adedeji 1998, McCabe 1979) we 
follow previous literature (Adedeji 1998; Huang and Song 2006) and use 4 
year-averages for all variables. Finally, following the UK based literature 
regarding capital structure and payout research we use the proxies25 
mentioned in Table 5. For constructing our UK dividend and share repurcahses 
payout ratios we choose to scale by total assets instead of net income.  In the 
UK, companies are considered to have particularly sticky dividends, i.e. 
dividend payments are maintained  irregardeless of fluctuations in profitability  
(see Griffiths and Wall 2007; Braggion and Moore 2001; Cook 2014; Jones 
2014). Therefore,  we scale payouts by total assets which is used as the 
denominator for all other scaled variables. Table 17 provides descriptive 
statistics for the data. Table 18 compares the averages of the variables 
between the two sub-periods 2005-08 and 2008-2011. Results show that key 
financial decisions investment, dividends, share repurchases and investment 
are statistically significant different from each other according to the t-test. It 
appears that these variables have been affected by the crisis thus justifying 
our decision of splitting the period into consideration into two sub-periods. 
More specifically, it appears that on average dividends, share repurchases, 
investment and leverage have decreased for the 2008-11 period. 
 
 
                                       
25 For a detailed discussion regarding proxy selection see the related US chapter part 
3.3.4 
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Figure 6 QDP quarter on quarter growth 
 
 Source: ONS (2014) Key Economic time series data: GDP, Office for National Statistics, 
available online at: www.ons.gov.uk 
We hypothesize that firms make long-run decisions regarding their capital 
structure, payout and investment policies, which are consistent with each 
other. My theoretical framework suggests interdependence between the 
above-mentioned financial decisions and implies that the corresponding 
variables (LEV, DIV, REP, INV) are endogenous. In addition, Adedeji (1998) 
and Ding and Murinde (2010) provide empirical evidence of interdependence 
between dividends and investment and dividends and capital structure in UK 
firms. In order to deal with endogeneity issues besides the traditional OLS we 
use two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) and three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
(see Gujarati 2004). The first stage of the 2SLS procedure regresses each 
endogenous variable (LEVi, DIVi, REPi, INVi) on every exogenous variable in 
the system (i.e. the control variables included in 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i 
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and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4i) to obtain the fitted values. The obtained fitted values are 
“purged” of the influence of the respective disturbance terms. For the second 
stage of the 2SLS process, the obtained fitted values are used as instruments, 
replacing the right hand side endogenous variables in equations (1)-(4). The 
2SLS process produces consistent estimates. However, 2SLS is a limited 
information method as it estimates each equation in the system individually 
without worrying about the restrictions on the other equations in the system 
and hence may be inefficient.  
By contrast, the 3SLS process is a full information method, which estimates all 
the equations in the model simultaneously, thus taking into account any 
restrictions resulting from the omission or inclusion of a variable in each 
equation. However, as Gujarati (2004) notes, 3SLS is sensitive to specification 
errors. Since 3SLS is a full information method, if one equation is misspecified, 
the error is transferred to the rest of the system's equations.  
The selection of control variables in each equation in the system satisfies the 
rank and order conditions of identification. In each equation, there are some 
control variables, which are included only to this equation and therefore can be 
used as instruments. In order for instruments to be valid they need to satisfy 
two conditions i) Instrument relevance and ii) instrument exogeneity (Gujarati 
2004; Stock and Watson 2011). Assuming an endogenous regressor Xi and its’ 
instrumental variable Zi, instrument relevance means that the variation of the 
instrumental variable is related to the variation of the endogenous regressor or 
Corr(Zi,Xi)≠0. Instrument exogeneity means that the instrumental variable Zi 
is uncorrelated to the error term ui of the regression where the endogenous 
regressor is included or Corr(Zi,ui)=0. If these conditions are not met, 2SLS 
and 3SLS can produce poorer results than OLS as the relevant estimators can 
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have large standard errors and large asymptotic bias (Woolridge, 2006). 
Furthermore, Gujarati (2004) states that in practice it is not easy to find 
instruments, which satisfy these conditions. 
Regarding the instrument choice, we follow previous literature. For dividends 
(DIV) we use firm systematic risk (BETA) as the instrumental variable (see 
McCabe 1979; Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). Bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE) and 
collateral (COLTRL) serve as instruments for leverage (LEV) (see Noronha et al 
1996; Aivazian et al 2005; Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). Share repurchases have 
not been used as an endogenous variable in research so far. The choice of 
instrumental variables for share repurchases is based on two conditions. First, 
theoretical and empirical research has found these variables to be correlated 
to share repurchases. Secondly, these variables have not been found by 
empirical research to be important determinants of dividends, investment and 
leverage. Therefore, for share repurchases (REP) I use stock options 
(OPTIONS), share price returns (RETURN), stock liquidity (SLIQ) and cash 
holdings (CASH) as instruments. Following a similar rationale, depreciation 
(DEPRC) is the instrumental variable for investment (INV).  
In advance of the regression analyses we examine the distribution of the data 
since it is a basic assumption of OLS, 2SLS and 3SS methodology. Table 19 
presents the results of the three normality tests. The first two tests test the 
null hypothesis that the data have the skewness and kurtosis of a normal 
distribution. The third combines the two in an overall test statistic similar to 
the Jarque-Bera test for normality. According to these tests the data do not 
follow the normal distribution. In order to deal with this we use three 
measures.  
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First, I winsorize26 the data at the conventional 5% level to deal with potential 
outliers. Secondly, we use two alternative non-parametric estimation 
techniques, median regression and regression with bootstrapped standard 
errors. The median-regression model can be used to achieve the same goal as 
conditional-mean-regression modelling to represent the relationship between 
the central location of the response and a set of covariates (Hao and Naiman 
2007). In addition, Hao and Naiman (2007) argue that in cases when the 
distribution is substantially skewed, the mean is not appropriate for 
interpretation while the median remains highly informative. Therefore, 
conditional-median modelling has the ability to be more practical.  
As a further alternative, we use regression analysis with bootstrapped 
standard errors. This approach is suggested, as it does not require 
distributional assumptions such as the residuals to be normally distributed and 
in addition, it can provide more accurate inferences (Guan 2003; Fox 2008). 
This method is based upon resampling the regression’s residuals in order to 
approximate their underlying distribution rather than assuming it (e.g normal 
distribution). Non-parametric estimations deal with the non-normality of our 
data; however, they do not deal with the endogeneity expected to be present 
in our system of equations. 
Regarding the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, we also test for the presence 
of multicollinearity between the covariates. Tables 30-33 present the VIF 
factors for each variable in each regression in the model for both periods 
(2005-08, 2008-11). Results indicate no multicollinearity problems. The 
                                       
26 Regression results from the winsorized data have produced more statistically 
significant variables and higher R-squares compared results from to the non-winsorized 
data confirming the distortion from outliers. 
Chapter 4. Are share repurchases an integral part of UK firms’ financial decision-
making? 
168 
 
relevant rule of thumb suggests that if a variable has a VIF factor greater than 
10 the variable may merit further investigation, Gujarati (2004). These 
variables have a max of 6.18 thus suggesting that multicollinearity is not an 
issue 
In order to establish the validity of the 2SLS and 3SLS we employ two tests 
regarding instrument validity. We use the Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak 
identification. Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are 
weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. Consequently, estimators 
can perform poorly. Low values of the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (i.e lower 
than 10) indicate weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005). In addition, we 
use the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that 
all instruments are valid i.e., uncorrelated with the error term. If the computed 
chi-square exceeds the critical chi-square value, we reject the null hypothesis, 
which means that at least one instrument is correlated with the error term and 
therefore the estimates based on the chosen instruments are not valid. Table 
5f presents the instrumental variable tests’ results for each 2SLS regression. 
The weak identification test, as it can be seen from Table 27, indicates that we 
have a weak instrument problem, in every regression, in both periods. The 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is quite low ranging from 1.13 in the investment 
regression in 2005-08 to 5.22 in the dividend regression in 2005-08. Stock 
and Yogo (2005) report that, as a rule of thumb Cragg-Donald Wald F-
statistics below 10 indicate weak instruments. In addition, Sargan test’s 
results indicate that the instruments are correlated with the error term in most 
of the regressions. The exception being the share repurchases and leverage 
equations in 2005-08 and the share repurchases equation in 2008-11.  
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Instrumental variables tests cast doubt on the instrument validity. The 
problem of weak instruments is often present in similar studies. Studies which 
employ instrumental variables often do not report tests regarding their validity 
(see Jensen et al. 1992; Noronha et al. 1996; Adedeji 1998; Crutchley et al. 
1999; Ding and Murinde 2010, Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). Furthermore, 
regression results from some of the aforementioned studies indicate weak 
instrument problems. A typical example is in Jensen (1992) where the variable 
fixed assets serving an instrument for leverage is not statistically significant in 
the leverage equation. Similar cases are reported in the majority of the 
aforementioned studies. However, instrument validity is not usually discussed 
or tested. This might be due to the difficulty of finding valid instruments, 
underlined by Gujarati (2004). 
As Woolridge (2006) highlights, invalid instruments can produce poorer results 
than OLS as the relevant 2SLS and 3SLS estimators can have large standard 
errors and large asymptotic bias. Therefore, in order to check the robustness 
of the results, l consider both the results from the OLS estimations and the 
non-parametric estimations. As non-parametric estimations deal with non-
normality issues in our data, they are expected to produce more valid results 
than OLS. 
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Table 19 Definition of variables 
Variable name Variable 
acronym 
Description 
Leverage LEV Sum of long term debt plus short term debt 
scaled by total assets.  
Dividend payout 
ratio 
DIV Common cash dividends scaled by total assets  
Share repurchase REP Share repurchase expenditure scaled by total 
assets  
Investment INV Capital expenditure scaled by total assets 
Profitability ROA Return on assets measured as EBITDA scaled by 
total assets 
Cash balance CASH Cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets 
Free cash flow FCF Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets 
Firm risk BETA Firm's market beta 
Collateral COLTRL Assets that can be used as collateral measured 
as net property, plant and equipment scaled by 
total assets 
Bankruptcy risk ZSCORE Altman’s Z score calculated as  
Z = 1.2
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 1.4
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 
3.3
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 0.6
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 + 
.999
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Firm size SIZE Logarithm of sales 
Growth 
opportunities 
GROWTH Sales Growth calculated as logSALESt – 
logSALESt-1 
Depreciation DEPRC Depreciation scaled by total assets 
Total stock return RETURN Stock's return calculated as the Log RIt+1 - 
LogRIt, where RI is the stock's return index from 
Datastream. 
The return index presents the theoretical growth 
in value of a theoretical stock holding. This 
holding is deemed to return a daily dividend, 
which is used to purchase new units of the stock 
at the current price. The gross dividend is used. 
RI on the base date =100, then: RIt = RIt-1*(Pit/ 
PIt-1)*(1+D*N-1), Where: RIt= return index on 
day t, RIt-1= return index on previous day, PIt= 
price index on day t, PIt-1 = price index on 
previous day, D= dividend yield % on day t, N = 
number of working days in the year (taken to be 
260).  
Stock options 
expense 
OPTIONS Stock options expense scaled by total assets 
Stock liquidity SLIQ Annual trading volume scaled by the number of 
common shares outstanding 
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Table 20 Descriptive statistics-UK sample 
2005-2008 2008-2011 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DIV 214 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.53 DIV 214 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.13 
REP 214 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.45 REP 214 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.15 
INV 214 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.14 INV 214 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.26 
LEV 214 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.80 LEV 214 0.21 0.15 0.00 0.77 
ROA 214 0.14 0.08 -0.06 0.93 ROA 214 0.13 0.08 -0.12 0.38 
DEPR 214 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.80 DEPR 214 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.19 
COLTRL 214 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.21 COLTRL 214 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.91 
RETURN 214 -0.03 0.08 -0.42 0.15 RETURN 214 0.00 0.09 -0.47 0.21 
OPTION 214 0.29 0.32 -0.08 2.03 OPTION 214 0.27 0.32 -0.01 2.84 
CASH 214 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.58 CASH 214 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.63 
FCF 214 0.10 0.07 -0.12 0.34 FCF8 214 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.28 
GROWTH 214 0.05 0.07 -0.25 8.28 GROWTH 214 0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.17 
SLIQ 214 1.45 1.23 0.12 0.40 SLIQ 214 0.90 0.72 0.03 7.52 
ZSCORE 214 1.88 0.97 -1.90 12.35 ZSCORE 214 1.82 0.90 -0.48 4.67 
SIZE 214 5.92 0.73 4.40 4.90 SIZE 214 6.00 0.73 4.71 8.38 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets, DIV: Common cash dividends to total assets, REP: Stock 
repurchases to total assets, INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled 
by total assets, CASH: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to 
total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, 
OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets 
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Table 21 Difference in variables’ means 2005-08 and 2008-11, UK sample 
 
Mean Ho: mean difference = 
0 
Pr(|T| > |t|) Variable Obs. 
2005-
08 
2008-
011 
DIV 214 0.033 0.028 0.048 
REP 214 0.019 0.008 0.000 
INV 214 0.048 0.041 0.000 
LEV 214 0.221 0.213 0.061 
ROA 214 0.142 0.128 0.000 
DEPR 214 0.039 0.040 0.022 
COLTRL 214 0.256 0.250 0.063 
RETURN 214 -0.031 -0.004 0.000 
OPTION 214 0.289 0.268 0.074 
CASH 214 0.114 0.110 0.353 
FCF 214 0.102 0.102 0.916 
GROWTH 214 0.045 0.028 0.000 
SLIQ 214 1.449 0.903 0.000 
ZSCORE 214 1.880 1.824 0.000 
SIZE 214 5.916 6.004 0.053 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to 
total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation 
to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -
LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, 
OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets, SLIQ: annual trading 
volume to number of common shares outstanding 
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Table 22 Normality tests-UK sample 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: 
stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: 
Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – 
logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as 
the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, 
OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets, SLIQ: annual trading volume to number 
of common shares outstanding 
 
4.4 Findings and analysis 
Tables 22-27 present the results from the OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS regressions, 
median regressions and regression with bootstrapped standard errors. In 
general, the employed methodologies have produced generally similar results 
with a few differences regarding interactions between financial decisions. 
Results differ mainly between methods, which deal with endogeneity (2SLS, 
3SLS), and methods which do not (OLS, median regression, regression with 
bootstrapped standard errors).  
  2005-2008 2008-2011 
Variable Obs 
Pr(Sk
ewne
ss) 
Pr(Kurto
sis) 
Joint Test 
Prob>chi2 Obs 
Pr(Skew
ness) 
Pr(Kurtosi
s) 
Joint Test 
Prob>chi2 
DIV 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.08 0.01 0.01 
DEPR 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
INV 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COLTRL 214 0.00 0.05 0.00 214 0.00 0.07 0.00 
LEV 214 0.00 0.13 0.00 214 0.00 0.13 0.00 
REP 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RETURN 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OPTION 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CASH 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FCF 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.02 0.00 
SIZE 214 0.01 0.88 0.05 214 0.00 0.99 0.02 
GROWTH 214 0.16 0.00 0.00 214 0.01 0.00 0.00 
SLIQ 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 214 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ZSCORE 214 0.78 0.00 0.01 214 0.01 0.09 0.01 
BETA 214 0.00 0.64 0.01 214 0.00 0.64 0.01 
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4.4.1 Non-parametric estimations 
Tables 22-24 report the non-parametric estimation results.  
Both the median and the bootstrapping regression show that share 
repurchases do not have an impact on dividends and leverage in both periods, 
as the respective coefficients are statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
in the UK share repurchases do not serve as dividend substitutes as suggested 
by Grullon and Michaely (2002). In addition, the UK findings do not lend 
support to concerns that share repurchases can lead to the excessive leverage 
of companies (see Foroohar 2013). Moreover, share repurchases do not seem 
to influence investment in 2008-11. However, our findings show that share 
repurchases have a statistically significant negative effect on investment in 
2005-08. This is in accordance with the Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe 
(1979) where share repurchases as a use of funds has a negative impact on 
another use of funds (i.e. investment).  
The effect of dividends on investment is not consistent between periods. 
Dividends do not have a statistically significant impact on investment in the 
2005-8 period according to both non-parametric estimations methods. 
However, dividends seem to have a negative impact on investment in the 
2008-11 period. The coefficient of dividends is negative in both estimation 
techniques but only statistically significant in the bootstrapping regression. 
This difference between periods can be attributed to the post-crisis 
environment. The lack of liquidity in 2008-11 might strengthen the 
competition between share dividends and investment for the same limited 
financial resources.  
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Dividends in the UK do not seem to impact on share repurchases. According to 
both non-parametric estimations in 2005-08, dividends’ effect on share 
repurchases is statistically insignificant. There is an indication that in 2008-11, 
dividends have a positive effect on share repurchases as the relevant 
coefficients are both positive. However, the coefficient is statistically significant 
only in the median regression. Again, results are against the dividend 
substitution hypothesis by Grullon and Michaely (2002). 
Finally, the effect of dividends on leverage is not consistent between periods. 
In 2005-08, the median regression shows that dividends have a positive effect 
on leverage. This supports the Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) as 
a greater use of dividends leads to a greater use in debt financing. It is also 
supportive of the Pecking Order Theory, which suggests that firms with higher 
dividend payout ratios will have lower retained earnings and thus need to rely 
more on debt financing to fund investment opportunities. In 2008-11, the 
coefficient on dividends is insignificant in both the median and the 
bootstrapping estimations.  
Leverage does not seem to impact on investment. The respective coefficient in 
the investment equation is statistically insignificant it both periods and across 
both non-parametric estimation techniques. In addition, according to both 
non-parametric estimation methods leverage does not seem to have an effect 
on dividends in 2005-08. However, in 2008-11 the median regression 
estimation shows a negative and statistically significant effect of leverage on 
dividends. This is in line to the Free Cash Flows Theory. In the post crisis 
environment with scarce investment opportunities firms might choose debt 
over dividends as a more binding mechanism to reduce resources under 
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managerial control. The findings do not show an effect of leverage on share 
repurchases in 2008-11. However, the bootstrapping regression shows a 
positive and statistically significant effect of leverage on share repurchases in 
2005-08. This is supportive of the Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) 
where sources of funds (i.e leverage) have a positive impact on uses of funds 
(i.e share repurchases).  
Investment has a robust negative impact on dividends in both periods. In 
support of the Budget Constraint theory, the coefficient of the investment 
variable in the dividend non-parametric regressions is always negative and 
statistically significant with the exception of the median regression in 2005-08. 
In addition, investment does not appear to have an effect on share 
repurchases in 2008-11, as the respective coefficient in the share repurchase 
equation is generally statistically insignificant. However, investment appears to 
have a negative effect on share repurchases in 2005-08. Finally, the non-
parametric estimations have produced incosistent results regarding the effect 
of investment on leverage. In 2008-11, this effect seems to be negative while 
in 2005-08 it appears to be positive (only in the bootstrapping regression). It 
seems that in the post crisis period firms might draw funds from reducing 
share repurchases and dividends instead of levering up. Since raising debt is a 
binding choice of financing this would provide firms with financial flexibility 
which is considered significant in periods of uncertainty. On the contrary, in 
the pre crisis period where financial flexibility is expected be of lesser 
importance, an increase in investment is associated with an increase in 
leverage as supported by the Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) and 
the Pecking Order Theory. 
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As far the control variables are concerned, we observe no disparities between 
findings from the non-parametric estimations and earlier research. More 
specifically, in line with Free Cash Flow Theory, the effect of free cash flows on 
share repurchases is consistently positive and statistically significant on both 
non-parametric estimations (median and bootstrapped standard errors 
regressions) for both periods. This relationship is supported by earlier studies 
on UK firms (see Oswald and Young 2008; Dixon et al. 2008; Dhanani and 
Roberts 2009). Moreover, the findings confirm the significance of stock options 
and firm size. The coefficient on stock options is consistently positive and 
statistically significant supporting the option-funding hypothesis of Kahle 
(2000). Therefore, it seems that share repurchases in the UK are used flexibly 
to fund stock options and/or reduce free cash flows. Finally, contrary to our 
expectations firm size seems to have a positive effect on share repurchases. 
We expected smaller firms to be more prone to undervaluation and utilize 
share repurchases to signal positive information to the market. Dittmar (2000) 
finds the same unexpected positive relationship between size and share 
repurchases. The author suggests that this could be because larger firms are 
also likely to be misvalued and use share repurchases to take advantage of 
possible undervaluation. Regarding the stock return variable it is seldom 
negative and statistical significant as in Dittmar (2000). As the author argues 
this could be attributed to the fact that we are not using quarterly data which 
might better capture the potential undervaluation motive. However, this could 
be due to the effect of the strict UK regulatory framework on share 
repurchases. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) argue that due to this UK companies 
find it more difficult than their US counterparts to use open market 
repurchases to exploit perceived undervaluation. The UK regulatory framework 
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described by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) became even stricter by 2004. As 
reported earlier the implementation of The EU Market Abuse Directive 
2003/6/EC (MAD) 29 increased the risk of facing market manipulation charges 
when compared to the old safe harbour provisions (Siems and De Cesari 
2012). The variables cash holdings and stock liquidity do not appear to have 
an effect on share repurchases. Finally, both the median regressions and the 
bootstrapping regressions show a negative coefficient on GROWTH. This 
negative effect is in line to Rozeff (1982) and Crutchley et al (1999) as 
growing firms are expected to retain earnings instead of distributing them in 
order to avoid the costs of external financing. 
We confirm free cash flows (FCF) and profitability (ROA) as dividend 
determinants. These variables have a consistent positive effect on dividends in 
line with the Free Cash Flow Theory and the Pecking Order Theory 
respectively. This supports earlier findings by Jensen et al. (1992), and 
Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010). In addition, growth opportunities (GROWTH) are 
related consistently and negatively to dividends, which is in line with the 
Pecking Order Theory. Finally, firm size and firm risk have the expected 
positive and negative effect respectively but are not statistically significant. 
In the leverage regressions both bootstrapping and median regressions 
identify bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE), firm size (SIZE) as capital structure 
determinants. Bankruptcy risk has a negative impact while size a positive one. 
These relationships are in accordance to the Trade Off theory. This result is in 
line with findings by Frank and Goyal (2009) and supports their contention 
that Altman's Z-score is one of the most reliable capital structure 
determinants. In addition, non-parametric estimations indicate collateral 
(COLTRL) as a leverage determinant. Collateral (COLTRL) is positive and 
Chapter 4. Are share repurchases an integral part of UK firms’ financial decision-
making? 
179 
 
statistically significant in both bootstrapping and median estimations. This 
supports Jensen (1976) who argues that firms with tangible assets can use 
them as collateral when a firm is taking on debt, thus reducing debt’s agency 
costs. Profitability (ROA) seems to have an effect on capital structure only in 
the 2005-08 period. Its impact on capital structure is positive which is 
supportive of the Trade Off Theory. According to the Trade Off theory 
profitable firms might use debt in order to exploit tax shields. However, in 
2008-11 profitability is not statistically significant. In part, this might be 
related to the significantly lower profitability of firms during 2008-2011, which 
might have reduced the potential benefits derived from leverage tax shields. 
Moreover, in this period of economic uncertainty many firms held back on 
investment projects, both due to increased costs and due to unavailability of 
funding or because of uncertainty about the development of the domestic and 
global demand and prices.  
Variables related to financial distress and probability of default retain their 
significance e.g (ZSCORE), (SIZE), (COLTRL). The free cash flow (FCF) 
variable has a negative effect on leverage in 2005-8 indicating that in the pre 
crisis period UK firms did not use debt as a mechanism to reduce agency costs 
of free cash flows. However, after the credit crunch both parametric and non-
parametric tests suggest no significant relationship between leverage and free 
cash flow. This resembles the profitability (ROA) results and may indicate that 
in the post crisis period UK firms are trying to maintain their liquidity due to 
difficulties in raising external finance and economic uncertainty. The Growth 
opportunities (GROWTH) variable does not seem to have a significant effect on 
leverage.  
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In the investment equation profitability (ROA), size (SIZE) and depreciation 
(DEPRC) have the expected positive effect on investment and are statistically 
significant in both periods. The documented positive effect of profitability on 
capital investment is in line with the contention of McCabe (1979) that sources 
of funds (earnings) have a positive effect on uses of funds (investment). 
According to McCabe (1979), depreciation identifies cash flows, which can be 
used to fund investment. This result is also in accordance with Abel and Eberly 
(2012) who argue that, as the depreciation rate reflects the users’ cost of 
capital, investment is a linear function of the depreciation rate. The positive 
impact of the firm size (SIZE) variable indicates that larger firms invest more. 
Finally, the growth variable (GROWTH) does not seem to have an effect on 
investment.
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4.4.2 Parametric estimations 
Tables 25-27 present results from the parametric estimations (OLS, 2SLS and 
3SLS). The parametric methods, which deal with endogeneity (2SLS, 3SLS), 
have produced similar results. However, there are some differences between 
these methods and OLS. This can be attributed to the impact of weak 
instruments as suggested by the relevant tests reported earlier in this section. 
Since the 2SLS and 3SL estimations suffer from weak instruments, the OLS 
results are more appropriate for inferences. Furthermore, the OLS results are 
very similar to the non-parametric results (median regression and regression 
with bootstrapped standard errors). This indicates that the non-normality of 
the data was not severe enough to distort significantly the OLS results.  
Share repurchases do not seem to influence other key financial decisions 
according to the 2SLS and 3SL estimations. The findings show that share 
repurchases do not have a statistically significant effect on investment and 
dividends. This applies to both periods, before and after the credit crunch, as 
the respective coefficient of share repurchases on both the investment and 
dividend equation is consistently statistically insignificant. Only OLS results 
indicate a negative effect on investment in 2005-08. As reported earlier this is 
also supported by the non-parametric results. Regarding the effect of share 
repurchases on leverage results are inconsistent. Share repurchases appear 
only to have a negative effect on leverage in 2008-11 as the respective 2SLS 
and 3SLS coefficients are statistically significant. Yet, this relationship is 
insignificant in OLS and both non-parametric estimations. Thus, the UK 
findings do not lend support that share repurchases can lead to the excessive 
leverage of companies (see FINNOV 2012; Foroohar 2013). Moreover, our 
results do not show evidence of dividend substitution by share repurchases. 
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However, there is evidence which suggest that share repurchases have a 
negative impact on investment. These supports concerns that share 
repurchases can be detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through 
investment (see FINNOV 2012). 
Dividends seem to have a negative impact on investment. This relationship 
appears be more evident in the post crisis period 2008-11 than in 2005-08. 
More specifically, OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS and bootstrapping regressions show a 
negative and statistically significant effect of dividends on investment and vice 
versa. This confirms earlier results of Adedeji (1998) for UK firms and is in line 
with McCabe's (1979) Budget Constraint theory, as dividends and investment 
appear to be competing uses of funds. The fact that dividends appear to have 
a negative effect on investment after the credit crunch supports economists’ 
concerns raised about funds available for investment in times of recession (see 
House of Commons Trade and Industry report 1994; Griffiths and Wall, 2007). 
In the pre crisis periods, only OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS support the negative effect 
of dividends on investment. However, as suggested later the 2SL and 3SLS 
results should be treated with caution, as they are likely to suffer from weak 
instrument problems, while the OLS estimations do not account for the non-
normality of the data. 
Dividends seem to have a positive effect on share repurchases according to 
2SLS and 3SLS in both periods and OLS in 2008-11. The same is suggested by 
the median regression in 2008-11. This is against to what most theories would 
support and against the dividend substitution hypothesis suggested by Grullon 
and Michaely (2002).  
Finally, 2SLS and 3SLS indicate that dividends have a positive effect on 
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leverage for the period before the credit crunch, since both the 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimations in 2005-08 show a strong positive and statistically significant 
impact. This relationship is also supported by the median regression in 2005-
08. This is in line with the Budget Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979) as a 
greater use of funds requires additional sources of funds. However, the impact 
of dividends on leverage is not statistically significant in the 2008-11 period. 
This may indicate that in 2008-11, firms did not lever up to fund dividend 
increases. Instead, they appear to have rather cut investment or share 
repurchases or use retained earnings. 
OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS show that capital structure does not seem to have an 
effect on payout policies in 2008-11. The same is supported by the non-
parametric estimations. However, the OLS and bootstrapping estimation in 
2005-08 indicate a positive effect. This is in line to the Budget Constraint 
Theory. Likewise, the findings do not show an effect of leverage on dividends. 
The impact of leverage on dividends is statistically insignificant in all cases but 
one, the 3SLS estimation in 2005-08. In addition, it appears that leverage 
does not impact on investment. In accordance to the Budget Constraint Theory 
the coefficient of leverage on the investment equation is generally positive 
however in most cases statistically insignificant. The same is supported by the 
non-parametric estimations. It seems that in the UK, the financing need 
associated with increases in investment and payouts does not lead to 
increases in capital structure in the long term. Dividends and investment might 
be funded by respective reductions of one another. This is supported by the 
documented negative impact of dividends on investment reported earlier. The 
negative impact of investment on dividends, which will be reported and 
discussed briefly in this section, is also in favor of this contention. Since we 
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observe no similar interaction between share repurchases and dividends and 
share repurchases and investment, share repurchases might be funded solely 
by free cash flows. 
Investment, as mentioned earlier, seems to impact on dividends. In 2008-11, 
the coefficient of the investment variable in the dividend and share repurchase 
equations is consistently negative and statistically significant across both non-
parametric and parametric estimation methods. The same applies for 2005-08 
where the relevant coefficient is insignificant in the median regression. The 
indicated negative impact of dividends on investment is in line with McCabe’s 
Budget Constraint Theory.  
In addition, investment does not appear to have an effect on share 
repurchases, as the respective coefficient in the share repurchases equation is 
generally statistically insignificant. However, as reported earlier non-
parametric estimations show a negative impact in 2005-08. Finally, investment 
does not seem to affect leverage as the coefficient of the investment variable 
in the leverage equation is statistically insignificant in all cases but one (3LS, 
2008-11). On the contrary, non-parametric estimations show a negative effect 
in 2008-11 and a positive one in2005-08. 
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Table 23 Summary of non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Dependent variables, UK sample 
2005-08 Median Bootstrapping 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV  -0.13 -0.07*** -0.01  -0.22*** -0.26*** 5.40*** 
DIV 0.01  -0.01 0.06* -0.053  -0.09 -0.37 
REP -0.13*** 0.02  0.60 -0.17* -0.17  0.30 
LEV 0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.01 0.02 0.03*  
 
2008-2011 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV  -0.15*** -0.01 -1.60***  -0.19*** -0.04 -0.82** 
DIV -0.14  0.06*** -0.24 -0.30**  0.03 0.15 
REP -0.05 0.04  0.12 -0.07 -0.04  0.42 
LEV 
0.01 -0.01*** 0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 
 
 No. 
observations 
214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively  
LEV: long term debt to total assets (book values), DIV: dividend payout (Common Dividends (Cash) to total assets, REP: Stock 
repurchases to total assets, INV: capital expenditures to total assets, 
Chapter 4. Are share repurchases an integral part of UK firms’ financial decision-making? 
186 
 
 
Table 24 Non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Control variables 2005-08, UK sample 
 
 Dependent variables 
2005-2008 Median Bootstrapping 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.01 -0.09*** -0.04** 0.30 0.01 -0.30* -0.12** -0.06 
SIZE 
0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.04*** 
ROA 
0.10*** 
0.16*** 
 0.65* 0.20*** 
0.17*** 
 1.06*** 
FCF 
 0.06* 0.11*** -1.34***  0.23 0.35*** -1.03*** 
COLTLR 
   0.30***    0.18*** 
ZSCORE 
   -0.05***    -0.07*** 
BETA 
 -0.01    -0.01   
OPTIONS 
  0.01***    0.04***  
RETURN 
  -0.01    -0.01  
CASH 
  -0.01    -0.02  
SLIQ  
  -0.01    0.01  
DEPRC 
0.87***    0.81***    
constant 
-0.06*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.03 -0.05*** -0.01 -0.07*** 0.02 
 No. 
observations 
214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
 R-squared 0.36 0.25 0.12 0.17 0.54 0.34 0.44 0.32 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations to total assets, CASH: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, 
COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – 
logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return 
index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets. 
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Table 25 Summary of non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Control variables 2008-11, UK sample 
2008-2011 Median Bootstrapping 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH -0.08** -0.10*** -0.01 0.25 0.04 -0.13*** -0.05** -0.16 
SIZE 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 0.04*** 
ROA 0.10*** 
0.13*** 
 0.04 0.19*** 
0.19*** 
 0.31 
FCF  0.18*** 0.02** 0.41  0.13 0.13** 0.02 
COLTLR    0.35***    0.21*** 
ZSCORE    -0.07***    -0.07*** 
BETA  -0.01**    -0.01   
OPTIONS   0.01***    0.01  
RETURN   -0.01    0.01  
CASH   0.01    0.01  
SLIQ    0.01    10.01  
DEPRC 0.63***    0.51***    
constant -0.03** -0.01 -0.01*** -0.07 -0.03* 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
 
No. observations 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
 
R-squared 0.27 0.37 0.13 0.17 0.37 0.52 0.33 0.30 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations to total assets, CASH: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, 
COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt 
– logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's 
return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets. 
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Table 26 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Dependent variables, UK sample 
2005-2008 
Dependent Variables 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV  
-
0.15*** 
-
0.15*** 
-
0.18 
 
-
0.21*** 
-0.02 2.64  
-
0.42*** 
0.06 5.40*** 
DIV -0.14  0.08 0.20 -1.02**  0.51*** 9.36** 
-
1.48*** 
 0.45** 15.16*** 
REP 
-
0.24*** 
0.01  0.27 0.05 0.03  -0.92 0.22 0.08  -1.70 
LEV 0.01 -0.01 0.02*  0.04 0.01 0.02  0.06*** 0.04*** -0.01  
2008-2011  
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV 
 
-
0.18*** 
-0.01 
-
0.61 
 
-
0.24*** 
0.01 0.98  
-
0.39*** 
0.04 1.56 
DIV -
0.36*** 
 0.08** 0.31 
-
2.07*** 
 0.17** 2.87 
-
2.07*** 
 0.14** 3.69 
REP 
-0.12 0.19*  
-
0.27 
0.80 -0.07  
-
7.04** 
1.35* 0.23  -9.20*** 
LEV -0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.01 -0.02 0.01  0.07** 0.01 -0.01  
 No. 
observations 
214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively  
LEV: long term debt to total assets (book values), DIV: dividend payout (Common Dividends (Cash) to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - 
Preferred Dividend Requirement), REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital 
expenditures to total assets, all variables have been winsorized at the 5% level  
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Table 27 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Control variables 2005-08, UK sample 
 Dependent variables 
2005-2008 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH -0.01 -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.05 -0.12 -0.16*** -0.06 1.28* -0.18*** -0.1*** -0.04 2.10*** 
SIZE 
0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.05* 0.01* 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 
ROA 0.23*** 0.20***  1.21*** 0.40*** 
0.20***  -0.50 0.50*** 0.28***  
-2.96*** 
FCF  0.09* 0.19*** -1.29***  0.10** 0.14 -2.20**  0.01 0.03 -1.73*** 
COLTLR    0.14***    -0.02    0.06 
ZSCORE    -0.08***    -0.10***    -0.06*** 
BETA  -0.01    -0.01    -0.01   
OPTIONS   0.03***    0.03***    0.03***  
RETURN   0.01    -0.01    -0.01  
CASH   -0.01    0.01    0.02  
SLIQ    0.01    0.01    0.01  
DEPRC 0.77***    0.61***    0.39***    
constant -0.06*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.06*** 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.11 
 No. 
observations 
214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
 R-squared 0.53 0.48 0.45 0.38 - - - - - - - - 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, 
RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets, all variables have been winsorized at the 5% level  
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Table 28 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Control variables 2008-11, UK sample 
 Dependent variables 
2008-2011 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.03 -0.12*** -0.02 -0.23 -0.17* -0.13*** -0.01 -0.27 -0.15* -0.10*** -0.02* -0.24 
SIZE 0.01*** 0.01 0.01** 0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.07*** -0.01 -0.02 0.01*** 0.07*** 
ROA 0.20*** 
0.20*** 
 0.36 0.59*** 
0.21*** 
 -0.02 0.57*** 
0.26*** 
 -0.38 
FCF  0.08** 0.04** -0.03  0.11** 0.01 0.19  0.04 0.02 0.19 
COLTLR    0.17***    0.04    0.07 
ZSCORE    -0.08***    -0.08***    -0.06*** 
BETA  -0.01    -0.01    -0.01   
OPTIONS   0.01***    0.01***    0.01***  
RETURN   0.01    0.04    0.01  
CASH   0.01    0.01    0.01  
SLIQ    0.01    0.01*    -0.01  
DEPRC 0.58***    0.23    0.13    
constant -0.04** -0.01 -0.02*** -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01*** -0.13 0.01 -0.01 -0.01*** -0.17* 
 
No. 
observations 
214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
 
R-squared 0.43 0.60 0.37 0.32 - - - - - - - - 
ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, 
RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets. All variables have been winsorized at the 5% level  
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Table 29 Instrumental variables overidentification and weak identification 
test-UK sample 
 2005-08 
 Overidentification test for all 
instruments -Sargan statistic (p-
values) 
Weak identification test - Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 
REP 0.73 1.11 
DIV 0.00 2.08 
INV 0.00 3.05 
LEV 0.00 1.07 
 2008-11 
REP 0.00 1.06 
DIV 0.04 3.00 
INV 0.00 2.30 
LEV 0.01 3.01 
* The null hypothesis for the overidentification test is that instruments are valid  
* As a rule of thumb Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics below 10 indicate weak 
instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005) 
Table 30 Share repurchases regressions (2005-08,  2008-11) VIF factors 
VIF 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
FCF 2.98 3.25 
DIV 1.74 2.04 
OPTION 1.63 1.78 
CASH 1.61 1.72 
SIZE 1.6 1.5 
SLIQ 1.56 1.5 
INV 1.48 1.47 
GROWTH 1.41 1.44 
LEV 1.38 1.42 
RETURN 1.28 1.35 
Mean VIF 1.67 1.75 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividendsto total assets, 
REP: Stock repurchases to total assets, INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: 
EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of 
sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to 
total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, 
where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets 
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Table 31 Investment regressions (2005-08, 2008-11) VIF factors 
VIF 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
ROA 2.62 3.48 
DIV 1.9 2.39 
REP 1.44 1.46 
DEPR 1.33 1.37 
GROWTH 1.32 1.34 
SIZE 1.18 1.18 
LEV 1.11 1.16 
Mean VIF 1.56 1.77 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividendsto total assets, 
REP: Stock repurchases to total assets, INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: 
EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of 
sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to 
total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, 
where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets 
 
Table 32 Leverage regressions (2005-08, 2008-11) VIF factors 
Leverage 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
ROA 6.18 6.74 
FCF 5.4 5.32 
INV 2.84 2.89 
COLTRL 2.19 2.56 
DIV 1.93 2.42 
REP 1.62 1.42 
GROWTH 1.42 1.39 
ZSCORE 1.4 1.3 
SIZE 1.14 1.09 
Mean VIF 2.68 2.79 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividendsto total assets, 
REP: Stock repurchases to total assets, INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: 
EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of 
sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to 
total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, 
where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets 
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Table 33 Dividend regressions (2005-08, 2008-11) VIF factors 
Dividends 
Variable 2005-08 2008-11 
FCF 5.36 5.18 
ROA 5 5.16 
REP 1.62 1.4 
INV 1.59 1.38 
SIZE 1.26 1.23 
GROWTH 1.22 1.22 
LEV 1.19 1.16 
BETA 1.08 1.13 
Mean VIF 2.29 2.23 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividendsto total assets, 
REP: Stock repurchases to total assets, INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: 
EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of 
sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to 
total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, 
where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets 
 
As far as the control variables are, concerned parametric and non-parametric 
results have produced quite similar results. 
Regarding share repurchases, the coefficient on the Free Cash Flows variable 
is consistently positive across periods in and parametric estimation techniques 
however it is statistically significant only in the OLS estimations27. 
Nevertheless, as reported earlier, the effect of free cash flows on share 
repurchases is consistently positive and statistically significant on both non-
parametric estimations (median and bootstrapped standard errors regressions) 
for both periods. Similar is the case with the GROWTH variable. Regarding 
share repurchase determinants OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS confirm the significance 
of stock options and firm size. Parametric estimations support the counter-EPS 
dilution motive as they show a consistent positive effect of stock options on 
                                       
27 The effect of free cash flows on share repurchases is consistently positive and 
statistically significant on both non-parametric estimations (median and bootstrapped 
standard errors regressions) for both periods 
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share repurchases. This is in line with findings by Fenn and Liang (1999) and 
Kahle (2000). The aforementioned findings suggest that UK firms utilize share 
repurchases to flexibly fund stock options and/or reduce free cash flows. 
Finally, as in the case of the non-parametric estimations and contrary to our 
expectations firm size seems to have a positive effect on share repurchases.  
Parametric estimations also confirm free cash flows (FCF) and profitability 
(ROA) as dividend determinants. These variables have a consistent positive 
effect on dividends in line with the Free Cash Flow Theory and the Pecking 
Order Theory respectively. This supports earlier findings by Jensen et al. 
(1992), and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010). In addition, growth opportunities 
(GROWTH) are consistently negatively related to dividends, which is in line 
with the Pecking Order Theory. Finally, firm size and firm risk have the 
expected positive and negative effect respectively but are not statistically 
significant. 
Regarding leverage determinants the results show that the firm bankruptcy 
risk (ZSCORE) variable is consistently negatively signed and statistically 
significant. The ZSCORE variable has the expected negative effect on leverage 
consistent with Trade Off Theory, which indicates that firms avoid debt 
financing as their bankruptcy risk increases. This result is in line with findings 
by Frank and Goyal (2009) and supports their contention that Altman's Z-
score is one of the most reliable capital structure determinants. Firm size 
(SIZE) has a consistent positive and statistically significant positive effect on 
leverage in 2008-11. This appears to be in line with the Trade-Off Theory. 
After the credit crunch larger firms, which are expected to have a lower default 
probability, might had easier access to debt financing. Profitability (ROA) and 
collateral (COLTRL) do not seem to have an effect on capital structure, as the 
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related coefficients are not always statistically significant. In addition, it seems 
that firms do not utilize debt as a mechanism to reduce agency costs of free 
cash flows. The FCF variable is negatively signed, though it is not consistently 
significant. The Growth opportunities (GROWTH) variable does not seem to 
have a significant effect on leverage.  
In the investment equation profitability (ROA) has the expected positive effect 
on investment and is statistically significant across periods and estimation 
techniques. The documented positive effect of profitability on capital 
investment is in line with the contention of McCabe (1979) that sources of 
funds (earnings) have a positive effect on uses of funds (investment). The 
depreciation (DEPRC) variable has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on investment in 2005-2008. The effect is still positive in 2008-11 but it is 
statistically significant only in the OLS regression. According to McCabe 
(1979), depreciation identifies cash flows, which can be used to fund 
investment. This result is also in accordance with Abel and Eberly (2012) who 
argue that, as the depreciation rate reflects the users’ cost of capital, 
investment is a linear function of the depreciation rate. The firm size (SIZE) 
variable does not seem to have a consistent and statistically significant effect 
on investment. Finally, the growth variable (GROWTH) has an unexpected 
negative coefficient. However, this appears to be statistically significant in the 
2SLS and 3SLS estimations. 
Summarizing, the results indicate that, unlike in the US, share repurchases in 
the UK are not well integrated into firms’ financial decision-making. The 
differences in financial decision-making between the UK and the US setting 
justifies the contention that a different market might lead to different findings, 
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as supported by a number of studies ( see Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et 
al., 1996; Short and Keasey 1999; La Porta et al., 2000 Armour et al. 2002; 
Dhanani 2005; Bennedsen & Nielsen 2010). More specifically, we do not find 
evidence of dividend substitution in UK firms, as share repurchases do not 
seem to have an effect of dividends. It appears that in the UK share 
repurchases are used as a complement form of payout and not as a substitute. 
Moreover, our findings do not support concerns that share repurchases lead to 
the excessive leverage of companies (see Foroohar, 2013) as share 
repurchases do not seem to affect leverage. However, we find evidence that 
share repurchases can have a negative influence on investment, a concern 
expressed by FINNOV (2012). However, unlike the US this relationship 
appears to be valid only in the pre crisis period (2005-08). Regarding share 
repurchase determinants, we find that the Free Cash Flows Theory and the 
option-funding hypothesis seem to drive share repurchases. Therefore, it 
seems that share repurchases in the UK are used flexibly to fund stock options 
and/or reduce free cash flows 
In addition, we find evidence of interdependence between dividends and 
investment confirming earlier results of Adedeji (1998). The documented 
negative interaction between dividends and investment suggests that they are 
competing uses of funds and is supportive of McCabe’s Budget Constraint 
Theory. The fact that dividends appear to have a negative effect on 
investment even after the credit crunch supports economists’ concerns raised 
about funds available for investment in times of recession (see House of 
Commons Trade and Industry report 1994; Griffiths and Wall, 2007). 
Furthermore, using recent data 2005-2011, we confirm that extant theories 
can explain the determinants of each financial decision. Regarding dividends 
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the impact of free cash flows, profitability and growth opportunities is in 
accordance to the Free Cash Flows Theory and the Pecking Order Theory. 
Trade-Off Theory seems to be the dominant theory regarding capital structure, 
as its main determinants seem to be bankruptcy risk and firm size. Finally, 
profitability and depreciation highlight the importance of financial constraints 
and the influence of the depreciation rate on investment. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to empirically assess if concerns that share repurchases in 
the UK can be detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment 
and lead to the excessive leverage of companies (see FINNOV 2012; Foroohar 
2013) are substantiated. In addition, the UK market has provided us with an 
appealing research setting to compare our US findings, due to similarities and 
differences between the two markets. 
This chapter contributes to our understanding of the integration of share 
repurchases into UK financial decision-making and thus is of importance to 
investors and regulators. In contrast to the US findings, I do not find evidence 
of dividend substitution. It seems that in the UK share repurchases are used 
as complements to dividends rather than substitutes. Moreover, this study 
does not provide empirical support to concerns that share repurchases can 
lead to excessive leverage of companies (see Foroohar, 2013). However, I do 
find evidence which support FINNOV’s (2012) concerns that share repurchases 
can be associated with distorted incentives such as to mitigate the EPS dilution 
effect of stock options and can to undermine productive investment (see 
(FINNOV, 2012 a,b). More specifically, I document a negative interaction 
between share repurchases and investment and confirm stock options as a 
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significant share repurchase determinant. However, the interaction between 
investment and share repurchases holds only in the pre crisis period (2005-
08). Moreover, the fact that growth opportunities are related consistently and 
negatively to share repurchases mitigates these concerns to some extent. In 
general, our results do not show that share repurchases are systematically 
integrated into UK financial decision-making. It seems that share repurchases 
are used flexibly to fund stock options and/or reduce free cash flows.  
Considering the frequency and magnitude of share repurchases in the UK our 
findings concern not only domestic but also foreign investors. Since 2008, 
foreign investors hold almost half of UK quoted shares (OEE, 2013). Of further 
importance to investors and regulators as well is the documented negative 
interaction between dividends and investment. The fact that dividends appear 
to have a negative effect on investment even after the credit crunch supports 
economists’ concerns raised about funds available for investment in times of 
recession (see House of Commons Trade and Industry report 1994; Griffiths 
and Wall, 2007). The interdependence between dividends and investment 
should also concern researchers as the relevant endogeneity concerns should 
be accounted for in future research. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, we observe no disparities with 
previous evidence. We confirm a negative relationship between leverage and 
bankruptcy risk and leverage and free cash flows. In addition, growth 
opportunities, profitability, and free cash flows have a significant effect on 
dividends. Finally, profitability and depreciation have a positive effect on 
investment. 
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In this study, we have employed a number of different estimations techniques 
to check the robustness of our findings. More specifically, we have employed 
both parametric (OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS) and non-parametric estimations (median 
regressions and regressions with bootstrapped standard errors). As our 
instrumental variables appear to be weak in every equation and hence may 
perform poorly (see Gujarati 2004; Stock and Yogo 2005) we based our 
conclusions on our non-parametric estimations. Nevertheless, we did not 
observe significant differences between different estimation methods, which 
suggests that our findings are robust. 
This research so far indicates that US and UK listed firms display noticeable 
differences in their financial decision-making. So indeed, the different 
regulatory and institutional setting of the UK market produced different results 
from the US one. Therefore it might be that these differences can be attributed 
to differences in institutional characteristics as supported by a number of 
studies (see Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et al., 1996; Short and Keasey 
1999; Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 2005). However, in the US chapter I use a 
sample of non-financial companies from the S&P 500 index, whereas in the UK 
Chapter the sample uses non-financial companies from the FTSE All Share 
Index. Therefore, the US-UK difference can also be attributed to the smaller 
size and/or different firm characteristics of UK firms. We will investigate the 
extent to which these differences are driven by country specific factors or firm 
size in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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5. The integration of share repurchases into US and UK 
firms financial decision-making. Do country specific 
factors matter? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
So far, this research indicates that there are similarities but also significant 
differences in the factors, which drive key financial decisions, in particular 
share repurchases, between the USA and the UK. As far as similarities are 
concerned, in both the US and the UK I document a negative interdependence 
between dividends and investment. Moreover, in both countries share 
repurchases do not seem to influence firms’ capital structure. However, while 
for the USA the findings provide evidence that share repurchases have become 
an integral part of large firms’ financial decision-making; this does not appear 
to be the case for the UK.  
In the US, share repurchases seem to be driven not merely by free cash flows 
but also by decisions about investment and dividends, and both dividends and 
investments are in turn affected by share repurchases. This indicates that 
share repurchases have become an essential consideration when managers 
take financial decisions in large US firms. Moreover, the fact that these results 
hold both for the period before and subsequent to the credit crunch suggests 
that, while firms’ overall pay-out ratios fell, in general the credit crunch did not 
lead managers to marginalize share repurchases over dividend payments or 
vice versa.  
By contrast, the UK research does not support such interdependence between 
dividends and share repurchases. The findings show that in the UK share 
repurchases are used as a complementary form of payout and not as a 
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substitute. Moreover, in the UK the negative interaction between share 
repurchases and investment is not consistent as it holds only for the pre-crisis 
period. This suggests that UK firms, contrary to US ones, readjusted their 
share repurchase policy in light of changing macroeconomic conditions and 
expectations. In general, the UK findings suggest that share repurchases are 
not systematically related to managers’ other principal financial decisions. UK 
managers appear to use share repurchases as a flexible mean to reduce free 
cash flows and/or to fund stock options.  
The aforementioned differences support prior literature which suggests that, 
national differences regarding the development of capital, financial and goods 
markets, as well as regulatory frameworks and corporate governance systems 
are likely to influence corporate behaviour (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et 
al. 1996; Short and Keasey 1999; La Porta et al. 2000; Armour et al. 2002; 
Dhanani 2005; Bennedsen and Nielsen 2010). However, documented 
differences could also be attributed to firm characteristics. For example, for 
the US research we draw on a US sample of non-financial companies included 
in the S&P 500 index, whereas the UK sample draws on non-financial 
companies included in the FTSE All Share Index. Consequently, firms in the US 
sample are on average significantly larger than the firms in the UK sample. 
Even if I would curtail the UK sample to the FTSE 100 index, a noticeable size 
difference between the firms in the two different samples would be 
maintained. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether differences 
between the US and UK results are driven by country specific differences or by 
differences in firm characteristics. This project seems worthwhile, as it will 
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contribute to knowledge by indicating the degree to which different cultural, 
structural or regulatory reasons influence corporate behaviour. This is 
expected to be of importance to regulators and investors especially in the case 
of the interaction between share repurchases and other key financial decisions 
and more specifically investment. US and EU firms have been criticized to use 
share buybacks as a mean to recycle capital and propping up share prices 
instead of investing in CAPEX and promoting growth (FINNOV 2012; Laurent 
2015). As the frequent use of share repurchases might limits funds available 
for investment especially in times of recession this is an important issue for 
regulators and investors. However, if country specific factors do indeed 
influence corporate behaviour then economist concerns that share repurchases 
can be detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment 
(FINNOV, 2012) should not be generalized. Specifically in the UK, due to the 
influence of cultural, structural or regulatory reasons these concerns might be 
alleviated. Furthermore, If differences between the US and UK results stem 
from differences in firm characteristics this is of importance from a 
methodological point of view. More specifically, studies which utilise large 
samples studies, which assume homogeneous corporate behaviour among 
firms. Large samples are likely to include firms with significantly different firm 
characteristics, which in turn are likely to lead to heterogeneous corporate 
behaviour. For example, highly profitable mature firms with low growth 
opportunities versus in their early years whose growth opportunities exceed 
their generated income. 
Finally, the US and UK findings so far indicate that the financial crisis lead UK 
firms to readjust their financial policies. However, the earlier chapters did not 
account for country specific differences. This chapter will investigate the 
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reactions of US and UK firms to the 2007/08 financial crisis while controlling 
for time and country specific factors while aiming to gain more insight into 
their financial decision-making.  
The following sections, 5.2 to 5.4, will begin by discussing country-specific 
differences between the US and the UK in terms of bankruptcy, tax codes and 
corporate governance. Section 5.5 will consider the impact of the financial 
crisis on both countries. Consequently, in section 5.6, comparative descriptive 
statistics will be provided to highlight significant differences in firm 
characteristics between the US and the UK. In addition, I will consider how the 
aforementioned differences are likely to influence the four financial decisions 
under investigation. This will be followed by a description of the chosen 
methodology and the empirical model. Section 5.7 presents and interprets the 
findings. Section 5.8 concludes while 5.9 discusses the limitations of this study 
and suggestions for future research. 
5.2 Regulation 
The US and the UK display noticeable differences regarding the regulatory 
frameworks related to certain financial decisions. More specifically, differences 
in terms of their bankruptcy codes and the regulatory framework for share 
repurchases have been argued to affect capital structure and share repurchase 
decisions respectively (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Rau and Vermaelen 2002). 
5.2.1 Bankruptcy code 
Differences in national bankruptcy codes are expected to affect firms’ capital 
structure (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Acharya et al 2004). In countries with 
creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes a firms’ management will not remain in 
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charge if the firm enters the bankruptcy process while control rights will be 
transferred to debtholders (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Franks and Torous 
1996). This increases the risk not only to shareholders’ rights to the company 
but also to managers’ employment. Therefore, in countries with creditor-
friendly bankruptcy codes a firm’s management will be more careful to avoid 
financial distress. By contrast, in countries with shareholder-friendly 
bankruptcy codes creditor rights are less well protected and managers and 
shareholders have more time to develop plans to change the operational and 
financial structure of firms after the firm has declared bankruptcy, even if this 
at the expense of creditors. Therefore, firms in countries with a creditor-
friendly bankruptcy code are expected to rely less on debt financing than 
firms, which operate in countries with a shareholder-friendly one.  
The US and UK bankruptcy codes are diametrically opposed. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) note that the US provides incentives to keep firms as going 
concerns even if this is harmful to the firms’ creditors, as some firms are worth 
more in liquidation than as a going concern. By contrast, the UK code is rather 
creditor friendly, which increases the risk that firms with cash flow problems 
which fail to pay their interest or redeem the principal on time are liquidated 
quickly, even if there would be realistic options to save the firm without 
expropriating creditors. E.g. in contrast to the UK, in the USA interest and 
principal payments are suspended for at least 120 days after a firm has been 
put into bankruptcy protection, while shareholders have the exclusive right to 
propose a reorganization plan (Acharya et al. 2004). 
Research by Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicates that UK firms exhibit lower 
leverage ratios than their US counterparts. This appears to be in line to the 
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contention that, more creditor friendly bankruptcy laws lead to lower gearing 
ratios (Acharya et al. 2004). However, Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) findings 
have produced mixed evidence on this as other G-7 countries exhibit higher 
leverage ratios than the UK despite also having less equity-friendly codes than 
the US. This suggests that the UK results could be affected by differences in 
other known firm specific capital structure determinants such as size, 
profitability and collateral.  
Acharya et al. (2004) suggest that earlier research does not control for asset 
specificity and that when assets specificity is taken into account results show 
that differences in national bankruptcy codes can affect the capital structure 
choice. Acharya et al. (2004) reason that firms with high asset-specificity, i.e. 
firms with assets, which cannot easily be redeployed by firms outside their 
industry, ceteris paribus will rely less on debt financing due to the 
comparatively low potential liquidation values of their assets in the case of 
bankruptcy. Indeed, findings by Acharya et al. (2004) indicate that firms with 
high (low) asset-specificity, proxied by plant and equipment , tend to carry 
less (more) debt in a creditor-friendly bankruptcy code compared to firms 
operating in countries with equity-friendly bankruptcy codes. However, the 
effect of asset specificity proxied by plant and equipment reported by Acharya 
et al (2004) is similar to the effect of collateral proxied by property plant and 
equipment in earlier research. Empirical research has proxied collateral by 
property plant and equipment and generally supports the contention that 
leverage is positively related with collateral (see Rajan and Zingales 1995, 
Chen 2004, Huang and Song 2006, and Frank and Goyal 2009, Aggarwal and 
Kyaw 2010). According to Frank and Goyal (2009), collateral is one of the 
most significant capital structure determinants. Firms with tangible assets can 
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use them as collateral when a firm is taking on debt, thus reducing debt’s 
agency costs (Jensen, 1976). However, Acharya et al (2004) do not control for 
collateral. In addition, Acharya et al.’s (2004) proxy (i.e plant and equipment) 
can be considered dubious as property plant and equipment and plant 
equipment are likely to be highly collinear and therefore their proxy for asset 
specificity can also be a proxy collateral. 
If bankruptcy codes affect firms’ capital structure, then theoretical 
considerations suggest that they are also likely to affect other financial 
decisions. For instance, Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow theory suggests that 
debt serves as a mechanism to reduce the agency costs of free cash flows. If, 
however, firms in countries with creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes are 
reluctant to pursue high levels of debt funding, they might use high pay-out 
ratios, rather than debt, to deal with the agency costs of free cash-flow. This 
might explain why traditionally UK firms have exhibited higher payout ratios 
and lower leverage than their US counterparts (Dhanani 2005; Rajan and 
Zingales 1995). Moreover, according to McCabe’s (1979) budget constraint 
hypothesis, lower levels of debt financing means that fewer sources of funds 
are available for payouts and investment. Under these conditions, the 
hypothesis suggests a more pronounced negative interdependence between 
uses of funds.  
Consequently, our analysis will examine whether differences between the US 
and the UK in capital structure and its interrelationships with other key 
financial decisions can be attributed to country specific differences (i.e. 
bankruptcy regulation) or whether they are related to sample specific 
differences in firms’ collateral, asset specificity, size and profitability. 
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5.2.2 Regulation of share repurchases 
There are significant differences of the regulatory environments for share 
repurchases in the UK and the US (Kim et al 2005; Scott 2014; Habbart et al 
2014). More specifically, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) point out that the UK has 
stricter regulations that justifies the more frequent use of share repurchases in 
the US. Table 28, summarizes differences in share repurchases regulation 
between the US and the UK.  
A first noticeable difference is that share repurchases authorization is more 
straightforward and less complicated in the US. In the UK, an ordinary 
resolution of shareholders passed in a general meeting is required for 
approval. The resolution will set out a share repurchase authorization, which 
may be general or specific and may be unconditional or subject to specific 
conditions (Scott, 2014). The authority can at most be given for a five-year 
period, but in practice, it is usually limited to one year. In addition, the 
resolution needs to set out explicitly the terms and conditions of the 
repurchases, which as it will be explained briefly, are subject to strict volume, 
price and timing restrictions. By contrast, in the US share buybacks usually 
require only board approval (Dhanani and Roberts 2009, Habbart et al 2014). 
The fact that share repurchases in the US are essentially at the discretion of 
the board of directors means that decisions to repurchase are less complicated 
and can be made on an ad hoc basis. This is likely to allow US firms’ 
management to better coordinate share repurchases with other financial 
decisions. 
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Table 34 A Summary of the share repurchases regulations and restriction for 
share repurchases in the US and the UK 
 United States United Kingdom 
Approval Board of Directors Shareholder meeting 
Timing restriction None  
Price restriction None  
Volume restriction None  
Separate Disclosure None  
Insider Trading None  
Based on Kim et al 2005 
Moreover, compared to the USA, the UK Companies Act 2003 has much 
stricter regulations regarding anti-insider trading rules and disclosure 
requirements, as well as tighter restrictions on the quantity, timing, price 
range of share repurchases regarding quantity, timing, price range (Kim et al 
2005; Scott 2014). As discussed below, these differences have a direct effect 
on a firm’s ability to exploit undervaluation and on firm’s management to 
expropriate selling shareholders (Kim et al 2005, Habbart et al 2014).  
Kim et al (2005) report that in the US, open market share repurchases are 
regulated by Rule 10b-18. Before the enactment of this rule in 1982, share 
repurchases regulation was characterised by considerable uncertainties and 
lack of explicit rules and guidelines. Consequently, repurchasing firms faced an 
increased risk to be charged with price manipulation. The enactment of Rule 
10b-18 provided repurchasing firms with the opportunity for immunity from 
such charges if certain conditions are met. These conditions, also known as 
‘‘safe harbour’’ provisions, relate to the timing, price, volume and manner of 
purchase of the open market share repurchase (see Table 29) 
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Table 35 Rule 10b-18 safe harbour provisions 
Manner of purchase The purchases generally must be made from or through 
only one broker or dealer on any single day. 
Time of purchase The purchases must be made within certain time frames 
during the day. 
Purchase price The price generally must not exceed the highest 
independent bid or the last independent transaction price, 
whichever is higher, quoted or reported in the consolidated 
system at the time the purchase is affected. 
Volume of purchases The volume of shares purchased on any single day must 
not exceed 25% of the average daily trading volume for 
the four calendar weeks preceding the week of the 
purchase; however, once each week the issuer may affect 
one block purchase (in lieu of purchasing under the 25% 
limit) if no other Rule 10b-18 purchases are effected that 
day and the block purchase is not included when 
calculating a security’s four-week average daily trading 
volume. 
Adapted from Habbart et al. (2014, p.6) 
However, compliance with the rule’s conditions is voluntary. Non-compliance 
to these rules alone is not illegal. However, if the repurchasing firm does not 
comply it no longer has safe harbour protection. In addition, the US regulatory 
framework surrounding share repurchases is characterized by the lack of a 
mandatory disclosure requirement. Kim and Varaiya (2003) suggest that this 
can create a conflict of interest between a repurchase firm’s insider 
shareholders and outside shareholders. More specifically, the firm’s insiders 
can sell their shares while the firm is repurchasing its shares at comparatively 
high prices, as the purchasing drives up the share price in the short-term. 
However, outside shareholders, who do not know that that the firm is buying 
back its shares due to the lack of disclosure, might purchase shares as they 
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perceive the share price increase to be related to firm performance rather than 
the firm’s share trading.  
By contrast, in the UK decisions to engage in open market share repurchases 
have to be reported immediately to the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), 
i.e. the UK’s Listing Authority (UKLA). In addition, the FSA has to be informed 
of the completion of the share repurchase as soon as possible about the 
number of equity shares purchased, and the highest and lowest purchase 
prices in a day. These rules are supposed to make shareholders and potential 
investors aware of the firm’s actions and allow them to take more informed 
investment decisions.  
Moreover, the UK has timing restrictions in place to prevent insider trading 
(Rau and Vermaelen 2002) in particularly sensitive periods. The LSE Model 
Code prohibits firms to repurchase shares during “close periods”, which are 
non-trading windows when officers and directors are not allowed to trade in 
their firm's shares. These non-trading windows include the two months before 
the publication of annual or semi-annual earnings and one month before the 
publication of quarterly results. Apart from preventing insider trading, Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) suggest that these regulations make it more difficult for UK 
companies to use open market repurchases to exploit perceived 
undervaluation than their US counterparts.  
In conclusion, the regulatory environment for share repurchases in the UK is 
stricter than that in the USA. While this suggests that share repurchases are 
likely to be less popular in the UK than in the US it might also explain why the 
previous research findings indicate that share repurchases are less integrated 
in financial decision-making in the UK than in the USA. However, the 
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integration of share repurchases into financial decision-making can also be 
related to differences in firm specific characteristics between the two samples. 
Specifically firm size can also affect firms’ share repurchase behaviour. Firms 
in the US sample, drawn from the S&P 500, are expected to be larger than the 
UK firms drawn from the FTSE ALL-SHARE index. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
suggest that the US firms, due to their larger size, will find it easier to obtain 
external financing, particularly during periods of economic uncertainty, as they 
tend to be perceived to be less risky. Therefore, US firms will find it easier to 
fund share repurchases.  
Therefore, our analysis will investigate whether differences between the US 
and the UK in share repurchases and their interrelationships with other key 
financial decisions can be attributed to differences in the regulatory 
environment or to sample specific differences (i.e size). As it will be explained 
later in the methodology section qualitative differences in the share 
repurchases regulation are likely to be picked up by the inclusion of a country 
dummy in the share repurchases regressions. 
5.3 Taxes 
Like bankruptcy rules, differences in taxation are also expected to impact on 
the capital structure decision-making in different countries. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) argue that debt financing has the advantage of interest expenses 
being tax deductible. Survey research in European and US firms reports that 
roughly 50% of firm managers describe the “tax advantage of interest 
deductibility” as an “important or very important” factor affecting capital 
structure (see Graham and Harvey 2001; Bancel and Mittoo 2004; Brounen et 
al. 2005). Corporate income tax regulation in the UK and the USA display clear 
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differences. During 2006-2013 corporate tax rates in the USA remained stable 
at 40% while in the UK tax rates gradually declined from 30% during 2006-08 
to 23% in 2013 (KMPG, 2013). All else equal this differential in the corporate 
tax income gives US firms stronger incentives to opt for high levels of leverage 
to shield their income from the higher tax rate. This is in line with the 
observation by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Acharya et al (2004) which 
indicate that US firms exhibit higher gearing ratios than UK firms.  
Even though taxes appear to have an effect on capital structure, a large 
number of studies do not control for tax-rates (Rajan and Zingales 1995; 
Bevan and Danbolt 2002; Ding and Murinde, 2010). In this study, a tax-rate 
variable will be included in the capital structure equation in order to avoid 
misspecification issues and get a better understanding about whether leverage 
is likely to be affected by unobserved country specific characteristics, or by 
observable issues, such as differences in tax rates. 
As it will be explained in the methodology section, I will incorporate a firm-
specific tax-rate variable in order to control for differences in tax rates 
between the US and the UK. Firm specific tax-rates are affected by differences 
in the tax-regulation so that US and UK firms with otherwise similar 
characteristics in relation to e.g. profitability, size, etc. are likely to face 
different tax rates. 
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5.4 The 2007-08 Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis originating in 2007 was characterized by a severe 
shortage of investment capital and liquidity, which influenced firms’ financial 
decisions in the US and in the UK.  
In early 2007, due to the subprime mortgage crisis, a number of US subprime 
lenders and home building firms announced major losses, leading to some of 
them declaring bankruptcy and (BBC 2008; St Louis Fed 2015 ). As many of 
these firms had sold mortgage-backed securities to other financial institutions, 
this lead to global concerns regarding the stability of the financial sector as 
more and more banks and insurance firms begun to discover subprime 
mortgage backed securities in their portfolios. A few months later, in July 
2007, investment bank Bear Sterns announced to its investors that it was 
halting redemptions on two of its hedge funds. Subsequently, on the 9th of 
August 2007, Investment bank BNP Paribas informed its investors that they 
would not be able to withdraw money from two of its hedge funds due to a 
"complete evaporation of liquidity" in the market. This event soon led 
investors to attempt liquidating assets deposited in highly leveraged financial 
institutions. The resulting crisis of confidence led to banks becoming reluctant 
to lend to other banks in the short-term money markets, keeping interbank 
lending rates persistently high. In the USA a total of 25 banks went bankrupt 
by 2008 and many banks required bailouts to avoid bankruptcy (BBC 2008; 
FDIC 2015). In September 2008, the financial crisis entered a severe stage 
triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
Chapter 5. The integration of share repurchases into US and UK firms financial 
decision-making. Do country specific factors matter? 
214 
 
Concurrently with the US, the UK economy was facing similar issues with 
failing financial institutions. In mid September 2007 the UK bank Northern 
Rock experienced a banking run, sought, and received emergency financial 
support from the Bank of England, which led to its nationalisation. 
Subsequently, a number of other UK banks and building societies were partly 
nationalised, as they required large-scale financial support by the UK 
government in order to avert their bankruptcy (Kingsley, 2012).  
The shortening of banks’ balance sheets due to falling asset values and stricter 
capital requirements lead to a severe decrease in personal and corporate 
credit and a rapid downturn in the housing and construction markets. Firm 
financing became more expensive, while the reduction in consumer spending 
due to the recession had a negative impact on cash inflows and profits. These 
developments severely affected the US and the UK economy as evidenced by 
movements in their stock markets and real GDP growth (Figures 7 and 8). The 
U.S. stock market peaked in October 2007, and then entered into a rapid 
decline until January 2009. The same pattern is present regarding growth in 
real GDP (Figure 8). From Figures 7 and 8 it is evident that the US and the UK 
economies followed a very similar course. 
Both the US and the UK governments employed a range of means to deal with 
the financial crisis, including lowering interest rates, enacting Quantitative 
Easing (QE) programmes and providing bank bailouts. Both central banks 
reduced interest rates to stimulate the economy. In the UK, the base rate was 
cut from 5.5% in 2007 to 0.5% in 2009. Similarly, in the US the FED rate was 
reduced from 5.25% in 2007 to 0.25% in 2008. In addition, both countries 
implemented Quantitative Easing (QE) programmes to stimulate the economy. 
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Between November 2008 and October 2014, the Federal Reserve engaged in 
three rounds of QE to stimulate the US economy. As part of its QE policy, the 
Federal Reserve accumulated 4.5 trillion dollars in assets during this period 
(Hilsenrath, 2014). At a rather smaller scale, the Bank of England purchased 
375 billion pounds of assets between March 2009 and July 2012 (Bank of 
England, 2014).  
Falling demand, difficulties accessing external finance and generating income 
as well as the lack of investment opportunities are all expected to have a 
direct impact on firms’ key financial decisions investigated in this study, 
namely decisions about investment, capital structure, share repurchases and 
dividends. I expect the impact of the financial crisis on companies in the US 
and the UK to differ because of their different institutional and economic 
environments and the different scales of government interventions.  
However, some of the differences regarding the impact of the financial crisis 
on firms’ decision-making I found in the first two empirical chapters could be 
due to differences in firm specific characteristics, in particular firm size. While 
the US sample consists of non-financial S&P 500 companies, the UK sample 
consists of non-financial companies included in the FTSE ALL-SHARE index. 
Due to their larger size, US firms are likely to find it easier to raise external 
funds, particularly during periods of economic uncertainty, as they tend to be 
perceived to be less risky (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). On the contrary, UK 
firms by having comparatively less access to external funds might be forced to 
marginalise share repurchases in order to reduce their financing needs. Thus, 
the differences between the US and the UK regarding the factors affecting 
financial decision-making before and after the financial crisis I found in the 
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first two empirical projects, might reflect size differences, rather than country-
specific differences. 
Moreover, the approval for share repurchases in the US is less complicated 
and can more easily be made on an ad hoc basis than in the UK. Thus, it is 
possible that US managers were in a better position to utilise share 
repurchases in a flexible manner in the period after the financial crisis, which 
was characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. This might have made it 
easier for US managers to integrate share repurchases systematically into 
their financial decision-making than for UK managers. 
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Figure 7 Monthly figures for S&P 500 and FTSE ALL SHARE INDEX between 2004 - 2012 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance (2015), S&P 500 and FTSE ALL SHARE INDEX available at finance.yahoo.com 
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Figure 8 USA-UK real GDP growth 
 
Source: OECD (2015) Gross Domestic Product available at stats.oecd.org
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5.5 Summary 
The section reviewed the US and the UK market in terms of their regulatory 
framework, taxes and ownership structure. It seems that there are significant 
differences regarding the bankruptcy code, the share repurchases framework, 
taxation and dividend policy of these two countries. Such differences are likely 
to influence corporate behaviour and may be the cause of differences 
regarding the integration of share repurchases into financial decision-making 
indicated in the first two chapters. More specifically in the first chapter the 
findings show interdependence between share repurchases, investment and 
dividends suggesting that share repurchases have become an essential 
consideration when managers take financial decisions in large US firms. By 
contrast, the UK findings do not show interdependence between dividends and 
share repurchases and an incosistent interaction between share repurchases 
and investment suggesting that in the UK share repurchases are used as a 
complementary form of payout and not as a substitute. Our analysis should 
therefore take into account country differences regarding the institutional and 
economic environment and test if these influence financial decision-making in 
the two countries. Moreover, our review has shown that the financial crisis 
originating in 2007-8 may have had a different impact in these two countries 
due to differences in firm size stemming from sample choice and 
characteristics. Consequently, our analysis should also consider differences in 
macroeconomic conditions between the pre and post crisis periods. Finally, 
potential differences in firm characteristics due to differences in firm size 
should be accounted for. Summarizing, our analysis suggest to merge the US 
and UK samples from both the pre and post crisis periods and use firm-specific 
variables to take account of firm-specific differences as well as country and 
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time variables (i.e dummy variables) to take into account country and time 
period differences. 
In the following section I will present the methodology followed to investigate 
if the documented differences between the findings in chapters 3 and 4 are 
driven by differences in the institutional and economic environment or 
differences in the firm-specific characteristics. 
5.6 Sample specific differences  
5.6 Comparative analysis of the sample data 
As mentioned earlier, US firms are drawn from the S&P 500 index whereas the 
UK ones from the UK-all share index. Therefore, due to sample choice, US 
firms are larger than the UK ones. These differences in size and other firm 
characteristics might explain to some degree documented differences between 
the cross-country regression results. Table 30 shows that that the firms in the 
US sample are significantly larger than the firms in the UK sample are if size is 
proxied by total assets. The average US firm in the sample is approximately 
three times larger than the respective UK one. Both distributions regarding 
size are skewed and more specifically right-tailed as the median is smaller 
than the average. Looking at the median, which might be a more appropriate 
measure regarding the aforementioned skewness, I observe that the median 
US firm is almost 9 times larger than the respective UK one. 
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Table 36 Total Assets per year 2005-11 (΄000$) 
US 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
2005 271 15,600,000 28,000,000 163,890 265,000,000 6,750,000 
2006 272 17,200,000 30,700,000 303,371 275,000,000 7,450,000 
2007 272 18,600,000 32,300,000 334,357 276,000,000 8,400,000 
2008 272 18,500,000 30,100,000 474,154 226,000,000 7,900,00 
2009 272 19,800,000 32,500,000 592,093 231,000,000 8,400,000 
2010 272 21,400,000 34,800,000 857,468 299,000,000 8,800,000 
2011 272 23,200,000 37,800,000 1,290,883 327,000,000 9,500,000 
UK 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
2005 214 5,103,887 18,600,000 21,377 159,000,000 695,000 
2006 214 5,060,269 17,500,000 40,350 152,000,000 755,000 
2007 214 5,559,947 18,300,000 49,685 161,000,000 825,000 
2008 214 7,100,892 24,200,000 48,108 229,000,000 1,055,000 
2009 214 7,277,439 24,400,000 55,788 214,000,000 1,000,000 
2010 214 7,953,793 27,261,443 63,020 243,989,470 1,129,776 
2011 214 8,323,945 28,652,160 68,599 263,157,720 1,186,875 
 Difference in means: Diff= mean(US) - mean(UK), Ho≠0 
2005 10,500,000*** 
2006 12,200,000*** 
2007 13,000,000*** 
2008 11,400,000*** 
2009 12,500,000*** 
2010 13,400,000*** 
2011 14,900,000*** 
 
Additional differences between the US and UK firms can be observed regarding 
other variables. Table 31 provides descriptive statistics for key variables 
related to the US and UK sample as well as differences in means testing. 
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Table 37 Comparative descriptive statistics between the UK and the US sample 
2005-2008 UK US Diff= mean(UK)- mean(US), HO Diff=0 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Difference in means 
DIV 214 0.422 0.275 272 0.212 0.198 0.210 *** 
REP 214 0.188 0.266 272 0.713 0.538 -0.525 *** 
INV 214 0.047 0.033 272 0.060 0.046 -0.013 *** 
LEV 214 0.218 0.137 272 0.207 0.137 0.011   
ROA 214 0.141 0.068 272 0.170 0.071 -0.029 *** 
DEPR 214 0.038 0.020 272 0.039 0.018 -0.002   
COLTRL 214 0.251 0.204 272 0.262 0.203 -0.011   
RETURN 214 -0.030 0.072 272 0.001 0.053 -0.031 *** 
OPTION 214 0.273 0.254 272 0.553 0.499 -0.279 *** 
CASH 214 0.110 0.086 272 0.141 0.128 -0.031 *** 
FCF 214 0.101 0.058 272 0.132 0.052 0.031 *** 
SIZE 214 5.912 0.675 272 6.875 0.499 -0.963 *** 
GROWTH 214 0.046 0.048 272 0.050 0.040 -0.003   
SLIQ 214 1.370 0.842 272 2.356 1.320 -0.985 *** 
ZSCORE 214 1.890 0.827 272 2.216 1.060 -0.325 *** 
BETA 214 0.943 0.489 272 1.126 0.472 -0.184 *** 
TAX 214 0.293 0.105 272 0.323 0.090 -0.03 *** 
2008-2011 UK US Difference in means 
DIV 214 0.426 0.244 272 0.206 0.020 0.007 *** 
REP 214 0.100 0.139 272 0.564 0.538 -0.460 *** 
INV 214 0.039 0.030 272 0.048 0.035 -0.009 *** 
LEV 214 0.209 0.139 272 0.226 0.183 -0.017   
ROA 214 0.129 0.070 272 0.161 0.070 -0.032 *** 
DEPR 214 0.039 0.021 272 0.040 0.018 -0.001   
COLTRL 214 0.246 0.209 272 0.259 0.213 -0.012   
RETURN 214 0.001 0.070 272 0.002 0.044 -0.001   
OPTION 214 0.242 0.206 272 0.557 0.485 -0.315 *** 
CASH 214 0.106 0.082 272 0.154 0.125 -0.049 *** 
FCF 214 0.102 0.053 272 0.065 0.051 0.037 *** 
SIZE 214 5.991 0.677 272 6.947 0.486 -0.956 *** 
GROWTH 214 0.046 0.048 272 0.025 0.030 0.021   
SLIQ 214 0.860 0.505 272 3.344 1.557 -2.484 *** 
ZSCORE 214 1.822 0.814 272 2.193 1.038 -0.370 *** 
BETA 214 0.943 0.489 272 1.126 0.472 -0.184 *** 
TAX 214 0.278 0.06 272 0.318 0.04 -0.04 *** 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets, DIV: Common cash dividends 
scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before 
Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: 
EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – 
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logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI 
year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options 
expense to total assets. TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100 
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The average UK firm appears to have higher dividend higher payouts (DIV) 
than its US counterpart does. This confirms both earlier and recent 
observations regarding higher dividend payouts in the UK when compared to 
other developed economies (Bond et al. 1996; Griffiths and Wall 2007; Cook 
2014). This culture of comparatively high and consistent dividends in UK might 
be related to a traditionally high level of investment by domestic and foreign 
institutional investors (see Bond et al. 1996; Allen and Michaely 2003; Griffiths 
and Wall 2007; Cook 2014). The difference in means regarding dividend 
payout is one of the most noticeable amongst all variables. More specifically, 
average dividend payouts in the UK sample appear to be twice as high as in 
the US sample.  
Another striking difference is related to share repurchases. US firms in the 
sample appear to have almost six times higher share repurchases payouts. 
The fact that UK firms in the sample seem to distribute relatively less via share 
repurchases is in line with the contentions by Rau and Vermaelen (2002). The 
difference regarding the use of share repurchase between samples might be 
attributed to the UK stricter share repurchases regulatory framework. 
However, the difference might partially be explained by differences in the 
values of the stock options (OPTIONS) and share liquidity (SLIQ) variables 
between the two country samples. The US sample firms seem to make greater 
use of stock options (two times higher) as a form of employee and executive 
compensation. Moreover, the liquidity of shares from the US sample (SLIQ) is 
much higher than that of the UK sample. Both the use of stock options and 
share liquidity have previously been found to positively affect share 
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repurchases in a number of studies (see Fenn and Liang 1999; Kahle 2000; 
Bens et al. 2003; Brockman et al. 2008; De Cesari 2011). 
Regarding capital structure, there is no statistically significant difference 
between UK and US firms. However, statistically significant is the difference 
regarding investment. The investment variable is 1% higher in the US in both 
periods. In addition, the average UK firm in our sample appears to be riskier in 
terms of bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE), has lower cash holdings (CASH), is less 
profitable (ROA), has less Free Cash Flows (FCF) and generates fewer returns 
(RETURN)28. However, UK firms in our sample are less risky in terms of 
systematic risk (BETA). Finally, as expected, on average UK firm face a lower 
tax rate (TAX). There are no statistically significant differences in terms of 
growth opportunities (GROWTH), depreciation (DEPRC) and collateral 
(COLTRL), between US and UK firms. 
Table 32 shows the percentage changes for each variable between 2005-8 and 
2008-11. Quite noticeable is that subsequent to the financial crisis, UK firms in 
our sample drastically reduced their share repurchase payout ratio (on 
average by 46.81%), whereas the respective decrease for US firms was less 
than half this amount (20.90%). Another difference is that dividend payout 
ratios of UK increased on average by 1%, whereas US firms on average 
reduced them by almost 3%. The aforementioned differences between the US 
and the UK firms in the sample regarding dividends and share repurchases 
suggest that UK managers marginalize share repurchases over dividend 
payments. This is in accordance to the UK findings from Chapter 4 indicating 
that in the UK share repurchases are used as a complementary form of payout 
                                       
28 The difference in returns (RETURN) is only statistically significant in 2005-08. 
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and not as a substitute, which can be drastically reduced in times of economic 
uncertainty. Another difference between the two countries concerns 
profitability. UK firms exhibit a larger decrease in profitability, (-8.51%) versus 
(-5.29%) in the US. This has implications for the interpretation of changes in 
payout ratios. Profitability (ROA) is calculated as EBITDA to Total Assets. 
Therefore, a decrease in ROA indicates a decrease in Net Income. Net Income 
serves as the denominator in the share repurchases and dividend variables. 
Therefore, all else equal, the greater decrease in the share repurchase ratio 
documented in the UK becomes even more profound considering a 
comparatively higher decrease in the denominator. Finally, we observe that in 
the post crisis period average US firm increased their leverage by 9.18%, 
while UK firms on average reduced their leverage by 4.13%. This might be 
related to firm size as the relatively larger US firms might have had easier 
access to debt financing during the crisis.  
In summary, as the comparative analysis of the US and UK samples indicates, 
there are indeed significant differences in terms of firm specific characteristics 
and in particular firm size, free cash flows and stock liquidity. Such 
characteristics have been identified, by ours as well as previous research( see 
Rajan and Zingales 1995;Dittmar 2000; Kahle 2000; Bens et al. 2003; Frank 
and Goyal 2009; Dhanani and Roberts 2009), as important financial decision 
determinants and are likely to explain to some degree differences in between 
US and UK financial decision-making.  
Moreover, the financial crisis seems to have had a differential impact on UK 
firms as they, in contrast to US firms, appear to have decreased their 
leverage. This might be associated to their smaller size and thus having 
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relatively more difficulties to raise external financing. In addition, UK firms in 
the sample exhibit a larger decrease in share repurchases payout ratios in the 
post crisis period. This decrease might be associated with the decrease in 
leverage as UK firms were not able to fund share repurchases via debt 
financing. Overall, the pre and post crisis comparative results suggest that I 
should take into account the time period factor into our analysis. The following 
section will incorporate and control for these differences into the empirical 
analysis. This will enable us to test the influence of time and country specific 
factors as well as firm-level characteristics on financial decision-making and 
indicate if they are indeed the cause of differences between the US and UK 
results. 
Table 38 Percentage changes (%) for each variable per country between 
2005-08 and 2008-11 
 
Variables 
𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏(𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏) − 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏(𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖)
𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏(𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖)
 
 
UK US 
DIV 0.95% -2.83% 
REP -46.81% -20.90% 
INV -17.02% -20.00% 
LEV -4.13% 9.18% 
ROA -8.51% -5.29% 
DEPR 2.63% 2.56% 
COLTRL -1.99% -1.15% 
RETURN -103.33% 100.00% 
OPTION -11.36% 0.72% 
CASH -3.64% 9.22% 
FCF 0.99% 8.33% 
SIZE 1.34% 1.05% 
GROWTH 0.00% -50.00% 
SLIQ -37.23% 41.94% 
ZSCORE -3.60% -1.04% 
BETA 0.00% 0.00% 
TAX -5.12% -1.55% 
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5.7 Methodology  
This research so far has provided evidence of interdependence in financial 
decision-making in both the US and the UK. In addition, financial decisions in 
both countries seem to be driven by the same determinants. However, the 
findings show noticeable differences between the two countries regarding the 
integration of share repurchases into firms’ financial decision-making. In the 
UK, in contrast to the US, I do not find evidence of dividend substitution. In 
addition, the negative interaction between investment and share repurchases, 
consistent in both periods in the US, holds only in the pre crisis period (2005-
08) for UK firms. 
Our aim is to investigate whether differences between UK and US financial 
decision-making can be attributed to institutional differences or differences in 
firm characteristics. Therefore I need to test and control for the influence of 
differences due to country specific factors, time period and firm level 
characteristics in US and UK financial decision-making. In order to do so I 
construct a combined sample of the S&P 500 index and the FTSE ALL-SHARE 
index from both 2005-8 and 2008-11. By combining the observations from the 
US and UK samples I will be able to add appropriate country and time dummy 
variables as well as control variables for various firm level determinants. The 
dummy variables will be able to control for all unaccounted country and time 
specific differences. Therefore, I will be able to identify the presence and 
influence of differences in financial decision-making between the US and the 
UK. 
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5.7.1 The empirical model 
Taking into consideration the above in order to meet our objectives I formulate 
the following system of equations, consisting of one equation for each financial 
decision under investigation. For every company i, each financial decision is a 
function of the remaining ones, plus a vector of exogenous control variables 
including firm specific determinants related to the specific financial decision, a 
country dummy, and a time period dummy.  
As explained earlier I will use a combined country (US-UK) and time period 
(2005-08, 2008-11) sample. The literature review has identified a number of 
qualitative differences between the two countries (i.e. regulatory environment, 
culture). In addition, the financial crisis is expected to have a different impact 
in the two countries. Therefore, the use of dummy variables is suggested in 
order to control for qualitative differences between the two countries and 
periods (Gujarati, 2004). 
More specifically, in order to test for potential differences in capital structure 
related decision-making I add a country dummy in the capital structure 
regression. The country dummy will be included to control for all unobserved 
time invariant country specific factors, which may affect capital structure. As 
previously discussed, such factors are expected to be of particular importance 
as specifically in the case of bankruptcy regulation. Differences in national 
bankruptcy codes are expected to affect firms’ capital structure (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Acharya et al 2004). Therefore, the dummy variable in the 
capital structure regression will point out if there are significant differences in 
the capital structures of the two countries and will indicate their influence after 
controlling for firm specific characteristics.  
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As previously discussed, another key difference is related to taxation. 
Differences in taxation is also expected to impact on the capital structure 
decision-making in different countries since Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue 
that debt financing has the advantage of interest expenses being tax 
deductible. This is possible to consider at firm level with the inclusion of a firm 
specific tax rate variable. 
Concerning the share repurchases equation, since I also expect country 
specific factors to impact on managers’ preference for or ability to use share 
repurchases I also include a dummy variable in the share repurchases 
regression. The country dummy will be included to control for time invariant 
country specific factors, which affect the share repurchase decision such as the 
regulatory framework. It will allow us to test if there are differences and 
observe their influence in the use of share repurchases between the two 
countries, after controlling for firm specific characteristics. 
UK firms traditionally exhibit relatively higher dividend payouts (see Bond et 
al. 1996; Allen and Michaely 2003; Griffiths and Wall 2007; Cook 2014). This 
suggests a culture of comparatively higher dividend payouts ,which should be 
accounted for in the dividend regression. In order to test and control for this, I 
include a country dummy variable in the dividend regression. 
Finally, in the investment equation I include a country dummy variable which 
aims to test and highlight any differences between US and UK firm investment. 
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Thus, I arrive at the following system of equations, 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓1(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1𝑖) + 𝜀1𝑖 (1) 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓2(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2𝑖) + 𝜀2𝑖 (2) 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖 = 𝑓3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3𝑖) + 𝜀3𝑖 (3) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓4(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4𝑖) + 𝜀4𝑖  (4) 
where ε1i , ε2i, ε3i, ε4i are stochastic zero mean error terms. 
The dependent variables LEV, DIV, REP and INV represent Leverage, 
Dividends, Share Repurchases and Investment respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4i are the respective vectors of exogenous 
control variables for each dependent variable. The control variables included in 
each vector have been identified based on relevant theories and prior 
empirical research as discussed in chapter 2.2. Therefore, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1i, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2i, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3i and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4i include the same variables29 as described in Chapter 
3.x.  
Substituting each of the vectors (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠1, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠2, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠4) 
with the abovementioned variables I arrive at the following system of 
equations30: 
                                       
29 For a detailed discussion regarding proxy selection see chapter 3.x. As previously 
discussed, theoretical considerations and prior empirical evidence suggests that the 
same variables are relevant both for the US and the UK context. 
30 As part of sensitivity testing we controlled for industry effects by re-estimating my 
system of equations including industry dummies in every equation. We did not observe 
any change in the direction of the relationships under investigation, however there were 
changes in statistical significance. Since in many cases the industry dummies were 
insignificant their inclusion most probably increased the coefficients' variance and thus 
affected their statistical significance. 
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(1) LEVi = α0+ α1DIVi + α2REPi+ α3INVi + α4ROAi+ α5SIZEi+ α6GROWTHi+ 
α7FCFi+α8COLTRLi+α9ZSCOREi+α10TAX+α11Cdummy+α12Tdummy+ ε1  
(2) DIVi = β0 + β1LEVi+ β2REPi+ β3INVi+ β4ROAi+ β5SIZEi+ β6GROWTHi+ 
β7FCFi+ β8BETAi + α9Cdummy+α10Tdummy+ε2  
(3) REPi= γ0 + γ1LEV+ γ2DIVi+ γ3INVi+ γ4SIZEi+ γ5GROWTHi+ γ6FCFi+ 
γ7OPTIONSi+γ8RETURNi+γ9SLIQi+γ10CASHi+α11Cdummy+α12Tdummy+ ε3 
(4) INV = δ0 + δ1LEVi+ δ2DIVi+ δ3REPi+ δ4ROAi+ δ5SIZEi+ δ6GROWTHi+ 
δ7DEPRCi+ α8Cdummy+α9Tdummy+ε4 
5.7.2 Sample and Data  
The initial samples of US S&P 500 and UK ALL-SHARE index firms consist of 
272 and 214 firms respectively. By combining  these observations across both 
2005-08 and 2008-11, I arrive at 972 observations.  
Following the US and UK based literature regarding capital structure and 
payout research I use the proxies31 mentioned in Table 33. 
Since both the US and UK results suggest interdependence in financial 
decision-making I follow the same estimation techniques as in Chapters 3 and 
4. More specifically, beyond the traditional OLS, I utilises 2SLS and 3SLS 
which are expected to deal with endogeneity issues. 
OLS, 2SL and 3SLS estimations are based on the assumption that data follow 
a normal distribution. In order to test this I employ three normality tests 
(Table 34). The first two, the skewness test and the kurtosis test, test the 
skewness and kurtosis of our data against those of a normal distribution. The 
third combines these two tests in an overall test statistic similar to the Jarque-
                                       
31 For a detailed discussion regarding proxy selection see chapter 3.3.4 
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Bera test for normality. Table 34 shows that our data are not normally 
distributed. I winsorize32 the data at the conventional 5% as the data is 
subject to outliers. This will deal with potential outliers by smoothing the tails 
of the distribution. The winsorized sample, which has a distribution that is 
closer to the normal distribution, will be used for the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimation.  
In addition, I use two alternative non-parametric estimation techniques, 
median regression and regression with bootstrapped standard errors. The 
skewness test has shown that the distribution of our data is skewed. In such 
cases, the mean is not appropriate for interpretation whereas the median 
remains highly informative. Therefore, Hao and Naiman (2007) suggest the 
median-regression over conditional-mean regression modelling as OLS, 2SLS 
and 3LS. 
In addition, I utilise regression analysis with bootstrapped standard errors. 
This method does not require distributional assumptions such as the residuals 
to be normally distributed. Instead of assuming a normal distribution, this 
estimation technique resamples the regression’s residuals so it can calculate 
approximately their underlying distribution. Guan (2003) and Fox (2008) 
suggest that this estimation method can give more accurate inferences than 
Least Squares estimations in the presence of non-normality. Non-parametric 
estimations deal with the non-normality of our data, however they do not deal 
with the endogeneity expected to be present in our system of equations. 
In order to consider whether our model suffer from multicollinearity problems, 
                                       
32 Regression results from the winsorized data have produced more statistically 
significant variables and higher R-squares compared results from to the non-winsorized 
data confirming the distortion from outliers. 
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I calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable. Tables 46-49 
presents the VIF factors for each variable for every regression  in the model. 
Results do not suggest multicollinearity problems. Gujarati (2004) notes that if 
a variable has a VIF factor greater than 10 the variable may merit further 
investigation. As in the sample, VIF factors range from 1.10 to 3.35, I consider 
that multicollinearity does not present a problem in this case. 
In order to establish the validity of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations I employ 
two instrument validity tests. Instrumental variables need to satisfy two 
conditions to be considered valid. First, as the instrumental variable will 
replace the endogenous regressor in the regression, they need to be relevant. 
This means that the variation of the instrumental variable is related to the 
variation of the endogenous regressor (Gujarati 2004; Stock and Watson 
2011). Secondly, instruments need to be exogenous. This means that the 
instrumental variable should not correlate to the error term of the regression 
where the endogenous regressor is included.  
I use the Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak identification. Low values of the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (i.e lower than 10) indicate weak instruments 
(Stock and Yogo 2005).The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (Table 36) ranges 
from 1.41 in the share repurchases regression to 5.55 in the leverage 
indicating weak instruments. This indicates that the instruments are weak. 
Woolridge (2006) reports that in the presence of weak instruments 2SLS and 
3SLS can produce poorer results than OLS as the relevant estimators can have 
large standard errors and large asymptotic bias. I use the Sargan statistic to 
test for instrument exogeneity. The null hypothesis is that all instruments are 
exogenous i.e. the instrumental variables do not correlate with to the error 
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term of the regression where the endogenous regressors are included. If the 
computed chi-square exceeds the critical chi-square value, I reject the null 
hypothesis, which means that at least one instrument is correlated with the 
error term and therefore the estimates based on the chosen instruments are 
not valid. Table 40 shows that only in the leverage (LEV) and share 
repurchases (REP) regressions instruments are exogenous. However, as 
reported earlier, in these regressions instruments have been found to be 
weak. Therefore the 2SLS and 3SLS results should be treated with caution 
because, as Woolridge (2006) explains, invalid instruments can produce worse 
results than OLS, as the relevant 2SLS and 3SLS estimators can have large 
standard errors and large asymptotic bias.  
However, Gujarati (2004) states that in practice it is not easy to find 
instruments, which satisfy both the conditions of instrument relevance and 
instrument exogeneity. The problem of weak instruments is quite common in 
studies, which utilise simultaneous equation techniques. In most cases 
instrument validity test are not reported (see Jensen et al. 1992; Noronha et 
al. 1996; Adedeji 1998; Crutchley et al. 1999; Ding and Murinde 2010, 
Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). In addition, a number of the aforementioned seem 
to suffer from weak instruments as indicated by their regression results. A 
typical example is in Jensen (1992) where the variable fixed assets, serving as 
an instrument for leverage, is not statistically significant in the leverage 
equation. Similar issues are present in most of the aforementioned studies. 
Nevertheless, instrument validity is not often tested. This might be due to the 
difficulty of finding valid instruments underlined by Gujarati (2004). Therefore, 
due to the presence of weak instruments I also consider results from OLS 
estimations. In addition, non-parametric estimations are employed to check 
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the robustness of the results. Non-parametric estimations, do no deal with 
endogeneity issues, however, they deal with non-normality and thus are likely 
more valid than OLS. 
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Table 39 Definition of variables combined US/UK sample 
Variable name Variable 
acronym 
Description 
Leverage LEV Sum of long term debt plus short term debt 
scaled by by net income after preferred 
dividends33 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
DIV Common cash dividends scaled by net income 
after preferred dividends34  
Share repurchase REP Share repurchase expenditure scaled by net 
income after preferred dividends  
Investment INV Capital expenditure scaled by total assets 
Profitability ROA Return on assets measured as EBITDA scaled by 
total assets 
Cash balance CASH Cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets 
Free cash flow FCF Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets 
Firm risk BETA Firm's market beta 
Collateral COLTRL Assets that can be used as collateral measured 
as net property, plant and equipment scaled by 
total assets 
Bankruptcy risk ZSCORE Altman’s Z score calculated as  
Z = 1.2
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 1.4
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 
3.3
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 0.6
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 + 
.999
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Firm size SIZE Logarithm of sales 
Growth 
opportunities 
GROWTH Sales Growth calculated as logSALESt – 
logSALESt-1 
Depreciation DEPRC Depreciation scaled by total assets 
   
Total stock return RETURN Stock's return calculated as the Log RIt+1 - 
LogRIt, where RI is the stock's return index from 
Datastream. 
The return index presents the theoretical growth 
in value of a theoretical stock holding. This 
holding is deemed to return a daily dividend, 
which is used to purchase new units of the stock 
at the current price. The gross dividend is used. 
RI on the base date =100, then: RIt = RIt-1*(Pit/ 
PIt-1)*(1+D*N-1), Where: RIt= return index on 
day t, RIt-1= return index on previous day, PIt= 
price index on day t, PIt-1 = price index on 
previous day, D= dividend yield % on day t, N = 
number of working days in the year (taken to be 
260).  
Tax Rate Acronym (Income Taxes / Pre-tax Income * 100) 
Country Dummy  Cdummy Dummy variable, takes the value of 1 if UK firm, 
zero otherwise 
Time period dummy Tdummy Dummy variable, takes the value of 1 for the 
2008-11 period, zero otherwise 
                                       
33Negative net income observations are removed from the sample to ensure sensible 
payout observations. 
34Negative net income observations are removed from the sample to ensure sensible 
payout observations. 
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Table 40 Normality tests-  combined US/UK sample 
 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets, DIV: Common 
cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock repurchases 
to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: 
capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, 
BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, 
ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth 
(logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's 
return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return 
index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets. TAX: Income 
taxes divided by pretax income *100 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Joint Test Prob>chi2 
DIV 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEPR 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INV 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COLTRL 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEV 972 0.000 0.000 0.002 
REP 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RETURN 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OPTION 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CASH 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FCF 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 972 0.011 0.009 0.000 
GROWTH 972 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
SLIQ 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ZSCORE 972 0.000 0.001 0.000 
BETA 972 0.001 0.000 0.000 
TAX 972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5.8 Findings and analysis 
5.8.1 Non-parametric estimations  
Tables 37 and 39 report the non-parametric estimation results.  
Both the median and the bootstrapping regression show that, while controlling 
for firm-level characteristics, both the country and the time dummy are 
statistically significant in the share repurchases equation. More specifically, the 
country dummy is statistically significant and negative indicating that, all else 
equal, the average UK firm has a lower share repurchases payout ratio than 
the average US firm. This seems in line with the contention of Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) that the stricter UK regulatory environment can lead to the 
lower use of share repurchases as a distribution method. In addition, the time 
period dummy is statistically significant and negative suggesting that in the 
post crisis period US and UK firms decreased their share repurchase payout 
ratios. This might relate to scarce funding opportunities and decreased cash 
flows prevalent in the post crisis period. Moreover, the non-parametric 
estimations regarding the share repurchase regression show that dividends 
and investment have a negative effect on share repurchases while leverage 
has a positive one. These results are in line with the Budget Constraint 
Hypothesis of McCabe (1979) and closely resemble the US results from 
Chapter 3; however, they differ from the UK findings in Chapter 4. In the UK 
results identified a positive impact of dividends on share repurchases. This 
difference can be attributed to the fact that in the combined US-UK sample the 
country and time period dummies captured differences in institutional factors 
and macroeconomic conditions, which were not accounted for in the individual 
country estimations. In the first two chapters, the individual country and split 
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period samples (2005-08 and 2008-11), did not allow us to control either for 
country specific differences (e.g the stricter share repurchases regulatory 
framework and bankruptcy code in the UK, the culture of higher dividend 
payouts in the UK) nor for the effect of different market conditions (scarce 
investment and funding opportunities in the post crisis period). 
In the dividend regression, non-parametric estimations show that the time 
period dummy is insignificant. This highlights the inflexible nature of dividend 
payouts. It seems that UK and US managers tried to maintain their dividend 
payout ratios throughout the financial crisis. The country dummy in the 
dividend regression is statistically significant and positive. This shows that 
ceteris paribus UK firms have higher dividend payout ratios than their US 
counterparts. This is in line with a number of previous studies (see Bond et al. 
1996; Griffiths and Wall 2007; Cook 2014). It has previously been argued, 
that the traditionally high level of investment by domestic and foreign 
institutional investors in the UK stock market has lead to a culture of 
comparatively high and consistent dividends in listed firms (see Bond et al. 
1996; Allen and Michaely 2003; Griffiths and Wall 2007; Cook 2014). For 
example, pension funds and insurance companies are holding on average 40% 
- 50% of UK equities for the 1994 - 2000 period. However, domestic pension 
funds have been moving out of the UK equity market after 2002, (FT, 2012 a, 
b). Nevertheless, dividend payout ratios remained high (Griffiths and Wall 
2007; Cook 2014). This might be attributed to the reluctance of managers to 
reduce dividends (see Allen and Michaely, 2003). Moreover, both the median 
and bootstrapping estimations for the dividend regression show that share 
repurchases and investment have a negative effect on dividends while 
leverage a positive one. This is in accordance with the Budget Constraint 
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Theory of McCabe (1979) where dividends are identified as a use of funds 
which competes with other uses of funds (i.e investment and share 
repurchases) and are positively affected by access to funds, such as debt (i.e. 
leverage). The aforementioned results regarding the combined US-UK sample 
dividend regression resemble the US results from Chapter 3, which suggest a 
negative interaction between dividends, share repurchases and investment. 
However, the UK findings in Chapter 4 do not suggest an effect of share 
repurchases on dividends. The significance of the country dummy in the 
combined US-UK  sample dividend regression suggests that the reason for this 
difference is the culture of higher dividend payouts in the UK, which has not 
been accounted for in the UK sample estimations.  
In the investment regression, non-parametric estimations show that the time 
period dummy is statistically significant and negative. Most likely, in the post-
crisis period, US and UK firms decreased their capital expenditures due to 
scarce investment and funding opportunities. The country dummy is negative, 
but only statistically significant in the bootstrapping regression. This indicates 
that the average UK firm, all else equal, invests less than its US counterpart. 
Furthermore, the non-parametric estimations indicate that dividends and share 
repurchases have a negative effect on investment, in line with the Budget 
Constraint Theory of McCabe (1979). Dividends have a negative effect on 
investment in both the US and UK individual sample estimations. However, 
investment seems to be consistently, affected only by share repurchases in the 
US estimations and not in the UK ones. This difference can be attributed to the 
fact that the combined US-UK sample estimations allowed us to take into 
account the changes in economic conditions regarding the pre and post crisis 
environment. The inclusion of the time dummy in the combined US-UK sample 
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estimations was able to capture and account for qualitative differences such as 
the severe shortage of investment capital and liquidity in the post crisis period, 
which are likely to influence financial decision-making. Firms’ capital structure 
does not seem to influence investment. It seems that, US and UK firms do not 
lever up to fund investment opportunities. 
With regard to firms’ capital structure, the time dummy in the leverage 
regression indicates that there are not any statistically significant differences 
in leverage ratios between the pre and post crisis period when firm 
characteristics are accounted for. However, the country dummy is statistically 
significant and positive indicating that UK firms, all else equal, have a higher 
leverage. This is surprising given that the UK has a stricter bankruptcy code 
than the US. The UK code is quite creditor friendly, which increases the risk 
that firms facing cash flow problems will not be able to meet their interest 
payment obligations and will be liquidated quickly. Therefore, UK firms should 
carry less debt ceteris paribus. However, it seems that the stricter UK 
bankruptcy code does not have a significant impact on the capital structure 
choice. Dividends seem to have a positive effect on leverage in line with the 
Pecking Order Theory and the Budget Constraint Theory. The Pecking Order 
Theory suggests that in the long term high payout ratios will lead to higher 
leverage since firms with high dividend payout ratios have lower retained 
earnings and therefore will need to rely more on debt to fund investment 
opportunities. According to McCabe (1979), a higher use of funds as payouts 
and investment would lead to a higher need for sources of funds as debt 
financing). However, the debt-financing variable used in this study (debt to 
total assets) has its limitations. It does not specifically cover additional debt 
financing to which the Budget Constraint Theory actually refers to. 
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Nevertheless, frequent use of additional debt financing would lead to higher 
leverage ratios in the long term, ceteris paribus. Share repurchases do not 
seem to have an effect on leverage ratios. However, investment seems to 
have a negative effect on leverage. Overall, this suggests that, US and UK 
firms tend to funds for investment opportunities by reducing share 
repurchases and dividends instead of levering up. 
Regarding the exogenous control variables, for each financial decision, non-
parametric estimations for the combined US-UK sample resemble results from 
the individual country sample estimations. This suggests that financial 
decision-making in both countries is influenced by the same factors. 
In the share repurchase regression, as far the control variables the concerned, 
both non-parametric estimations (median and bootstrapped standard errors 
regressions) show a positive and statistically significant effect of free cash 
flows (FCF) on share repurchases. This is line to Free Cash Flow theory, which 
suggests that share repurchases can be used as a mechanism to reduce the 
agency costs free cash flows. Likewise, supporting the option-funding 
hypothesis of Kahle (2000), the coefficient on stock options (OPTIONS) is 
consistently positive and statistically significant. Firm size (SIZE) seems to 
have a positive effect on share repurchases but is only statistically significant 
in the median regression. Dittmar (2000) reports similar results. Dittmar 
(2000) argues that, if size relates to information asymmetries then larger 
firms are also likely to be misvalued and use share repurchases to take 
advantage of possible undervaluation. The stock return variable is negative but 
statistically significant only in the bootstrapping estimation. If a company is 
undervalued, it will most likely exhibit a history of low returns. The stock 
return variable was used as a proxy for undervaluation as (Dittmar 2000) 
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argues that if a company is undervalued, it will most likely exhibit a history of 
low returns (Dittmar 2000). Therefore, the negative effect of the stock return 
variable indicates that firms with a history of poor returns repurchase their 
shares to exploit and or signal their undervaluation. The coefficient of growth 
opportunities (GROWTH) is negative in both non-parametric estimations; 
however, it is statistically significant only in the median regression. According 
to Rozeff (1982) and Crutchley et al. (1999), firms with growth opportunities 
are expected to retain earnings instead of distributing them in order to avoid 
the costs of external financing. The stock liquidity variable (SLIQ) is negative 
and statistically significant in the median regression. This is in line with De 
Cesari (2001) who suggests that firms’ attempt to enhance the liquidity of 
their shares by engaging in increased trading in their own shares via share 
repurchases. Cash holdings (CASH) do not appear to have an effect on share 
repurchases. 
In the dividend regression, both non-parametric estimations show a negative 
effect of growth opportunities (GROWTH) on dividends. This suggests that, as 
in the case of share repurchases, growing firms which require financing for 
their increasing working capital requirements tend to obtain funds by reducing 
alternative expenditures (i.e dividend and share repurchases) and avoid the 
costs of external financing. Profitability (ROA) has a positive effect on 
dividends as predicted by the Pecking Order Theory. It seems that dividends 
are not used as a mechanism to reduce agency costs of free cash flows as the 
free cash flows (FCF) variable has a negative effect on dividends. Firm size 
(SIZE) has a positive and statistically significant effect only in the median 
regression indicating that larger firms have higher payout ratios. The 
coefficient on firm’s systematic risk (BETA) is negative in both non-parametric 
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estimations however; it is statistically significant only in the median 
regression. This is in line with Rozeff (1992) who argues that more risky firms 
are expected to pay lower dividends in order to reduce the probability of 
requiring costly external finance. 
In the leverage regression, both non-parametric estimations identify 
profitability (ROA), bankruptcy risk (ZSCORE), collateral (COLTRL) and firm 
size (SIZE) as capital structure determinants. The respective coefficients of the 
aforementioned variables are signed in accordance to the Trade Off theory. 
Profitability, size and collateral have a positive effect on leverage, while 
bankruptcy risk a negative one. However, surprisingly, the tax rate (TAX) is 
not statistically significantly related to leverage. The growth opportunities 
(GROWTH) variable is statistically insignificant. 
Finally, in the investment equation the coefficients on profitability (ROA), 
growth opportunities (GROWTH), size (SIZE) and depreciation (DEPRC) are 
positive as expected and statistically significant. The positive coefficient of the 
profitability variable is in line with McCabe (1979) who argues that sources of 
funds (earnings) have a positive effect on uses of funds (investment). The 
positive effect of depreciation on investment is also in line with McCabe (1979) 
who supports that depreciation identifies cash flows, which can be used to 
fund investment. However, the positive effect of depreciation on investment is 
predicted by Abel and Eberly (2012), who argue that, as the depreciation rate 
reflects the users’ cost of capital, investment is a linear function of the 
depreciation rate. The positive effect of the firm size (SIZE) variable on 
investment suggests that larger firms invest more. Finally, the positive effect 
of the growth variable (GROWTH) indicates that firms invest more in the 
presence of growth opportunities. 
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5.8.2 Parametric estimations 
Tables 38 and 40, present parametric estimation’ results (OLS, 2SLS and 
3SLS). The parametric estimations have produced the following similar results 
to the non-parametric estimations.  
In the share repurchases regression, both non-parametric and parametric 
estimations indicate that both the country dummy and the time dummy have a 
negative effect on share repurchases. Moreover, the effect of dividends, 
investment and capital structure on share repurchases is consistently 
negative. In addition, as far control variables are concerned, both parametric 
and non-parametric estimations confirm free cash flows, options, growth 
opportunities and firm size as important share repurchases determinants. 
In the dividend regression, parametric estimations confirm the positive effect 
of the country dummy and that share repurchases and investment, have a 
negative effect on dividends. No discrepancies are observed between the 
parametric and non-parametric estimations regarding the control variables in 
the dividend regressions. In addition, parametric estimations confirm the 
negative effect of growth opportunities (GROWTH), systematic risk (BETA) and 
free cash flows (FCF) and the positive effect of profitability (ROA) and firm size 
(SIZE).  
In the investment regression, both parametric and non-parametric estimations 
show that the time period dummy and the country dummy are statistically 
significant and negative. Moreover, investment appears to be negatively 
influenced by dividends and share repurchases and positively by leverage. 
Regarding control variables parametric estimations confirm that investment is 
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positively affected by profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE) and depreciation 
(DEPRC). 
In the leverage regression parametric and non-parametric estimations show 
the time dummy is generally statistically insignificant. In addition, dividends 
have a positive effect on leverage. Regarding control variables, parametric 
estimations show that leverage is affected negatively by bankruptcy risk 
(ZSCORE) and positively by collateral (COLTRL) and firm size (SIZE).  
Although the non-parametric and parametric estimations are quite similar, a 
few discrepancies can be observed.  
In the dividend regression, OLS and 2SLS, similar to the non-parametric 
estimations show that the time period dummy is statistically insignificant. 
However, the 3SLS estimation shows that the time dummy is negative and 
statistically significant. However, in this case I draw conclusions from the OLS, 
and the non-parametric estimations, since the instruments are weak and 3SLS 
estimations are known to magnify any misspecification bias in the system.  
In the leverage regression estimations are not conclusive regarding the effect 
of the country dummy. The OLS estimation shows that the country dummy is 
positive and statistically significant. This is in line with the non-parametric 
estimations. However, the country dummy is statistically significant and 
negative in both 2SLS and 3SLS. However, as mentioned earlier 2SLS and 
3SLS suffer from weak instruments and therefore their results should be 
treated with caution. Share repurchases do not seem to have an effect on 
leverage ratios according to OLS and 2SLS however they do have a positive 
effect according to 3SLS. In this case we consider OLS and non-parametric 
estimations to be more valid due to the weak instrument problem. Moreover, 
as in the case of the non-parametric estimations, OLS shows that investment 
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has a negative effect on leverage. 2SLS do not show a statistically significant 
effect of investment on leverage while 3SLS shows a positive one. This 
discrepancy can be attributed to the presence of weak instruments. There are 
some differences between non-parametric and parametric estimations 
regarding the effect of growth opportunities (GROWTH), profitability (ROA) 
and free cash flows (FCF). The coefficient, on growth opportunities is 
insignificant in the non-parametric estimations, negative in OLS and positive in 
2SLS and 3SLS. Profitability (ROA) has a positive effect on leverage in non-
parametric estimations and OLS, an insignificant effect in 2SLS and a negative 
one in 3SLS. Finally, the coefficient FCF is negative in non-parametric 
estimations and OLS, and insignificant in 2SLS and 3SLS. Regarding the 
aforementioned difference, we believe the non-parametric estimations to be 
comparatively more valid considering the presence of weak instruments in the 
2SLS and 3SLS estimations and the non-normality of our data.  
In the share repurchases regression, OLS and 3SLS estimations, in contrast to 
non-parametric estimations, indicate that cash holdings (CASH) have a 
negative impact on share repurchases a positive and statistically significant 
effect of free cash flows (FCF) on share repurchases. However, since 3SLS 
suffers from weak instrument problems and OLS does not account for non-
normality in our data this relationship might be biased.  
Finally, in the investment equation OLS as both non-parametric estimations 
suggest a positive effect of growth opportunities (GROWTH) on investment. In 
contrast, 2SLS and 3SLS suggest a negative one. Again, we believe the non-
parametric estimations to be more valid.  
It seems that the presence of weak instruments in the instrumental variables 
estimations has caused a few discrepancies between the non-parametric and 
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parametric estimations. Therefore, considering the weak instrument issue we 
believe the non-parametric results to be more valid. However, non-parametric 
estimations do not deal with the endogeneity in financial decision-making, 
which our results indicate. Therefore, in the cases that non-parametric and 
parametric estimations have produced similar results then these are likely to 
be valid. In the few cases that estimation methods produced different results 
these should be treated with caution. 
Summarizing, the results indicate that, there are significant differences in 
financial decision-making between the UK and the US. We identify that country 
specific factors lead to differences in the dividend, share repurchases and 
capital structure decision. More specifically, the UK institutional and economic 
environment appears influence firms’ decision-making so that UK firms tend to 
engage less in share repurchases, have higher dividend payout ratios and 
higher leverage ratios. The negative significance of the country dummy may 
be attributed to the stricter, in terms of share repurchases approval, timing, 
price, volume and disclosure requirements, regulatory framework in the UK as 
supported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002). UK firms also appear to maintain 
higher payout ratios than their US counterparts as indicated by the positive 
significance of the country dummy in the dividend regression. This might be 
attributed to a culture of high dividend payouts in the UK (see Bond et al. 
1996; Griffiths and Wall 2007; Cook 2014). In addition, managers might be 
reluctant to cut dividends as empirical evidence show that markets do not 
welcome dividend reductions and that these are followed by share price 
reductions (see Allen and Michaely 2003. The positive effect of the country 
dummy in the capital structure is unexpected considering the stricter 
bankruptcy code in the UK. Therefore, differences in country specific factors 
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and macroeconomic conditions seem to affect the integration of share 
repurchases in financial decision-making and explain discrepancies between 
the findings from Chapter 3 (US) and Chapter 4 (UK). 
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Table 41 Non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Dependent variables, combined US/UK sample 
 Median Bootstrapping 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
INV  -0.95*** -1.14*** -0.96***  -0.98*** -1.43*** -0.73*** 
DIV -0.01***  -0.06*** 0.05* -0.01**  -0.05 0.05* 
REP -0.01*** -0.03**  0.01 -0.02** -0.03  0.01 
LEV 0.01 0.21*** 0.16***  0.01 0.30* 0.18***  
 No. 
observations 
972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
 *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively  
LEV: long term debt to total assets (book values), DIV: dividend payout (Common Dividends (Cash) to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - 
Preferred Dividend Requirement), REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital 
expenditures to total assets,  
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Table 42 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Dependent variables, combined US/UK sample 
 
Dependent Variables 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 INV  -1.11*** -1.66**** -0.78***  -1.04*** -0.91*** -0.84  -2.65*** -2.52*** 1.50*** 
DIV -0.02***  -0.08* 0.07*** -0.24***  -0.46** 0.69*** -0.34***  -0.07 1.00*** 
REP -0.02*** -0.03*  0.01 -0.10*** -0.11  0.01 -0.12*** -0.33***  0.23*** 
LEV 0.01** 0.20*** 0.17**  0.12*** 0.34*** 0.30  0.05*** 0.79*** 0.48***  
 No. observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively  
LEV: long term debt to total assets (book values), DIV: dividend payout (Common Dividends (Cash) to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - 
Preferred Dividend Requirement), REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital 
expenditures to total assets 
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Table 43 Non-parametric (median and bootstrapping) estimation results - Control variables, combined US/UK sample 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets, DIV: Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income 
before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales 
 Median Bootstrapping 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 0.08*** -1.16*** -0.90*** 0.07 0.13*** -1.45** -1.01 -0.06 
SIZE 
0.01*** 0.02** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.05*** 
ROA 
0.05*** 
1.10*** 
 0.26* 0.06*** 
1.09*** 
 0.28* 
FCF  -1.02*** 1.60*** -0.55***  -1.52*** 1.67*** -0.47*** 
COLTLR    0.28***    0.21*** 
ZSCORE    -0.05***    -0.04*** 
BETA  -0.06***    -0.01   
OPTIONS   0.14***    0.135***  
RETURN   -0.11    -0.47**  
CASH   -0.04    -0.06  
SLIQ    -0.02***    -0.01  
DEPRC 0.94***    0.82***    
TAX    -0.01    0.01 
Cdummy -0.01 0.23*** -0.47*** 0.07*** -0.02*** 0.25*** -0.55*** 0.03** 
Tdummy -0.01*** 0.01 -0.09*** -0.01 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.19*** 0.01 
constant -0.03*** -0.01 0.25** -0.14 -0.05*** 0.32*** 0.67*** -0.06 
 no. observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
 R-squared 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.21 0.35 
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growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return index from Datastream, 
OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets. TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100, Tdummy: 1 for 2008-11 zero otherwise, Cdummy: 1 for UK firm, zero otherwise 
 
 
Table  44 Summary of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regression statistics - Control variables, combined US/UK sample 
 Dependent variables 
 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV INV DIV REP LEV 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
GROWTH 
0.09*** -1.84*** 
-
2.57*** 
-
0.32*** 
-
0.53*** 
-
1.98*** 
-
3.34*** 
0.92** 
-
0.75*** 
-
2.21*** 
-
2.53*** 
1.95*** 
SIZE 
0.01*** 0.03*** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.01* 0.02* 0.04** 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
ROA 
0.09*** 1.16***  0.37*** 
0.31*** 1.10***  -0.35 0.47*** 1.34***  -
1.10*** 
FCF 
 -1.05*** 2.02*** 
-
0.43*** 
 -0.72** 2.03*** 0.30  -0.07 2.41*** 0.07 
COLTLR 
   
0.19***    0.26***    0.11** 
ZSCORE 
   
-
0.06*** 
   -
0.05*** 
   -
0.02*** 
BETA 
 -0.03**    -0.03*    -0.01   
OPTIONS 
  0.25***    0.25***    0.18***  
RETURN 
  -0.16    -0.20    0.22*  
CASH 
  -0.30**    -0.24    -0.18**  
SLIQ  
  -0.01    -0.02    0.02**  
DEPRC 
1.02***    0.83***    0.21***    
TAX 
   -0.05    -0.05    -0.02 
Cdummy -
0.01*** 
0.245*** 
-
0.44*** 
0.04*** -0.01 0.19*** 
-
0.18*** 
-0.14** -0.02** 0.05 
-
0.45*** 
-0.09** 
Tdummy -
0.01*** 
-0.01 
-
0.18*** 
-0.01 
-
0.05*** 
-0.02 
-
0.38*** 
-0.01 
-
0.02*** 
-
0.06*** 
-
0.20*** 
0.04*** 
constant 
-0.02** -0.01 0.38*** -0.05 -0.04* 0.10 0.42*** -0.01 0.07*** 0.23*** 0.41*** -0.17** 
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LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets, DIV: Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, 
REP: Stock repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: 
EBITDA to total assets, FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, 
COLTRL: net property, plant and equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – 
logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI is the stock's return 
index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total assets.TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100, Tdummy: 1 for 2008-11 
zero otherwise, Cdummy: 1 for UK firm, zero otherwise 
No. 
observations 
972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
R-squared 0.48 0.33 0.29 0.46 - - - - - - - - 
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Table 45 Instrumental variables overidentification and weak identification test- 
combined US/UK sample 
* The null hypothesis for the overidentification test is that instruments are valid  
* As a rule of thumb Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics below 10 indicate weak 
instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005) 
Table 46 Share repurchases regression VIF factors 
Variable VIF 
Cdummy 2.98 
OPTION 2.29 
CASH 2.13 
FCF 1.88 
SLIQ 1.83 
SIZE 1.81 
GROWTH 1.5 
DIV 1.41 
RETURN 1.32 
LEV 1.3 
Tdummy 1.16 
INV 1.13 
Mean VIF 1.73 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets, TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100, Tdummy: 1 for 2008-11 
zero otherwise, Cdummy: 1 for UK firm, zero otherwise 
 
 Overidentification test for all 
instruments -Sargan statistic (p-
values) 
Weak identification test - Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 
REP 0.42 1.41 
DIV 0.00 5.23 
INV 0.00 4.77 
LEV 0.29 5.55 
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Table 47 Investment regression VIF factors 
Variable VIF 
Cdummy 2.28 
SIZE 1.74 
REP 1.51 
GROWTH 1.42 
DIV 1.4 
ROA 1.36 
LEV 1.16 
DEPR 1.15 
Tdummy 1.12 
Mean VIF 1.46 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets, TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100, Tdummy: 1 for 2008-11 
zero otherwise, Cdummy: 1 for UK firm, zero otherwise 
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Table 48 Dividend regression VIF factors 
Variable VIF 
Cdummy 2.82 
FCF 2.51 
ROA 2.33 
REP 1.76 
SIZE 1.73 
INV 1.36 
GROWTH 1.35 
Tdummy 1.18 
LEV 1.16 
BETA 1.1 
Mean VIF 1.73 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets, TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100, Tdummy: 1 for 2008-11 
zero otherwise, Cdummy: 1 for UK firm, zero otherwise 
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Table 49 Leverage regression VIF factors 
Variable VIF 
ROA 3.35 
Cdummy 3.29 
INV 3.03 
FCF 2.72 
COLTRL 2.68 
SIZE 1.78 
REP 1.77 
ZSCORE 1.7 
GROWTH 1.49 
DIV 1.46 
Tdummy 1.19 
TAX 1.1 
Mean VIF 2.13 
LEV: Sum of long term debt plus short term debt scaled by total assets., DIV: 
Common cash dividends scaled by net income after preferred dividends, REP: Stock 
repurchases to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividend 
Requirement), INV: capital expenditures to total assets, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, 
FCF: cash flow from operations scaled by total assets, CASH: cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, BETA: stock’s beta, COLTRL: net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets, ZSCORE: Altman’s Z score, SIZE: logarithm of sales, 
GROWTH: sales growth (logSALESt – logSALESt-1), DEPRC: depreciation to total 
assets, RETURN: stock's return calculated as the Log RI year1 -LogRI year0, where RI 
is the stock's return index from Datastream, OPTIONS: Stock options expense to total 
assets, TAX: Income taxes divided by pretax income *100, Tdummy: 1 for 2008-11 
zero otherwise, Cdummy: 1 for UK firm, zero otherwise 
 
Regarding the control variables in the share repurchases, dividend, capital 
structure and investment regressions the combined US-UK  sample 
estimations resemble those obtained from the individual country sample 
estimations. Therefore, our findings confirm that the influence of firm specific 
characteristics does not differ between the US and the UK. Share repurchases 
are positively influenced by free cash flows and stock options while negatively 
by growth opportunities. These results are in line with the Free Cash Flow 
theory and the option-funding hypothesis (see Kahle 2000). The findings 
regarding dividend determinants support the Free Cash Flow theory and the 
Pecking Order Theory as free cash flows, profitability and growth opportunities 
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affect accordingly on dividends. The main determinants regarding capital 
structure seem to be bankruptcy risk, profitability and collateral, which are 
signed according to the Trade-Off Theory. Finally, profitability and depreciation 
confirm the importance of financial constraints and the impact of the 
depreciation rate on the investment decision. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter’s objective was to investigate whether differences between the 
US-UK results are driven by country specific differences or by differences in 
firm characteristics. This study used a combined US-UK firm sample and 
included country and time dummies in its modelling. Thus, we were able to 
test the degree to which differences in financial decision-making between the 
US and the UK are driven by the firm-specific characteristics of the firms in the 
two samples and to which degree they are driven by differences in the 
institutional and economic environment in the two countries. 
This chapter contributes to our understanding of how national differences in 
the development of capital and financial markets as well as regulatory 
frameworks are likely to influence corporate behaviour. I have employed a 
number of parametric and non-parametric estimations to investigate this and 
deal with interdependence in financial decision-making as well as non-
normality in our data. The use of the instrumental variable approach (2SLS 
and 3SLS) is prone to weak instrument issues present in similar studies in the 
finance literature (see Noronha et al. 1996; Adedeji 1998; Crutchley et al. 
1999; Ding and Murinde 2010). As our instrumental variables appear to be 
weak in every equation and hence may perform poorly (see Gujarati 2004; 
Stock and Yogo 2005) we based our conclusions on our non-parametric 
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estimations. Nevertheless, we did not observe significant discrepancies 
between different estimation methods, which suggest that our findings are 
robust. 
Our findings show that there are significant differences, between the UK and 
the US as far as the share repurchases, dividends and capital structure 
decisions are concerned. Specifically, the combined US-UK sample share 
repurchase regressions have shown that while controlling for firm specific 
characteristics, country specific factors lead to a lower use of share 
repurchases in the UK negative effect possibly due to the stricter regulatory 
framework as supported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002). Moreover, the 
combined US-UK sample dividend regressions indicate that UK firms, all else 
equal, seem to try to maintain higher dividend payout ratios than their US 
counterparts. This might be attributed to a culture of high dividend payouts in 
the UK as well as the reluctance of managers to reduce these (see Bond et al. 
1996; Allen and Michaely 2003; Griffiths and Wall 2007; Cook 2014). Finally, 
the UK environment seems to have a positive effect in the capital structure 
despite the stricter bankruptcy code in the UK. This might be associated to the 
historically higher UK dividend payout ratios, which in the long term might 
have lead to increased debt financing needs in order to be maintained. It 
seems that differences in country specific factors can affect the integration of 
share repurchases in financial decision-making and explain discrepancies 
between findings from Chapter 3 (US) and Chapter 4 (UK). Moreover, the 
significance of the time dummy in the investment and share repurchases 
conditions suggests that differences in the macroeconomic conditions can 
affect financial decision-making and in turn can explain differences between 
the US and UK findings.  
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Regarding share repurchases, dividend, capital structure and investment 
determinants, I observe no disparities between results from the combined US-
UK sample estimations and those from the individual country sample 
estimations. Free cash flows and stock options have a positive impact on share 
repurchases while growth opportunities a negative one. These results are in 
line with the Free Cash Flow theory and the option-funding hypothesis (see 
Kahle 2000). Free cash flows, profitability and growth opportunities influence 
dividends in line with Free Cash Flow theory and the Pecking Order Theory. 
Capital structure is mainly driven by bankruptcy risk, profitability and 
collateral. Their impact on capital structure is in line with the Trade-Off 
Theory. Finally, profitability and depreciation positively affect the investment 
decision underlining the importance of financial constraints and the impact of 
the depreciation rate. 
In general, the combined US-UK sample estimations support prior literature 
which suggests that, national differences in terms of regulatory frameworks, 
corporate governance and the development of financial markets can affect 
corporate decision-making (e.g. Bennedsen and Nielsen 2010, La Porta et al., 
2000). Such differences seem to explain dissimilarities between the US and 
the UK in terms of the integration of share repurchases into financial decision-
making. Our findings are expected to be of importance to investors and 
regulators as they show that, without considering country specific factors, it is 
not feasible to generalise economist concerns that share repurchases can be 
detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment (FINNOV, 
2012) and for leading to the excessive leverage of companies (Foroohar 
2013).  
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In addition, the comparative analysis of the US and UK samples indicates, that 
there are indeed significant differences in terms of firm specific characteristics 
and in particular firm size, free cash flows and stock liquidity. Such 
characteristics have been identified, by this as well as previous research( see 
Rajan and Zingales 1995;Dittmar 2000; Kahle 2000; Bens et al. 2003; Frank 
and Goyal 2009; Dhanani and Roberts 2009), as important financial decision 
determinants and are likely to explain to some degree differences between US 
and UK financial decision-making.  
6. Conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future 
research 
6.1 Conclusion 
This study investigated the interactions between share repurchases and key 
financial decisions namely investment, dividends and leverage in US and UK 
firms. Its objective was to explore whether share repurchases are integrated 
into US and UK firms’ financial decision-making or whether they are merely an 
afterthought and therefore not systematically related to managers’ principal 
financial decisions. The primary motive for this study was to address concerns 
that in the US and the UK market share repurchases can be detrimental to 
firms’ ability to create value through investment (FINNOV, 2012) and can lead 
to the excessive leverage of companies (Foroohar, 2013).  
This study contributed to our understanding of financial decision-making in a 
number of ways. In the US, the documented robust interdependence, for both 
the pre and post crisis periods, between uses of funds namely, share 
repurchases, dividends and investment suggest that share repurchases are 
accounted for when other financial policies are set. Specifically the findings 
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provide empirical support to the dividend substitution hypothesis and to 
concerns that share repurchases can undermine productive investment. In the 
UK, where share repurchases are also well established, the results indicate 
that share repurchases are less consistently integrated in firms’ financial 
decision making.  
Considering the different findings the question arose, whether they are driven 
by different institutional contexts or, possibly, by differences in the sample 
characteristics, since the size of S&P 500 companies tends to much larger than 
that of FTSE All Share Index companies. The closer investigation of the US-UK 
differences suggests that, country specific factors do indeed influence 
corporate behaviour, which supports the contentions of Bennedsen and Nielsen 
(2010) and La Porta et al. (2000). 
This study has also addressed methodological concerns regarding earlier 
research into financial decision-making. We have seen in the literature review 
that the phenomenon of share repurchases has raised concerns regarding their 
effect on other financial decision especially concerning investment, dividends 
and leverage. In addition, extant theories and empirical research suggest a 
joint investigation of the aforementioned financial decisions. However, this 
suggestion has been mostly ignored by earlier research, where each financial 
decisions have been investigated in isolation, thus leading to misspecification 
and endogeneity concerns. In order to deal with these concerns, this study 
investigated share repurchases, dividends, investment and leverage within a 
simultaneous equation framework estimated by two-stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) and three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) (Gujarati, 2004). Since 2SLS 
and 3SLS estimations suffer from weak instrument problems, this study also 
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used non-parametric estimations, namely median regressions and regressions 
with bootstrapped standard errors, to check the robustness and validity of its 
findings. Non-parametric estimations, also help to address normality issues in 
financial data usually ignored in earlier research. 
The first chapter of this thesis investigated the interactions between share 
repurchases and dividends, investment and leverage in the US market. As 
share repurchases are especially prevalent in the USA, both in terms of 
magnitude and frequency (Dittmar 2008, Floyd et al. 2013), it was expected 
that US firms are particularly likely to integrate share repurchase programs 
systematically into their financial decision-making. Indeed, this research 
indicates that both in the period before and after the credit crunch key 
financial decisions about share repurchases, dividends and investment were 
interrelated. Specifically, our findings show a robust negative relationship 
between share repurchases and investment. This suggests that US managers 
consider share repurchases as an important alternative to investment when 
they set their corporate policies. This finding appears to provide empirical 
support to concerns that share repurchases might undermine productive 
investment (Lazonick 2008; FINNOV 2012). However, the fact that growth 
opportunities relate consistently and negatively to share repurchases mitigates 
these concerns to some extent. The US findings further indicate a negative 
interaction between dividends and investment, confirming earlier evidence by 
McCabe (1979) and Adedeji (1998). This result, combined with the 
aforementioned negative interaction between investment and share 
repurchases, supports McCabe's (1979) Budget Constraint Hypothesis, which 
suggests that payout policies and investment are competing uses of funds. In 
addition, in line with previous literature (Grullon and Michaely 2002; Jiang et 
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al. 2013; Kulchania 2013), the findings show a robust negative association 
between share repurchases and dividends, indicating dividend substitution. 
In order to check if our US findings can be generalized to other markets we 
extended our study to the UK, where share repurchases are also fairly well 
established. In addition, the US and the UK display differences in terms of the 
legal and institutional environment, thus making the UK the ideal setting to 
further our study. Our results suggest differences between the US and the UK 
regarding the integration of share repurchases into firms’ financial decision-
making. More specifically, the UK findings do not show a consistent interaction 
between share repurchases and investment. In addition, the UK findings 
suggest that share repurchases are used as a complementary form of payout 
and not as a substitute. In general, the UK findings suggest that share 
repurchases are not systematically related to managers’ other principal 
financial decisions.  
Chapter 5 sought to explore if the differences between the US and UK findings 
can be attributed to country specific differences or to firms specific 
characteristics. The findings support the contention that national differences in 
terms of regulatory frameworks, corporate governance and the development 
of financial markets can affect corporate decision-making (e.g. Bennedsen and 
Nielsen 2010, La Porta et al. 2000). Our findings indicate that the UK 
environment leads to a lower use of share repurchases in the UK, possibly due 
to the stricter regulatory framework as supported by Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002). Moreover, UK firms seem to try to maintain higher dividend payout 
ratios than their US counterparts, possibly due to a culture of high dividend 
payouts. Such differences seem to explain differences between the US and the 
UK in terms of the integration of share repurchases into financial decision-
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making. Therefore, without considering country specific factors, it is not 
feasible to generalise economists’ concerns that share repurchases can be 
detrimental to firms’ ability to create value through investment (FINNOV, 
2012) and for leading to the excessive leverage of companies (Foroohar 
2013). 
Overall, our findings have implications for policymakers, shareholders and 
future research. The documented negative interaction between share 
repurchases and investment is of particular interest to policymakers and 
shareholders as it supports economists’ concerns that share repurchases might 
undermine productive investment (see Laurent 2015; FINNOV 2012). In 
addition, our findings provide empirical support to the contention that national 
differences in institutional settings, including the regulatory environment, may 
influence corporate behaviour (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bond et al., 1996; 
Short and Keasey 1999; La Porta et al., 2000 Armour et al. 2002; Dhanani 
2005; Bennedsen & Nielsen 2010). This is of particular importance to 
policymakers as our findings show that the non-integration of share 
repurchases into UK financial making and therefore their inconsistent 
interaction with investment might be related to the stricter UK regulatory 
framework. Therefore, in the US where concerns regarding the negative 
impact of share repurchases on investment are substantiated, regulatory 
authorities might consider a stricter regulatory framework regarding share 
repurchases. From a methodological point of view, our findings regarding the 
strong interdependence between both forms of payout and investment lend 
support to McCabe’s (1979) contention that corporate financial decision-
making should be investigated using simultaneous equation techniques.  
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6.2 Potential limitations of the current and suggestions for 
future research 
This study employed both parametric and non-parametric estimations to 
investigate financial decision-making in the US and the UK. The 2SLS and 
3SLS estimations were used to deal with the expected interdependence in 
financial decision-making suggested by extant theories and empirical evidence. 
Indeed, our findings confirm this expectation. In the US, the findings suggest 
interdependence between uses of funds, namely share repurchases, 
investment and dividends. In the UK, we document interdependence between 
dividends and investment; and between share repurchases and investment in 
the pre crisis period (2005-08). Although 2SLS and 3SLS are expected to deal 
with endogeneity, their efficiency is questioned in the presence of weak 
instruments. The relevant tests have shown that, in both country samples (US, 
UK )and for both periods (2005-08, 2008-11) all of the equations suffer from 
weak instruments, although we chose them based on prior literature and 
theoretical considerations. This raises concerns regarding the reliability of the 
results as 2SLS and 3SLS estimators can perform poorly when weak 
instruments are used (Gujarati 2004; Stock and Yogo 2005). Specifically, as 
Woolridge (2006) explains, invalid instruments can produce worse results than 
OLS, as the relevant 2SLS and 3SLS estimators can have large standard errors 
and large asymptotic bias. Thus, in our case OLS results are considered to be 
more valid than 2SLS and 3SLS. However, OLS estimations require a normal 
distribution of the data which is not the case with our sample. Our non-
parametric estimations are expected to deal with non-normality issues. 
Therefore, we draw conclusions from the non-parametric estimations (median 
regressions and regressions with bootstrapped standard errors). Although 
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these estimators deal with the non-normality of the data, they do not deal 
with endogeneity expected to be present in our system of simultaneous 
equations. Therefore, a suggestion for further research is to identify 
appropriate instruments for principal financial decisions such as share 
repurchases, dividends, investment and capital structure. This seems to be an 
issue with earlier studies and appears to remain unresolved. As the majority of 
earlier research has looked into each financial decision in isolation (Faulkender 
et al 2006; Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010) a surprisingly small percentage of 
studies have employed the use of simulation equation estimations (see Jensen 
et al. 1992; Noronha et al. 1996; Adedeji 1998; Crutchley et al. 1999; Ding 
and Murinde 2010, Aggarwal and Kyaw 2010). However, given the results of 
instrument testing on our samples, we expect that these studies are also likely 
to have suffered from weak instrument problems. Therefore, the identification 
of appropriate instruments is of particular importance in order to increase the 
validity of estimations and inferences.  
Caution must also be used in the interpretation of dummy variable results. 
Chapter 5 sought to explore if the differences between the US and UK findings 
can be attributed to country specific differences such as institutional factors, 
culture and regulatory environment. In order to do so this study utulised dummy 
variables to control for qualitative differences between the two countries. 
However, one must be careful in interpreting these differences. The dummy 
variables will simply point out the differences, if they exist, but they cannot 
identify specifically the cause of these differences i.e institutional factors. The 
identification of quantitative variables  to control for such country specific factors 
may assist in disentangling separate influences (e.g institutional factors, cultural 
factors, bankruptcy code) on financial decision making.’’ 
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